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Time Bending: Temporal Malleability and Organizational Response in Crisis Situations  
Gary W. Carson 
ABSTRACT 
 
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 created a crisis of epic proportions for the airline 
industry. The attacks, on the heels of the first financial losses in four years, threatened the 
existence of many airlines. It was incumbent on the CEO to make sense and offer a plan 
to control the crisis and move forward. There were fewer audiences more attentive to this 
senemaking activity than the stockholders. On the cusp of the organization, shareholder 
management is a central job of CEOs in the 21st century. This study focuses on CEO 
presentations to shareholders for American, Delta and Frontier Airlines before during and 
after the events of 9/11. Using Close Textual Analysis as configured by Michael Leff, the 
time focused rhetorical analysis is extended to include slices of time. How CEOs use 
experienced time and interpreted time to gain stockholder confidence, control the crisis 
and create a shared vision of the future is the goal of this project. A longitudinal study 
across the years of 2001-2003, this dissertation considers how the organizational, 
leadership and personal goals of each of these airlines and their leaders are met through 
rhetorical configurations of time. 
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
 
This dissertation centers on a series of historical events and their consequences for 
the airline transportation industry from the perspective of rhetorical and organizational 
communication. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, when four commercial 
airliners beginning transcontinental flights were hijacked in a coordinated, simultaneous 
action and flown into targets in the United States, created unprecedented responses and 
consequences. These effects cascaded through the economy and the American psyche. 
The fallout threatened the existence of many airline companies. 
The focus of this dissertation is how leaders in the airline industry construct time 
to achieve their organizational and personal goals in response to the terrorist attacks. 
Contending for the survival of their organizations, leadership is often defined through the 
lens of how a crisis is handled (Ogrizek, Guillery, Kimball-Brooke, Brooke, 1999). In a 
letter to her 13 year old son (who would later become President) Abigail Adams noted ―It 
is not in the still calm of life, or in the repose of a pacific station, that great characters are 
formed. The habits of a vigorous mind are formed in contending with difficulties. Great 
necessities call out great virtues‖ (Adams, Adams, McCullough, 2002, p. 253).  
The exigencies created by the events of 9/11 for the airline industry called forth 
organizational responses on many different levels to many different constituencies. As 
the leader of an organization in crisis, the Chief Executive Officer is the ―face‖ of the 
organization (Ogrizek, et al. 1999). Taking into account both internal and external 
audiences, the CEO takes on the dual role of formulating responses and communicating 
decisions.  Through decision making and persuasive activity, the CEO shapes the actions 
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of the organization, the perceptions of its stakeholders, and the organization‘s interaction 
with the external environment. This dissertation addresses the leadership response to one 
particular constituency that exists at the cusp of the internal-external boundary of the 
company; the stockholders. As such, this investigation will deal with the rhetorical 
activity of United States airline leaders in presentations to shareholders over the three 
year period immediately preceding and following the 9/11 attacks.  
In the midst of crisis, CEOs are charged with a visionary role. They stand at the 
nexus of the past and present, making sense of the former to enact the latter. Utilizing 
their representational authority, they speak for the organization and for themselves as 
they attempt to give voice to the history of the organization and use of it to create a path 
to an envisioned future. To achieve this they take control of time and bend it as a tool 
utilizing both the storytelling and the meaning making function of their office to achieve 
their purposes. Time configurations are a nascent field in the organizational 
communication literature.   
Focusing on the rhetorical use of time in response to crisis exigencies calls for a 
close consideration of organizational communication, leadership, crisis management and 
rhetorical theory / practice. Each of these will be considered as they relate to three 
research questions. The research questions under consideration are: 
1. In response to the multiple exigencies created by the 9/11 attacks, what rhetorical 
time strategies did airline CEO‘s use in their annual meeting address to stockholders 
prior to, immediately following and significantly afterwards? 
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2. What are the similarities and differences in the time configurations of the chosen 
rhetorical strategies found within particular airlines and in comparison between the 
selected airlines over a three year period of time; 2001 – 2003?  
3. What factors account for the similarities and differences in the usage of time in the 
chosen rhetorical strategies both within a particular airline and between the three 
airlines in the three year study period? 
The following chapters consider the events of 9/11 and the responses to them 
from a communication perspective. Chapter one contains a literature review of pertinent 
theories and practices of rhetoric, organizational communication, and crisis management. 
Chapter two provides a methodology and research focus for the study. Chapter three 
places the presentations to shareholders within the larger context of the American/global 
economy and in a historical context of the chosen airlines. Chapter four presents an 
analysis of the CEO presentations to shareholders over a three year period. Chapter five 
compares the presentations within the particular airline for the three years and across the 
industry in each year.  Chapter five also draws conclusions from the study, considers 
limitations, theoretical and practical implications and suggests future areas of research.   
Literature Review 
 In the remaining pages of Chapter 1, I consider literature relevant to the theories 
and application of rhetoric; that is, strategic stylized language used with the intent of 
persuading an audience. The use of rhetoric in modern organizational settings and 
specifically – the United States airline industry in crisis is highlighted. I review literature 
salient to an understanding of the development of the use of rhetoric in organizations, 
consider the constitutive nature of communication in organizations and the rhetorical 
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nature of crisis response and management. This is done against the backdrop of the 
economic, organizational, political and social exigencies created by the attacks of 9/11.  
Experiences of September 11, 2001 
At the start of the Tuesday staff meeting of the church I led, our maintenance 
director Mike, a retired career Coast Guard Ensign, came in and announced that a 
commercial airliner had flown into one of the World Trade Center Towers. After a few 
comments on the event, we began discussing programs, schedules, music, leaky toilets, 
the start of a charter school and other pertinent information that was normal discourse of 
church staff meetings. My cell phone, on silent mode, buzzed repeatedly from two 
callers, as my wife, a RN, and Gale, the head of Pastoral Services at the hospital, called 
multiple times in the first few minutes of our meeting. When the phones of two other 
staff members rang, we began to joke about modern technology and the ―electronic 
leash.‖ The Church secretary, taking her call in the hallway, came back into the room and 
announced ―A second plane hit the other Trade Center Tower.‖   
In case there was any doubt, Mike said, ―This is not coincidence, we are under 
attack.‖ We quickly gathered around the television in the secretary‘s office. 
As a part time hospital chaplain, I spent the rest of the day at Community Hospital 
working with Pastoral Services, visiting every department, speaking with staff and 
patients, listening to their comments and holding religious services. Between visits I 
watched one of the ubiquitous TVs, horrified at the images of people jumping from the 
upper floors of the Towers and watching as the buildings collapsed one floor upon 
another. The noon hour was spent in the lunch room on the locked-down Psych Ward 
attempting to calm fears and offer comfort to folks who lived on the edge of life in 
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―good‖ times. I felt inept, fumbling for words while trying to be a calming influence, 
attempting to give assurances and perspective in the midst of ambiguity and uncertainty 
about what was happening and what it meant. As time passed, it was clear I was not alone 
in my rhetorical angst. Two days later I attended the third session of my introductory 
graduate class in communication at USF, and the events and ―meaning‖ of 9/11 still 
dominated every conversation.  
 The case could be made that the events of Tuesday morning, September 11, 2001 
impacted no industry more than the airlines. The disorientation, horror, sense of loss, 
uncertainty and material effects altered the face of the industry and impacted their 
operations substantially. In an unprecedented move in the history of air travel, The 
Federal Aviation Administration shut down all air transportation in the United States for 
three days (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004). When they took to the 
skies again it was a different world. Previously held views of how the world worked, the 
rules and expectations had all changed. Airline leaders were thrown into the breach to 
address uncertainty and ambiguity, calm fears, find credible interpretive frames and 
create a vision that fit an altered landscape. Strategic decisions in nebulous circumstances 
and the rhetorical management of those decisions amid disorientation tested their 
leadership capabilities.  
Before proceeding to the leader‘s rhetorical management within the airline 
industry, three theoretical areas that lay the foundation for this study are presented. The 
first area considered is crisis management. A communicative act that at its core is 
rhetorical, crisis management is a growing field of interest within organizational 
communication studies. The second salient area is the organizational communication 
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theories of Karl Weick and Anthony Giddens. Their views of how organizations use time 
provide a basis for the CEO time bending that is the focus of this work. The third area of 
consideration is general rhetorical theory and the recent development of rhetoric in light 
of its growing influence on organizational activity. It is through the lens of organizational 
threat management by the CEO in a yearly presentation to shareholders that these three 
salient, theoretical areas will find common ground and application. These presentations to 
the stockholders are akin to ―a state of the company address‖. They are infused with 
rhetorical choices and activity and provide a text worthy of multi- level for analysis.   
Crisis, Crisis Management and Organizations 
 Crises are a challenge to the existence of an organization. Regardless of their 
origins, crisis demands the attention of leadership. Crises require rhetorical responses to 
the multiple publics involved; crisis response involves a contestation for meaning, an 
appearance of control and an articulated vision for a ―return to normal‖ in the future. 
Organizations define crisis out of their particular frame of reference and worldview. 
Organizations validate a crisis by responding to these events as a crisis through the 
resources they employ to address it.  The airline industry, by its very nature, has 
attentiveness to crisis built into its operating structures. The events of September 11, 
2001 created a crisis situation that became a threat to the survival of the entire industry. 
From the outset the crisis of 9/11 for the airlines is an outsider created crisis. While 
planes were at the center of the events, they were not the cause of the tragedy and its 
aftermath. In one sense this origin relieves the airlines of the need to assume 
responsibility for the crisis. They are seen, along with the nation as a whole, as victims. 
This shaped their early responses in unique ways.  
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This section considers the organizational enactment of a crisis and the positive 
and negative aspects of Crisis Management Plans. Each of these areas directly correlates 
to the activities of airlines in the aftermath of 9/11. As an industry well schooled in crisis 
management, the potential consequences of these unique events created a need for new 
responses. The events of 9/11 did not fit in their Crisis Management Plans. They were, in 
many ways, in uncharted skies. To find their way into the future CEOs use the reference 
points of the past to create a future flight plan.  
Crisis Definitions 
Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) distinguished between an incident, an accident, a 
conflict and a crisis. A crisis is defined as a ―challenging of the basic assumptions of an 
organization‖ (Pauchant, Mitroff, p.12), ―an unexpected, negative and overwhelming 
event‖ (Barton, 2001, p. 2), a ―loss of control‖ (Heath, Millar, 2004, p. 9), a ―significant 
disruption of organizational narrative (Willihnganz, Hart, Leichty, 2004, p. 215). Millar 
(2004, p.19) summarizes several definitions when he states that a crisis: 
 occurs suddenly  
 demands quick reaction 
 interferes with organizational performance 
 creates uncertainty and stress 
 threatens the reputation, assets of the organization 
 escalates in intensity 
 causes outsiders to scrutinize the organization 
 permanently alters the organization 
 
Crisis can be seen as “an interrupted narrative” (Heath, 2004, p. 151); “poor management 
of unexpected events” (Weick, Sutcliffe,  2001, p. 2) or “a threat to organizational 
survival and legitimacy” (Pauchant, Mitroff, p. 12). Crisis management is about 
responses that exhibit some sense of control, re-configuring perceptions, creating 
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symbolic actions and communication (Ogrizek, et al. 1999). Crisis management 
intensifies the functions of leadership/management, ―[management] is about keeping 
disorder at bay‖ (Lennie, 1999, p. 96).  Before a  
Millar identifies three major categories based upon the origins of the crisis.  
- Managerial: malfeasance or inattentive management - allowing small 
problems to grow into big ones.                          
- External: environmental disasters or outsider created disasters                                      
- Societal: legal actions or changes in laws, attitudes or beliefs (2004, p. 27).                                
One can say that a crisis occurs when the prevailing narrative has escaped the 
control of the leadership and new ways of viewing the world are needed before 
stakeholders and publics can make sense of it. As noted above, the origin of 9/11 allows 
the initial responses of the crisis to focus on its external genesis. The purpose of a 
longitudinal study is to see if that focus is sustainable or if prolonged crisis raises other 
questions about the organization, its leaders and what constitutes effective responses. 
Millar‘s summarization of crisis definitions will be utilized in this investigation. The 
attacks of 9/11 and their effect on the airline industry fit Millar‘s criterion of ―occurs 
suddenly, demands quick reaction, interferes with organizational performance, creates 
uncertainty and stress, threatens the reputation and assets of the organization, escalates in 
intensity, causes outsiders to scrutinize the organization, permanently alters the 
organization.‖ 
Crisis management involves at least two different activities; making changes and 
communicating those changes. While changing structures, practices and strategies is vital 
to address the issues of a crisis, communication of those changes to various 
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constituencies  is essential to convey control of the crisis and subsequent recovery from a 
crisis. Changing the internal activities and outside relationships may address the problem, 
but that in itself will not help the corporation recover because crises have significant 
public scrutiny. Left alone, this scrutiny can exacerbate and even escalate the crisis. 
Organizational changes lay the groundwork of fixing the problem and reestablish normal 
operations. The communication of those changes and repairing the image of the 
organization within the community and the larger society reduces outside scrutiny, limits 
unfavorable actions and helps to repair the image of the organization (Ogrizek, et al. p. 
57). One primary response to crisis is the assurance that order is being restored, that 
control is being regained. The need for this is magnified for shareholders who buy shares 
for future returns on their investment based upon their confidence in management and 
their practices. ―Stock markets… are driven by perception and anticipation‖ (Yilmaz, 
Oren, 2004 p. 6). Communication of the changes made to address a crisis, to regain 
control of a situation and restore confidence is critical in shareholder management 
(McKay, Deogun, 1999).  Shareholder confidence in the organization, is a future oriented 
activity. Past events and even past crises are ultimately only relevant to the extent that 
they impact future perceptions of the health and stability of the organization. 
In the next section of this chapter organizational communication will be presented 
as a context for crisis management. In the third section the rhetorical nature of 
organizational crisis management will be considered.  
Organizations and Organizing 
Organizations are socially constructed entities. That is, they are meaningful orders 
established and maintained through communication. Social construction is evident in 
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every aspect of an organization, in the values it upholds, the culture it establishes, its 
policies and procedures, the rewards it hands out and its view of the external 
environment. Organizations are created through individual‘s interaction with 
environments, creating processes and relationships whereby they invent, through their 
choices and meaning making, what is known as an organization. Karl Weick (2000) 
notes, ―I view organizations as collections of people trying to make sense of what is 
happening around them‖ (p 5).  People within organizations, often times with divergent 
views, come to tacit agreement on what things mean, proposing, defending and creating 
salient policies and procedures for their organization. These choices are created and 
defended by persuasive argument. Hence social construction has at its foundation a series 
of persuasive actions. 
The rise of rhetorical activity in organizational communication theory 
Part of the development of any society is the process of forming relationships 
around shared values, goals and meanings (Migdal, 2001). Society is organized through 
these relationships. Collectives of people gather based upon the concept of kinship as an 
organization pattern. While maintaining individual identities each is subsumed into larger 
cooperatives founded upon some need, goal or organizing principle; food, protection, 
procreation and/or affiliation. The foundation of the organizing pattern defining 
leadership and follower-ship in ancient times was based upon religious virtue, class and 
the need for protection. The coalition of religion, politics and military might expressed in 
the concept of the priest/ king/ general was one of the prevalent organizing patterns 
(Hastings, 2003). These roles often became an integration of power and intrigue, with 
leadership passed between generations or changed through violence. A clear example of 
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this is seen in the accession to power of the Egyptian king Akhenaton. His establishment 
of monotheism in a society that was historically polytheistic resulted in his being deposed 
through an alliance of ousted priests and the army (Mertz, 1990). With the advent of 
democracy in classical Greece, we find in Plato‘s Republic one of the first significant 
treatises giving a philosophical/theoretical justification for societal and governmental 
organizational patterns (Book I). Centuries later, the Magna Carta codified the rights of 
nobility, legitimizing a power structure through law instead of relying on individual favor 
and the personal views of the ruler. Later the rise of guilds and the concept of the nation 
state began to supplant the divine right of kings whose power was based on collusion 
with the church as it granted religious justification for the exercise of ruling authority.   
 What is significant in this brief summary of shifting organizational patterns is the 
role that communication, specifically rhetoric, plays in organization. Aristotle‘s view of 
verbal combat supplanting physical combat found its place in the justification, 
negotiation and creation of power-sharing structural patterns. Two of the three categories 
Aristotle recognizes for the use of rhetoric, deliberative and forensic rhetoric, deal with 
decision making in the application of power. The removal of religion and religious values 
from the center of an organizational ethos increased the role rhetoric played in organizing 
and organizations. Religion, an enterprise that is largely rhetorical (Burke, 1970) is 
contested and eventually supplanted as the foundation and rationalization of societal 
organization. Other premises took the place of religion, requiring a rhetorical 
justification. These other premises gave rise to people associating along lines outside of a 
common genetics, culture, religion, or geography. These rhetorical premises were 
concepts, not institutions, and participation was, at least in theory, voluntary. Their 
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conceptual nature elevated the significance of communication/rhetoric in fostering and 
maintaining organizations and as a key to examining organizational life. Alliances were 
established based on benefits and acceptance, identification and mutuality spread across 
time and space. In the industrialized world of global corporations and networking, 
alliances, membership, belonging, participation, and jobs create associations and 
identifications that transcend historical ties to land, kith and kin.  A primary means of 
establishing these ties is communication.  
I will demonstrate later in a section on the history of rhetoric that the ancient 
focus of the classics was on the speaker, where the audience was a consideration but not 
the primary concern. In modern rhetoric the audience plays a central role in engaging the 
rhetor in a coalition of meaning making ( Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969). In a similar 
vein, social construction makes a connection to cooperative meaning making within 
organizations. This is critical because many modern organizations have moved from 
organizational patterns where power and control were concentrated in the hands of a few 
leaders to organizations operating as a coalition of diffused authority and shared power. 
Persuasive presentations and shared meaning are essential in modern organizations where 
workers and management are seen as partners in the organization (O‘Hair, Freidrich, 
Dixon, 2005). The two complementary and mutually supporting developments;  the 
rhetorical coalition of audience and speaker and the negotiated,  constructed shared 
meaning of organizations have a major impact on the modus operandi and expectations 
for airline CEOs operating in the 21st century. It is by establishing a shared interpretation 
of what events mean that a CEO persuades the shareholders to trust in the future viability 
of the organization.  At present I turn to the two theorists, Karl Weick and Anthony 
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Giddens, whose work will provide a framework for understanding the presentations of 
CEOs to shareholders that is the focus of this study.  
Karl Weick and Anthony Giddens 
Weick first published the Social Psychology of Organizing in 1969, developing 
concepts of how an organization creates and interacts with its environment in a recursive 
loop, a circular system of enactment, selection and retention. Weick posits that the 
environment often presents as an equivocality, a situation open to uncertainty and 
multiple interpretations, that must be addressed. Making sense of the equivocality 
requires enactment of the environment. Enactment is a choice of what is salient. 
―…people are very much a part of their own environments. They act, and in doing so 
create the materials that become the constraints and opportunities they face‖ (Weick, 
1995 p. 31). The choice of what to enact in an environment is related to past results 
retained in the organizational memory; they are outputs of organizing that were 
previously successful sense making responses to an equivocality. Once successfully 
resolved the response is now stored as cause maps. ―These maps …allow the person to 
interpret what goes on in a situation and they allow the person to express herself in that 
same situation and to be understood by others‖ (Weick, 1979, p. 132). Cause maps are 
rhetorical devices used to affirm for the speaker and convince the hearer of the sensible 
reduction of a past equivocality and create a relationship to a current environment and 
perceived need. In an Aristotelian sense, cause maps are a means of persuasion by which 
a rhetor links perceived patterns of cause and effect relationships to current conditions 
and invites the hearer to make the same connections. In a broader sense, cause maps are a 
reflection of a belief system, a worldview.  ―Your beliefs are cause maps that you impose 
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on the world, after which you 'see' what you have already imposed" (Weick, 1979 p. 
135).  
These world views create what Burke labels a ―circumference of action‖ in which 
we use symbols for purposive discourse (Burke, 1945, p. 76). These circumferences are 
defined by our own choices of salience that are communicated in repeated figurative 
phrases called tropes. In a section entitled ―Four Master Tropes‖ Burke states ―I refer to 
metaphor, metonomy, synecdoche, and irony.  And my primary concern with them here 
will be not with their purely figurative usage, but with their role of discovery and 
description of ‗the truth‘ ‖ ( p. 503). Cause maps, as defined by Weick, are tropes, a 
shorthand of shared meaning and experience that connects people, actions, choices, 
culture, organizing principles, the past, present, and imagined future together. 
 The structuration meta- theory of Anthony Giddens complements Weick‘s views. 
Developed as a reaction to structuralism, his concern in The Constitution of Society is 
with how the structures and enactment of those structures in organizations by individuals 
constitute, reconstitute and transform the organization in the continuous flow of activity 
over time termed the ―durée‖ (1979, p. 3). Like Weick, he sees organizations functioning 
and operating within enacted environments as ―part of a fluid process of social 
production and reproduction‖ (Durham, 2005 p. 31). Giddens (1979) sees the recursive 
reenactment of rules and behaviors through time as critical to the processes of organizing, 
power wielding and structure creation. ―An ontology of time space as constitutive of 
social practices is basic to the conception of structuration, which begins from temporality 
and thus, in one sense, history‖ (p. 3). Individuals, operating within a set of rules, 
constraints and structures co-create the organization. Social construction based on 
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relational interactions establishes the ground for movement of the organization into the 
future. He states, ―One of the main propositions of structuration theory is that the rules 
and resources drawn upon in the production and reproduction of social action are at the 
same time the means of system reproduction‖ (p. 19).  
Instead of operating within a fixed organizational structure with rules, practices 
and procedures as givens, Giddens theorizes that we may participate in, affirm and/or 
undermine the structure and rules of the organization. These choices create intended and 
unintended consequences for the individual. Intended consequences are created in so far 
as one participates within the structure, follows the company pattern and reaffirms the 
structure and rules. Unintended consequences in that this repetitive affirmation through 
participation can lead to institutionalization where practices are ―sedimented in time-
space‖ (Giddens, 1979 p. 22). Individuals within the organization are subject to a 
powerful force pulling them toward conformity created by this institutionalization. These 
forces become embedded in practices and worldviews and at times, particularly in a 
crisis, become both the guiding beacon and the driving wind to bring the ship safely back 
to port. The concept that organizational rules and structures are created across time and 
space and embodied in organizational hierarchies (McPhee, 2004) is useful in this study. 
Giddens conceives of the notion of durée, which is the continuous flow of activity across 
time and space. This cautions against the invocation of a singular rhetorical moment and 
invites consideration of rhetorical moments flowing across time from multiple sources 
with various adjustments to the intended and unintended consequences. This multiplicity 
of sources and situations create a rhetorical ecology (Edbauer, 2005) (Warner, 2002).  
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The events of 9/11 challenged the efficacy of societal structures, creating 
discontinuities and equivocalities that were previously unknown within aviation 
(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004). The structures and rules of the airline 
industry and government sponsored security suffered a severe blow. There was a ―break‖ 
in the application of previously learned behaviors and rules. How would leaders respond 
to the exigency of the situation? Which cause maps would they invoke as sense making 
paradigms? How would the rhetorical moment of that Tuesday in September 2001 impact 
the configuration of identity, control and threat management in the time that followed?  
Organizing Section Summary 
Before I detail rhetorical development and some of its implications within modern 
organizations it is useful to consider how the concepts introduced in this section 
interrelate.  What constitutes a crisis for one person or one part of the organization may 
not be a crisis for another. In Weick‘s terminology, the circumstances of the environment 
must be enacted in order to create, recognize, validate and focus organizational 
energy/resources on the event that is now proclaimed a crisis. Watzlawick, et al. (1974) 
note that crises are relationally defined (p. 90). That is, a crisis for an organization is 
created through a relationship between what is seen, how that seeing is perceived, the 
persuasive activities that occur to convince others of the ―reality‖ of the problem and the 
selection of ―learned‖ behaviors for addressing that crisis. In this study airlines enact their 
role as victims of the attacks as well as utilize the crisis of the 9/11 attacks to deflect 
public focus on many normal business activities that are problematic.  
The organization, contextually, historically and structurally rooted, seeks out 
previously successful solutions retained within organizational memory to identify [enact] 
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a potential crisis and possible solutions. Enactment is a process of scanning the 
environment with a list of organizational capabilities and retained lessons from the past 
available as identifiers and interpretive tools. The structure of the organization privileges 
some frames over others, hears some voices over others. People and organizations solve 
problems for which they have solutions (Watzlawick, et al. 1974). Only when the 
problem is actionable is it sense-able for the organization. It is this type of sensemaking 
that allows organizations to move forward without continually reinventing themselves. 
The insights of Karl Weick and Anthony Giddens provide a basis of understanding from 
which the responses of airline CEO‘s amidst the crisis created by the actions of 9/11 can 
be investigated. In light of the needs of crisis management and the influence of 
communication within organizations the rhetorical responses of CEOs to the crisis 
situation of 9/11 will be considered. 
Rhetoric in organizational settings 
Rhetorical theory, symbolic combat and rhetorical moments 
An ongoing problem of human existence is how to settle differences without 
destroying, through violence or alienation, the community one seeks. Aristotle, the father 
of neo-classical modern rhetoric, envisioned the use of language as a means of verbal 
defense and combat (Rhetoric, Book 1: 1), utilizing forms to discover truth, create 
agreements and influence people to work in concerted ways, thereby multiplying 
individual efforts and effectiveness. In a classic definition, Aristotle opined in Rhetoric 
that ―rhetoric is the identification of all available means of persuasion in any given 
situation (Book 1: 2). In this definition he established that rhetoric is situational, always 
derived from a specific situation and applicable to that particular set of circumstances. 
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Michael Leff (2000, p. 243), concurs, ―…the rhetorical hypothesis … must deal with the 
specific persons and actions that enter into consideration of a social or political situation, 
and so rhetorical argument must apply principles to actual cases‖.  
Thus the application to specific circumstances, to actual cases, is a foundation of 
rhetorical analysis. These rhetorical actions or words are choices selected within an array 
of available choices. These choices reflect the intent and motivation of the rhetor. These 
choices also reflect the constraints and possibilities available to the rhetor created by the 
context of the situation, or at least the circumstances that the rhetor sees. Hence a 
situation is rhetorically enacted within surroundings, which is its context. The context 
creates the circumstances in which the original action or words that are of interest are 
made intelligible and meaningful. To understand the available means of persuasion and 
the intent of the rhetor the context must be understood. Only then can the choices that the 
rhetor made be evaluated. The rhetor enacts the context with a discursive response, that 
is, the rhetor chooses what is salient by responding to specific aspects of the contextual 
situation with the goal of achieving a desired outcome. It is this context, the reading of 
the context and the salience-enacting choices of the rhetor that is known as a rhetorical 
moment. (Black, 1970). 
Rhetorical history, time and rhetorical enactments 
Rhetorical moments are both recognized and enacted by the rhetor. In the 
interplay between events, interpretation, goal[s] of the rhetor and the perceived needs of 
the audience, rhetoric, that is persuasive speech, is formulated. In a seminal work, David 
Zarefsky (1998) elucidated ―Four Senses of Rhetorical History‖.  
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1. ―… the history of rhetoric – the development, from classical times to the 
present, of principles of effective discourse‖ (p. 26)   
2. ―The rhetoric of history…. ‗is concerned with the tropes, arguments and other 
devices of language used to write history and to persuade audiences…. because rhetoric 
is central to it [history]‖ (p. 28).  
3. ―The third sense of rhetorical history, then, is the historical study of rhetorical 
events‖ (p. 29). 
4. ―… the study of historical events from a rhetorical perspective is the most 
elusive but possibly the most rewarding. … What distinguishes the rhetorical historian is 
not subject matter but perspective. … the rhetorical historian [operates] from the 
perspective of how messages are created and used by people to influence and relate to 
one another‖ (p. 30). 
The study of responses of the CEOs and their organizations to the crisis events of 
9/11 for the airline industry in general and each airline in particular from 2001 to 2004 
fall clearly into category four of Zarefsky‘s configuration. Some of their responses are 
clearly rhetorical events as presented in the third sense. Also of note is that these lines of 
division are blurry as the rhetorical elides into the historical and back again. Historical 
events begat rhetorical events that in themselves become historical events due to their 
significance and communication competencies in a tightly coupled and sometimes 
inseparable loop of activity and language. The pronouncements of CEOs in response to 
organizational and/or environmental events are rhetorical presentations that can gain 
significance as historical events. 
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All of these senses are infused with time considerations. Two conceptions of time,  
experienced time (Charmaz, 2003) and interpreted time (Harvey, Kamoche 2004) are 
useful in understanding how rhetoric and time interrelate. Experienced time is the linear 
time of events unfolding. It is a schedule format, where the sequencing of events in 
proper order is vital. Interpreted time is the time of storytellers and mythology. It is the 
act of seeing within the chronological order connections and relationships and 
constructing meanings from separated events. While one action may not directly follow 
another in time, it may follow in significance or relationship. Connections are made by 
leaping across time for the purpose of grouping that uses persuasion to show their 
relationship. This is rhetorical time. Both linear and rhetorical time considerations are 
distributed throughout Zarefsky‘s historical considerations of rhetoric. The rhetorical 
usage of time is a significant part of the meaning making. The unfolding and 
configuration of ―time‖ and the larger sense of configuring events into the fullness of 
―Time‖ for rhetorical purposes, reveals significant aspects of the rhetor‘s goals and 
orientation.   
Audience, rhetorical ecology and meaning 
 One of the hallmarks of rhetoric has been to take into account the audience and 
tailor the oration to them. (Aristotle, Rhetoric Book I. 1356; German, Gronbeck, 
Ehninger, Monroe, 2004). In the latter half of the twentieth century the concept of the 
speaker choosing to address a single audience became problematic. Words spoken to a 
specific audience about a specific context can be electronically rebroadcast to audiences 
beyond the scope of the rhetor‘s original configuration. Through these secondary 
presentations and further rhetorical manipulation of an original presentation, a text can 
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now be utilized in ways that were not part of the intended rhetorical response to a 
singular rhetorical moment. This configuration of an audience beyond the vision of the 
rhetor significantly expands the concept of rhetorical moment. In this section these 
alterations are considered in light of the multiple audiences, multiple identities and crisis 
management goals that a CEO must address in the airline industry in the early years of 
the twenty-first century.    
The study of rhetoric seeks to consider what language does, how it functions in a 
particular situation (Bitzer, 1969). Rhetoric functions as a means of persuasion. Symbolic 
presentations can move an audience toward a particular action, position, or worldview. 
Burke defines rhetoric as a ―symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by 
nature respond to symbols‖ (1945, p. 43) and argues that "the most characteristic concern 
of rhetoric [is] the manipulation of men's beliefs for political ends....the basic function of 
rhetoric [is] the use of words by human agents to form attitudes or to induce actions in 
other human agents‖ (p. 41). Rhetoric seeks to create the circumstance where the 
intended audience will be moved, in some way, from where they are at the start, toward 
the rhetor‘s goal of action, acceptance or identification. Hence the intended audience, as 
identified in the analysis of the rhetorical artifact, is significant in understanding the 
rhetor‘s selection of available persuasive means, or purposive choices within the social 
environment, linguistic choices, time sequencing and overall rhetorical presentation.  
One of the core assumptions of rhetoric is that when preparing a text, the rhetor 
envisions an audience for the presentation and adapts the presentation based upon an 
analysis of that audience. The text reflects the rhetor‘s interpretation and expectations of 
that perceived audience. Analysis of a text will uncover the rhetor‘s understanding of the 
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audience. Rhetorical analysis requires an evaluation of the rhetor‘s conception of the 
audience and a determination if the perceived audience and the audience that is 
influenced by the text are congruent.  In ancient Rome, the first part of Cicero‘ s oral 
presentation Against Verres, delivered before a judicial tribunal was intended to convict 
governor Verres of his crimes. When the conviction occurred after only the first of five 
planned presentations, Cicero had the other four intended court orations published 
(Cicero, 1971). The purpose of the original rhetorical act, to persuade the tribunal of 
Verres guilt or innocence, was transformed into a demonstration of Cicero‘s oratorical 
and rhetorical skills. Likewise, a President of the United States delivering a policy speech 
at a college graduation does not have those graduates and their families sitting in front of 
him as the intended or focus audience. The intended audience, the perceived audience 
and the audience of influence are muddied even more with the advent of multiple 
technological means of transmission and reproduction. 
Much was made of the presentations by Osama bin Laden and President Bush 
upon the start of the war in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001. Cheshire (2001) noted that 
the use of electronic transmission allowed the images and words of President Bush to be 
juxtaposed with those of the leader of Al Qaeda. Bush, sitting in the Oval Office with the 
symbols of the nation state displayed about him, as the ideological representative of 
democracy and capitalism, declared war. As the President fades into the ether, images of 
Osama bin Laden appeared, wearing a U S Army camouflage jacket, delivering an 
oration before the rocky background of a cave, a gun in the corner, displaying symbols of 
his claimed ideological, religious authority; representing his amorphous coalition. In this 
juxtaposition, the news media presented the ―texts,‖ Cheshire argued, as competing 
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rhetorical acts presenting two worldviews in a ―form of etheric jujitsu‖. This was 
rhetorical war accompanying the actual military engagement. Cheshire notes, ―Sept. 11 
was just the beginning of it …. the terrorists' televisual coup of Oct. 7 was as significant 
as the earlier one.‖ Their individual presentations were not chronologically sequential, 
and were not written as a call-response, presentation-rebuttal of a debate. This further 
layers the rhetorical acts, intended by the rhetors as a response to a specific rhetorical 
moment. The rhetor‘s efforts are re-packaged, in a rhetorical fashion, by the media‘s 
presentation through their own interpretive lens that displays the rhetor‘s original 
―intention‖ in a new light.  
Consumed by viewers and hearers, the dislocation of space and compression of 
time melds these presentations into a 21st century version of the 19th century Lincoln-
Douglas debates over the political, cultural clash of worldviews and issues surrounding 
slavery. Those debates of the mid 1800s were carried out in many different venues, for 
audiences bounded by experienced time and their spatial geography with significant 
alterations by the rhetors at each particular locale. The Bush - bin Laden ―debates‖ were 
enactments, creations by a confluence of the rhetors and the media through replays of 
singular presentations, rhetorically configured and shown by the media for its audiences, 
to appear in a forensic format as a ―debate‖. Moreover Cheshire posits that bin Laden‘s 
ability to upstage and supplant the President‘s announcement with his own presentation is 
the issue. ―… the content of bin Laden‘s video missives is basically irrelevant. What‘s at 
issue is their mere presence, which seems to give him control over reality itself exceeding 
that of generals, experts and heads of state‖ (2001) 
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While the function of rhetoric remains the same, the audiences, both intended and 
actual, the intent toward those audiences, and the influence of the rhetorical text over 
time and space can no longer be contained in the concept of rhetorical moment. The 
moments of persuasion, while still temporally bound in their genesis, can be extended by 
the technological carrying of the linguistic and symbolic presentation across space and 
time in ways that the author/speaker never imagined or intended. Zarefsky‘s categories 
can be seen, at times, to meld together surrounding singular rhetorical moments that are 
reconstituted, invigorated and supplied with new meanings in transmogrified social 
contexts. Multiple audiences and multiple interpreters of rhetorical acts create a flow of 
communication that is itself subject to the rhetorical shaping of the transmitters and 
consumers. This makes the concept of singular presentations problematic. Rhetorical 
texts are presented to a rhetorical moment, but sometimes develop a life of their own, 
dissociated from the moment. The present media-laden situation calls forth the concept of 
an ecology of rhetoric (Warner, 2002; Edbauer, 2005). An ecology of rhetoric promotes 
the understanding that rhetoric is not a single act but in certain situations is a series of 
presentations over time. They can only be fully understood when multiple presentations 
are considered en masse. I have noted how organizational communication within the 
complex communicative environment of Annual General Meetings of Shareholder 
creates an understanding of an ecology of rhetorical situations, an ongoing series of 
events that create the context for the response of the CEO dealing with the past and 
anticipating a future. One parallel to these required yearly presentations can be found in 
presidential State of The Union addresses.  
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The Annual Message and Annual General Meetings 
Organizational communication literature does not have a lot to say about CEO 
presentations to shareholders. When these presentations are considered from a rhetorical 
perspective there is even less scholarly consideration (Yuthas, Rodgers, Dillard, 2002).  
There is, however, a significant amount of literature analyzing the rhetoric of elected 
officials delivering annual messages. The Constitution of the United States provides for 
an annual statement about the country to be made to Congress by the President in what 
was known for the first century and a half of the United States as the Annual Message.  
Given by the President verbally before Congress or sent as a printed document, what we 
know as the State of the Union address is similar by analogy to the CEO presentations to 
shareholders at the SEC mandated Shareholders meetings. Some parallels that will be 
fruitful for this study will be drawn between the two presentations.   
The Annual Message/ State of the Union address takes its form and function from 
the Constitution, Article 2 section 3. Campbell, Jamieson, (1990) note  
―In charging presidents with reporting on the State of the Union, the 
Constitution gives them, in the role of national historian, the opportunity 
to reconstruct the past in order to forge the future. Using history skillfully, 
they can involve the Congress and people in an affirmation that is not only 
the way it was, but also the way it will be. More eloquent presidents have 
seized the opportunity to reshape reality and to imprint that conception on 
the nation‖ (p. 52) 
Four aspects of Campbell‘s and Jamieson‘s understanding of the annual message 
are significant for this study. Serving as historian the President can first reconstruct the 
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past. This reconstruction is a persuasive act achieved by the reordering of time and 
making connections to disparate events. Telling listeners what things meant in the past 
provides groundwork to explain what things mean now. It uses the past to establish a 
common vocabulary and interpretation schema for the present. The usage of time to 
persuade the readers and hearers of the meaning of past events is a fundamental action of 
these annual messages.  
Secondly, these addresses are not just for identifying issues and putting forward a 
recommended course of action, they are grounded in common values.  ―…facts do not 
speak for themselves; assessments must be grounded in values. As a consequence, State 
of the Union addresses not only assess and recommended; they also articulate the values 
underlying assessments‖ (Campbell, Jamieson, p. 53). Presidents make meaning of the 
past by connecting to the long held values that they affirm have carried the nation 
through. The identification of values is always rooted in the past. Once illuminated from 
the activities of the past these particular values are available to shape the future. It is, as 
the John Quincy Adams character of the movie ―Amsitad‖ intones ―…. who we are, is 
who we were.‖ (1994).  
Thirdly, ―skillful‖ Presidents reshape reality and imprint that reality on the hearts 
and minds of the people. Once the vocabulary of the past has been created it is utilized to 
explain what is happening in the present. Current circumstances are made ―real‖ by 
naming them and explaining them. Once established this reality becomes the means to 
construct a bridge to the future. These past-present relationships provide rationale for 
why it makes sense to take a proposed course of action to arrive at the desired future.  
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Fourthly, the values underlying assessments are not the only foundational work 
summoned from the past.  These annual messages serve to identify and [re]enact an 
identity.  ―In the course of mediating, assessing and recommending, Presidents also 
create and celebrate a national identity, tie together past, present and future, and sustain 
the institution of the presidency‖ (Campbell, Jamieson, p. 54). Note that the identity 
enacted is threefold. It is the national identity of the country, the identity of the institution 
of the President encased in the leadership role and the identity of the individual holding 
that office that are created and celebrated. Identity, like values, is an alignment of the past 
and present projected into the future. Campbell and Jamieson further state ―….. the 
annual message has been, from the outset, one symbolic moment in which the head of 
state has woven the cloth of common national history, character and identity‖ (p. 54). 
The President, in the State of the Union address, weaves the cloth of a common 
history that threads the activities and values of the past with the goals of the future. This 
is done while simultaneously affirming the office and person and invoking a common 
heritage and identity. The President enacts a past in order to create a future. The CEO, 
much like the President, symbolically represents, in their person as well as their 
presentation, the common values and identity of the corporation. Malleable time utilized 
to establish meaning and make connections is a tool of the national and organizational 
historian  
Annual Messages of the President of the United States show useful parallels in 
another connection to the CEO presentations at shareholders meetings. Many of both 
types of required presentations are done in the normal course of leadership and 
national/organizational activity. As such, they follow formulas and accepted historical 
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practices (Tullis, 1987). At other times the exigencies of a crisis create a unique rhetorical 
situation. One common theme is a positive approach.  
―Confronted with the problems of inflation, unemployment, war, ….. the state of 
the Union message boldly assures its citizenry that, in the future as in the past, 
Americans will solve their problems. …. No President, no matter how pessimistic 
or how severe the crisis, has ever reported that the State of The Union was such 
that its problems could not be surmounted. .‖ (Campbell, Jamieson, P. 55). 
In crisis situations presidential Annual Messages are forward looking, with plans of 
actions and a positive approach. In short, they exhibit what is rhetorically identical; some 
form of control, or at least the perception of control. The exercise or perception of control 
is a fundamental crisis response required of leaders. In a crisis presidential messages are 
proposals of actions that provide a sense of control, a vision of the future with the 
problem addressed and at least a restoration to normal activity. 
 A crisis raises the stakes of the task Presidents engage in when addressing the 
public. Those characteristics highlighted above take on greater meaning. This includes 
greater pressure on leadership qualities in a crisis situation. A crisis often brings the 
expectation and practice of charismatic leadership, Bligh, Koles and Meindl conducted a 
rhetorical study of President George Bush‘s major speeches after 9/11 including the State 
of The Union addresses in September 2001 and January 2002. They define charismatic 
leadership as ―A leader‘s exceptional powers or qualities that are linked to ….increased 
effort, satisfaction, and performance on the part of followers…‖ (p. 214). They note that 
in a crisis, presidential rhetoric  ―raises the salience of certain values and collective 
identities….. and articulates the goals and required efforts in terms of those values and 
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identities.‖  Since these values and identities are rooted in the past, presidential rhetorical 
responses to a crisis are grounded there as well.  
Using Shamir, Zakay, Breinin, and Popper‘s (1998, p. 388) seven properties of 
the content of charismatic speeches in response to a crisis, Bligh, et al, analyze Bush‘s 
speeches and the media‘s response to determine their charismatic leadership practice and 
perception. They found an increase of references to collective history, collective identity, 
values and moral justifications. In addition they identified increased references ―to distal 
goals and a distant future, and fewer references to proximal goals and the near future ‖ 
(Bligh, Koles and Meindl, 2004, p. 215). Presidential crisis rhetoric utilizes an elastic 
concept of time, expanding or contracting time in order to achieve the persuasive goals of 
the presentation.  
 These parallels in the role of historian and in crisis responses provide an 
analogous ground work to the nine presentations by CEOs that are the focus of this study. 
The usage of time as a persuasive tool, reconstruction of the past, historical conceptions 
of identity, hearkening to fundamental values, and time bending to create bridges from 
the current crisis to the desired future are all found within shareholder speeches at annual 
meetings. The legal requirement and the repetition of the speeches at specified times are 
also analogous. But political activity is not business. There are two significant differences 
in the situation that CEOs find themselves in.  
 Without delving into the differences between commerce and representative 
democracy as practiced in the U.S., two factors that alter the situation for CEOs are job 
[in] security and the results driven measurements found in profit and loss statements and 
share value. Presidents are elected for four years and as history shows us, serve out their 
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terms. Their job rating is defined, in the last sixty plus years, by polling data, popularity 
and job effectiveness ratings (Bligh, et al. 2004). Even if they are not able to govern 
effectively they stay in office. CEOs, on the other hand, can be fired at a moment‘s 
notice. In a 2 year study of CEO successions in Fortune 500 companies, Margarethe 
Wiersama (2003) notes that over 70% were the result of Board of Directors initiated 
ousters. Many of these were done for the purpose of ―restoring investor confidence 
quickly‖ Essentially these firings and early retirements had a significant rhetorical 
dimension. Even if a change is not warranted strategically for the organization it may 
happen because of the management of investors. Secondly, CEOs are measured quarterly 
and annually by profit statements, dividends, market shares, and other numerical data that 
indicates the health of their organization and success of their leadership. Unlike polling 
results for a president‘s popularity, casualty numbers of war, or the size of the national 
deficit, the numbers for organizations have direct consequences in salary and job security 
for the CEO. These daily measurements of confidence found in the closing stock value on 
Wall Street result in a shortened response time and greater direct connection between the 
numbers and the evaluation of the CEOs ability.  
 These differences intensify the situation for CEOs, creating a greater immediacy 
and pressure to their decisions and their presentations. The presentations of Presidents 
and CEOs have the similar characteristics and goals but the consequence, especially in a 
crisis, is intensified exponentially for the CEO. What the tasks of corporate leaders may 
lack in magnitude when compared with national political leaders they make up for in time 
pressure. Polling data on Presidential popularity may be bad news but the President will 
finish out their term. For the CEO poor performance reviews by shareholders may lead to 
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being summarily dismissed. The need for the past to provide markers and anchors for the 
future is found in both roles. The margin for error for the CEO is smaller, the time to 
respond is shorter and the personal consequences loom much larger. Time is the central 
currency by which these leaders fulfill their duties to their political constituency and their 
company‘s stockholders. 
Chapter Summary 
 Crises place unique demands on leaders to develop and deliver an effective 
response. Organizational crisis situations are by definition a particular circumstance that 
requires rhetorical responses to a variety of stakeholders over time. The ability to create 
shared meaning for the stakeholders while exhibiting control of the crisis situation is a 
primary task of leadership in the midst of crisis. The attacks of 9/11 relieved the airlines 
of culpability in creating the crisis but still required creation of credible responses to the 
new circumstances. Since stockholders are future oriented the linkage between the past 
and the future is an important one for CEOs effectively manage.  
 Organizations are constituted by communication, socially constructed to create 
shared meaning and activities, enacting environments and making sense of what has 
already happened in an enactment, selection, retention process. These retained memories 
become ―cause maps‖ of what has worked before enabling organizations to enact an 
environment that makes sense and at the same time reproduces the structures of the past. 
The interplay between individuals with agency and sedimented structures creates 
organizations. Repetition within organizations can be persuasive, persuading individuals 
to reproduce the structures. By the same token, perturbing the patterns, rules and 
structures can also be persuasive. Over time individuals with agency within organizations 
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can transform the structures, rules and meanings of the organization. As symbolic 
representatives of the organization CEOs can use both the repetition and the perturbation 
of structures, rules, processes and meanings to create a shared vision. This a significant 
rhetorical function of leadership.    
 Rhetoric has, from its inception, served an organizing function fulfilling both a 
forensic and deliberative purpose. As such, time has played a central part in its 
application. The use of experienced and interpreted time allows the rhetor to establish 
meaning utilizing time as needed to make connections and draw conclusions surrounding 
activities and events. The mediated context of modern society compresses and expands 
time considerations as well as multiplies audiences and electronically reproduced 
presentations into an ecology of rhetoric. This requires the speaker to address a larger 
context than a specific rhetorical moment. The attacks of 9/11 created a common ground 
of understanding and an extended time of dealing with the consequences.  Common 
ground is found in analogous consideration of residential State of the Union addresses. 
Like President‘s, CEOs serve as historians and meaning makers reaching into a past for 
connections to a desired future.   
In chapter two, consideration of a particular form of rhetorical analysis and its 
application to airline CEO presentations to their stockholders will be undertaken. I will 
analyze the speeches of CEOs to determine their intents and goals in managing investor 
confidence. The Research questions presented earlier in Chapter One will be used to 
focus my analysis. CEO presentations for three airlines over three years will compare 
how time is used to accomplish these goals.  
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Chapter 2  
 
Methodology 
Introduction 
Organizational crisis is an area of growing concern and analysis (Barton, 2001). 
While rhetorical analysis has been applied to threat situations, it has been considered 
mostly from a public relations management perspective (Seeger, 2006). With an 
increasing understanding of the communicative nature of leadership roles in the face of 
threat, rhetorical theory applied to these situations should prove useful. It is my goal to 
enrich the understanding of this field by examining a particular type of rhetorical 
response to a specified audience; the CEO address to shareholders at the Annual Meeting 
will be considered for three airlines; American, Delta and Frontier, in the first three years 
of the twenty-first century.  
This chapter will explain the rhetorical method utilized, identify salient 
comparative categories and explicate the methods of inquiry. A form of rhetorical 
criticism, Close Textual Analysis, will be used. This type of criticism focuses on how the 
speakers use time as part of their persuasive presentations. In addition, I will explain the 
choices for which texts to study, the boundaries of rhetorical moment(s), and the three 
research questions. 
Rhetorical Approach 
Close Textual Analysis 
Close textual analysis [CTA] (Burgchardt,1995; Hunt, 2003) is a method of 
rhetorical critique that centers on the internal activity of the discourse. It considers the 
word usage, definitions, syntax, grammar, ratios, cohesion, structure, techniques and 
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tropes contained inside a text. All rhetoric considers the context surrounding the 
rhetorical act, but Close Textual Analysis focuses less on the exigency than on how the 
rhetor, given a particular rhetorical moment, constructs the argument, brings influence to 
bear, presents the dramatic moment, classifies the interactions, describes the situation and 
identifies for the hearer/reader the salient points of presentation. CTA is an in-depth 
analysis of the internal linguistics of the presentation. Close Textual Analysis takes into 
consideration how the rhetor enacts the context. It is about the choices, methods and 
devices the rhetor uses to create connections and meanings within the work that are put 
forth to persuade the hearer to agree with the presentation. 
Close Textual Analysis engenders a comparative spirit within the work itself. 
Whereas other approaches bring social, philosophical or structural patterns with them and 
uncover their usage, perturbations and accretions, CTA uses the presentation as a source 
to understand itself. The parts help define the whole and the whole helps shed light on the 
parts. This line of inquiry asks, ―within a given context, how does the rhetor attempt to 
influence the audience? And what intentions and motivations are present in this work? 
These are then considered in light of the enacted needs, of the rhetorical moment. CTA 
does not use an outside source to pre determine the scheme of evaluation but finds its 
direction within the work itself. CTA uses carry on satchels while many other critiques 
require steamer trunks of predispositions to affect their analysis.  
Dramaturgy, C T A and the Analytic Process 
This seeking of intents, revealing motives and considering the internal grammar 
of the rhetor that characterizes CTA has a number of similarities to the literary based 
rhetorical analysis created by Kenneth Burke. Rhetoric, in its original conception, was an 
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analytical tool for the study of oral presentations. In the first century BCE, Longinus 
developed an application of rhetorical theory that applied to the written word (Herrick, 
1997). In the works of Kenneth Burke, we see the efforts of Longinus come full circle as 
literary theory is applied to rhetoric (Burke, 1931) in the concept of dramatism. Using a 
form of Close Textual Analysis, Burke develops comparative ratios of textual linguistics 
in the form of a pentad of perspectives to assist in identifying motives behind the rhetor‘s 
choices.   
Like CTA, dramatism illuminates the internal workings of the presentation as its 
main focus (Leff, 1986) . Burke attempts to provide tools with the understanding that 
wielding the tools are secondary to the rhetorical text itself. The tools he develops are not 
applied in a formulaic manner (Payne, 1990) but work by comparing aspects of the text to 
itself to discover the rhetor‘s plans. The tools, called the pentad, are; agent, agency, act, 
purpose and scene. These are used by choosing two parts of the Pentad, comparing the 
number of words that relate to the pentadic concepts and noting the emphasis of the 
words within the chosen categories. These categories are compared through ratios of 
word usage that point us in the direction of the rhetor‘s aims, motives and goals. For 
example, consideration of President Bush‘s State of The Union address on September 20, 
2001 shows that the conflict created by the 9/11 attacks is not seen on a temporal plain 
but as an eschatological battle between good and evil. Nineteen times Bush uses words of 
totality and completeness (―every‖ and ―all‖) to show that the scene is not a political, 
cultural conflict, it is the ultimate battle, for our very souls (Carson, 2006). The response 
he posits then fits his rhetorically enacted scene.  
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By attention to the form and interrelations within the texts and the linguistic 
clusters the analyst allows the text to ―discover‖ the relevant tools applicable to it. The 
analyst‘s insights emerge as the tools are applied in an exhaustive dissection of the text. 
For example, if a defense lawyer spends most of the time speaking of the poverty of a 
defendant‘s upbringing he is emphasizing the material components of the situation. The 
scene can be viewed as the determining factor of explanation for the actions of the 
defendant. The implication is that the responses are preordained by the environment. 
However, if the lawyer, in the midst of these material, scenic descriptors, speaks of the 
awards the defendant earned in his Boy Scout Troop the analyst may decide that the 
interruption of the description of the scene by this recounting of agency, the rhetor is 
attempting to highlight and emphasize the agency by the effect of incongruity. 
CTA and dramatism are used in concert, not to discover one hidden meaning, one 
philosophical frame or structure, but to consider a multitude of meanings. These 
possibilities are part of the work of the rhetorical act but also part of the work of the 
―seeing‖ and bias of the analyst. Just as the rhetor enacts an environment, selects 
meanings and responses, and chooses that which will be retained, so does the analyst.  
―Critics must move from what is given in the text to something that 
they themselves produce – an account of the rhetorical dynamics 
implicit within it. At minimum, this act of interpretation requires a 
means to justify the identification of significant features in the text to 
explain the interactions among these features.  This process … 
requires an exercise of judgment at some level of abstraction‖ (Leff, 
1986, p. 378). 
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It is the reflexivity contained within the analytical enterprise inherent in CTA, constantly 
comparing to itself and the results of one part to the grammar, syntax, tropes, and 
worldviews, of another part, that allows overarching and specific themes, motivations and 
goals, to be ―discovered,‖ ―found‖ and ―created‖ within the presentation through analysis.  
Before moving on to Michael Leff‘s adaptation of CTA from a Burkean 
perspective it is of note that analysis will sometimes reveal effects that were not intended 
by the rhetor. Hence, the CEO of Exxon attempts to diminish the hyperbolic, cataclysmic 
reactions by placing the Valdez oil tanker spill in perspective by noting that it is only the 
27th largest spill in industry history. This is interpreted as big business callousness and a 
devaluing of the ―pristine wilderness‖ (Ogrizek, et al., 1999, p. 75).  The rhetor cannot 
control the meaning given by others to the words once uttered, for whatever political, 
social or cultural reason that may be assigned to it. Language is an effective weapon or 
tool but often yields, by the very nature of its lack of singular ownership or control, 
unexpected results. As previously noted, this is further complicated by the textual 
manipulation that routinely occurs in a mediated society. 
Experienced and Interpreted time 
In close textual analysis, ―the critic must attend to the elements contained within 
the text itself…. this act of interpretation requires a means to justify the identification of 
significant features in the text and explain the interactions among these features‖ (Leff, 
1995).  It is an attempt to see the focus of the rhetor as seen through a detailed 
consideration of the internal constructions and the interplay of the text to itself and its 
subject matter. The text itself is informed from the contextual parameters. Once observed, 
these internal patterns, ―could not rest content with isolated judgments about the text 
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itself. The demands of the situation had to be entered into the equation‖ (Leff, 1995, p. 
5).  
Michael Leff contends that application of analytical constructs to other types of 
discourse dilutes theory and practice, for the primary function of the rhetorical analyst is 
found in the consideration of speech texts (1986). As such, these texts:  
1. Are bound to a moment in history, hence radically particular.  
2. Are an artistic and literal representation of that public world.  
3. Seek to alter public consciousness at that moment.  
4. Seek to establish a conceptual space for transformation to occur.  
      (Leff, 1986, pp. 382 – 386).  
Given Leff‘s emphasis on which texts are legitimated, Zarefsky reminds us that ―History 
and criticism are not identical but are overlapping circles (1998, p. 28). Of Zarefsky‘s 
four categories of circular overlap, Leff‘s close textual analysis would fall under what 
was earlier noted as sense number four, ―the study of historical events from a rhetorical 
perspective…‖ (p. 30). Leff compares historical events with the recounting of those 
events. The distinctions between the two are rhetorical choices that are revelatory of the 
rhetor‘s purpose and motivation. 
The concept of time is central to the textual criticisms in two ways: 
internally and externally. Internally speeches unfold through the 
chronological progression of words and sentences. Externally, 
speeches respond to social, political and economic circumstances 
that develop over time. To be effective, speeches must be well 
timed. The key to close textual analysis, according to Leff, is to 
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understand fully the interplay between intrinsic and extrinsic 
temporal dimensions of the discourse (Burchardt, 1995, p. 513). 
Discourse is an historical act embedded in an historical context. The timing of a 
speech symbolically reveals the historic time and negotiates the interplay between the 
historical significance of the rhetorical response and the situation. ―The central task of 
textual criticism is to understand how rhetorical action effects this negotiation, how the 
construction of a symbolic event invites a reconstruction of the events to which it refers.‖ 
(Leff, 1986, p. 522). Using close textual analysis centering on the rhetorical situation and 
rhetor‘s replay of the events, Leff seeks not so much as to ―appropriate the past‖ 
(Gronbeck, 1998, p. 56) as to engage in an analysis that will maintain ―the integrity of a 
discourse unfolding within the drama of local circumstances and straining to encompass 
and alter the configuration of those circumstances‖ (Leff, 1987, p. 389). 
 Close textual analysis, as exemplified by Leff‘s approach, is useful for this study. 
The CEO presentations under consideration here are historical accounts of a crisis that 
impacts the understanding and possible future viability of the organization. These 
accounts are bound within historical time of the actual events, what I have called 
experienced time. The CEO/rhetor reconfigures time, in what I have called interpreted 
time in order to achieve their persuasive goals. Considering how these historical events 
are reconfigured, how time is used to make the connections to the pre planning and post 
crisis responses will contribute significantly to the understanding of the CEO‘s purposes. 
Certainly the ―drama of local circumstances‖ highlighted through Leff‘s close textual 
analysis will be useful. Rhetorical criticism is not concerned primarily with ―permanence 
or beauty, but with the effect of the rhetoric (Zarefsky, 1998, p. 21). Leff‘s close textual 
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analysis is also close contextual analysis. It is the interplay between the perceived needs, 
what is available and what is utilized within the social context, and the inner action and 
activity itself.  
Michael Leff, sequencing, meaning making and CTA 
Theorist Michael Leff utilizes the perspective of time sequencing and meaning 
making developed by Burke and combines it into a format for Close Textual Analysis 
that looks at the logic of time sequencing in choices of the rhetor to reveal motivations 
and goals. Since both logical connections and temporal connections are choices, 
consideration of the two together can provide important clues to the goals of the rhetor; 
what they desire to expose and what they hope to obscure. The key is found in the 
sequencing and relation of events as they happened compared with the sequencing of 
these same events found in the descriptions and interpretations of the rhetorically enacted 
events in the rhetor‘s speech or persuasive act.  
A CEO presentation to shareholders is about retelling what happened, creating a 
sense of what it means, and stating the plan for the future. Since crisis management 
requires at least an appearance of control, a chronological sequencing that exhibits a 
sense of control is a common rhetorical choice.  Crisis events take place in time. We can 
chart them based on a chronological hour by hour sequencing. We can sometimes 
surmise what occurred and for how long it occurred. Of interest is how the rhetor uses 
time to make sense of these events that interests us here.  
The rhetorical act condenses, expands, frames, enacts, creates connections and 
gives meaning to events. The physical description of events themselves is never a clear 
cut ―given‖ but open to interpretation and perspective. The very nature of using symbols 
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to describe and create events is a rhetorical act, the primary focus of the rhetor is to make 
meaning and interpret events. While the ―facts‖ are often disputed, there is generally 
sufficient acceptance of events to create a common ground of understanding of what is 
being talked about and in what order it occurred. While understanding does not always 
equal agreement, this temporal guide structures the rhetorical moment.  
Leff argues that the usage of time ratios are insightful for rhetorical analysis. This 
is achieved in two ways. The first is the rhetor‘s linguistic choices that cluster together 
emphasizing certain characteristics of the events and responses. The second is a study of 
the time ratios that the rhetor uses to describe the actual event and its ―logical‖ 
connections outlined in the rhetorical text. Close textual analysis then becomes the 
vehicle by which these time configurations and their ―logic‖ connections are made. Leff 
provides a tool whereby we can consider the internal workings of the speech; its 
relationships, revelations and obfuscations, as they relate to what happened and how it is 
described as happening within the structure, tone, attitude, and linguistics of the speech. 
It is the temporal dis-location of the event and the speech that is used to see the 
interpretive goals of the rhetor. If the build up to an event takes place in a short time 
frame and the event itself is lengthy, it is of note when the rhetor spends two-thirds of the 
speech speaking about the genesis of the event and little time on the event itself. Perhaps 
the rhetor is seeking to show the inevitability of the event based on the causative factors 
of its genesis as opposed to highlighting the options of response to the event or the skills 
of the participants. These comparisons of time, in telling the story and creating meaning, 
are consequential choices that are used to persuade and influence the hearers toward 
desired conclusions and results. 
 42 
 
Leff, while not always applying the specific structure of the Burkean pentad of 
scene, act, agency, agent and purpose, uses these concepts and their derivatives to 
highlight rhetorical choices and the motivations that inhere to them. In the example on 
inevitability in the last paragraph the choice to highlight the build up may be that the 
scene has dominated and the agency of the respondent was limited by it. This ―the die is 
cast‖ perspective is seen in the time spent by the rhetor in building the case. Once the 
uncontrollable nature of events has been reified then the case for the valorous effort to 
respond in difficult, uncertain times is made. The airline industry, in a post 9/11 world, 
has a newly limited agency and a greatly altered scene in which to enact its choices and 
responses.  
Likewise, Kenneth Burke‘s concept of the importance of linguistic clusters, i. e. 
comparing the frequency of root word usage to other types of verbiage, is extended by 
degree by Leff to the temporal plain. Comparisons of words about time, the timing of 
words, the ratios of words, the re-sequencing of events, time metaphors, the individual 
descriptions and attributions of the meanings of events are the tools of analysis. Logical 
connections are noted and their influence considered, however, for Leff, temporal 
linkages trump logical categorizations – the temporal connection provides the logical 
relationships. It is in this temporal consideration that the internal workings of the 
rhetorical piece and the external, ―sitz in leben,‖ the life situation, occurs. The response to 
the rhetorical moment is found in the re-telling, the re-sequencing that leads to the 
interpretation of the event.  
The point of the analysis is not to know what words are used but the reason the 
words are used, the purpose of the created structure, how the logical and temporal 
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connections move those attendant to its message toward the goal(s) of the rhetor. Leff 
writes, ―Consequently, the enterprise begins with a severely empirical orientation; the 
critic must attend to the elements contained within the text itself. The empirical contents 
of a text, however are in no way equivalent to the symbolic action that marks a work as a 
rhetorical discourse‖ ( Leff, 1986, p. 378). It is this codifying of symbolic action through 
the alteration of original time sequencing that creates utility for the analyst and those 
seeking to understand a particular rhetorical act. The junction between the external 
moment and the internal interpretation as found in its temporal component helps point to 
the rhetor‘s choice of a means of persuasion. If the audience accepts the symbol system 
and symbolic descriptions contained within, then they are readily moved to understanding 
what the presenter seeks to convey and the conclusions derived.  
This is of particular relevance to the focus of this dissertation. The CEO enacts 
events that are deemed noteworthy. Those events are displayed through a retelling that 
conveys significance to them through the lens of the past year‘s activity. The events are 
imbued with meanings, goals, and implications for the future. The process is interwoven 
throughout with temporal sequencing, framing, re-sequencing and conversion of events 
into symbols of interpretation. Shareholders, analysts, the public and stakeholders of all 
types are invited to accept this symbol system and join in the meaning making 
conclusions proffered by the CEO. These conclusions have multiple implications for the 
company, the problems they face, their continued viability and profitability.  
An extension of Leff’s principles 
Michael Leff utilizes the perspective of time sequencing and meaning making by 
comparing what happened and how it is re-created in the presentation. But the 
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configuration of time as a persuasive technique is not only found in the compression of 
time that relates events separated by linear time into a cohesive singular action, causation, 
or result but is also found in how time is ―sliced‖. Where does the story begin? What is 
its ontology? As well as how far is it projected into the future? What is its ending? The 
selection of the space between where a story starts and where it ends has significance as 
an attempt to create a persuasive linkage. The slice of time in which the event takes place, 
the created temporal boundaries, have rhetorical significance. 
David Payne (1989) considers how time is configured as people apply rhetoric 
therapeutically to deal with failure. ―The selection of some past moment and the 
construction of a meaningful sequence involving failure that derives from an originating 
failure is especially important. ….. Furthermore, therapeutic theories all utilize 
interpretations that point to significant events of the past which preordain the kind and 
degree of failure that present troubles represent. …… [psychology & religion] support 
theories which create sequences of past events, and when used to explain instances of 
failure they point to which events are most likely to be causal and motivational.‖  (p. 95) 
An individual uses this slice of time to create connections, to select a rhetorically 
acceptable beginning that explains why the present events have occurred. A continuous 
line to the present is drawn from some constructed history. The event itself or the 
conceptual lesson, the meaning derived from the event, is carried forward to the present 
and through the present into the future. The past event or its lesson is configured as the 
roots for present action or a possible remedy for past failings.  
Time is also configured with a future orientation connecting it to an idealized or 
hoped for circumstance. Time is projected into a desired future, defining when the 
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desired action will be realized. The distance of this conceived future from the present is 
significant. The further away an event is projected from the present the greater the 
opportunity for an idealization of future circumstances. As time is projected into the 
distant future the events of the past fade in significance giving way to the ideals and 
values of the past.  
Individuals persuasively constructing a slice of time as a therapeutic response to 
failure make connections to help themselves alter the understanding of the past or align 
themselves with the goals of the future.  Similarly, when a CEO responds to failure they 
make connections by slicing time for the purpose of seeking the assent of the 
shareholders.  Dealing with projections of company viability and profitability the 
rhetorical consideration of time is intensified in the usage by the CEO. The internal 
activity for the individual in therapeutic usage becomes an external persuasion of others 
within an audience. The connections made are not within the internal system of the 
individual based on experience and memory. CEOs construct connections by recalling 
historically available events and ascribing meaning to them. They must first develop a 
common vocabulary with their audience by introducing a chosen event. Once that 
common vocabulary is established meanings of the past, present and future are possible.   
The speaker‘s use of history is shaped by their rhetorical goal which is grounded 
in their motivation. What they are trying to do through their presentation shapes what 
they are searching for in the available history. If they seek to emphasize values, truths 
and identities, then the rhetor can reach back into the fog of the unspecified past and 
pluck out a lesson fit for the current exigencies.  If the connection is to be made to a 
specific event then the story begins with an event rooted in a verifiable historical setting 
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and activity and meaning is given. If the future is the concern, then the past can be 
configured at the point at which the current problem started and appropriate changes can 
be proposed. Fixing the error of our ways can create a desired state. Future changes can 
also be grounded in a return to the past for which an event that is analogous to the desired 
state can be conjured.  This returning to our roots becomes the model form the past that 
will restore the future. The events chosen and the connections made, how time is sliced 
and reconnected is a rhetorical tool used to create connections in the minds of the 
audience.   
For example, I begin my Plan of Study submitted for the Doctoral Program at the 
University of South Florida‘s with, ―My sixth grade American History course read about 
Benjamin Franklin standing before the Continental Congress debating the adoption of the 
Constitution.… And so began my love affair with rhetoric.‖ This starting point relates 
how my interest in rhetoric and the power of words was piqued in a school class by 
studying the artistry of Franklin‘s words. It is then related to working in my dad‘s 
business, my work as Presbyterian minister and my future goals once my degree is 
completed. The meaning derived is inherently tied into the chosen slice of time. A student 
in a sixth grade English class to 46 year old doctoral student and beyond  is linked as a 
contiguous relationship with activities highlighted that confirm this thread through the 
years. As such, I rejected many other possible beginnings in order to make the meaning  
―obvious‖. It may be that the same lesson could be derived from selecting other starting 
points but the persuasive effect may not be as strong as a class long ago resulting in 
taking more classes now. By selecting this place to start the argument is made that the 
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present and future naturally follow these experiences of the past. As Weick notes, ―you 
‗see‘ what you have already imposed‖ (1979, p 35). 
As Payne discusses the framing of events in time in the therapeutic uses of 
rhetoric he notes, ―two basic sorts of historical interpretation are therapeutically useful: 
(1) those that emphasize permanence or continuity in temporal development, and (2) 
those that emphasize principles of change‖ (1989, p. 88). Time is ―sliced‖ to begin at the 
point that is symbolically enacted as a beginning of the present experience. Breaks in the 
flow are seen as aberrations to be corrected or needed alterations in the course of events 
to undo present undesirable circumstances. Meaning is given to the past in order to 
provide explanation to the present circumstances and future goals. Payne posits that 
present failures are related to past activities or that from this present situation the future is 
threatened.  
He goes on to note, ―First, these constructions of past and future orientations are 
symbolic. It is by using symbols drawn from conceptions of the past and the future that 
constructed sequences and interpretations can manipulate understanding of human 
experience and provide rationale for action. Second. The operations and symbolic 
manipulations of these meaning contexts are interactive.‖ (p. 96). This interaction works 
in both directions.  The symbol coheres to its usage and the usage constructs the value of 
the symbol. The way that it is used gives symbolic meaning and the symbolic meaning is 
put into ―action‖ by constructing relationships that are persuasive.  
This interaction allows the rhetor to transform time. ―When we look at the 
therapeutic use of this topos, we discover that that past and future are not simply two 
stages of temporal relationship; they are also ―places: where a person‘s identity can be 
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rhetorically situated for therapeutic analysis and change. Selves of the past can be 
perfected in present and future time. Selves of the future can be protected by reforming 
selves in the present to correct faults of the past. In short,,. when therapeutic change is 
proposed, one cannot simply avoid making arguments about identities ‗placed‘ in the 
past, present and the future.‖ (pp. 91-92). The usage of slices of time is not merely a 
rhetorical decision to determine appropriate ways to persuade they are an unavoidable 
necessity. 
CEOs are confronted with unavoidable choices of how time is to be expressed as 
they fulfill the requirements of their role, the form and the legal requirements of their 
shareholder presentations. As historians conjuring up events, values and identities, and as 
guides to a desired future by constructing bridges and identifying paths, they use time as 
a foundation of their persuasive activity. Since shareholder management has a significant 
component of managing perception then the time component becomes more critical as it 
defines the organization‘s past identity and what it will become in the future. The 
ambiguity and uncertainty of a crisis and the intensified need for a clear articulation of 
steadfast values and other anchors of identification increases the rhetorical import of the 
symbolic reenactment of the past and the linkage of those actions and values to a desired 
and achievable future.   
Crisis, enactment, structuration and rhetorical theory 
 The full value of this study is found in the synthesis that can occur between 
rhetorical analysis centered on the configuration of time, Gidden‘s structuration theory, 
and  Weick‘s theory of enactment and sense making as they are applied to the specific 
organizational communication of CEO presentations to shareholders at Annual General 
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meetings. Each has a time and logic component where they intersect, developing a 
coherence that allows the analyst to apply rhetorical principles to an organizational 
setting in unique ways. These intersections are most obvious in structuration theory and 
its concept of repetition and duree as practices over time create affirmations of structure, 
principles, power, relationships and culture. They are not as readily apparent in Weick‘s 
theory of enactment and sensemaking.  
 The enactment-selection-retention sequencing of Weick‘s theory of sensemaking 
has a memory function within it. In a cyclical loop that, once started, has no clear 
beginning or end, enactment of an environment is informed by the retained memory of 
past activities. Lessons learned give clues on what parts of the environment to enact. In 
short, the past lessons give you a starting point of where to start looking in the present 
environment. The scope of that memory provides a list of past activities and lessons from 
which one can co-opt their significance and meaning in making connections to the 
present circumstances. Iconic stories or figures, mythical retellings of distilled events 
stripped of their ambiguity and uncertainty, reaffirmations of tightly held culture, 
principles and values are available to the CEO to slice out and bring to today‘s 
exigencies.  
 The past orientation is only part of the story in Weick‘s configuration. It is the 
envisioned future implied in these choices that has the greatest significance. Retained 
memory is considered not just to link the organization to the past but also to influence the 
movement of the organization into the future. The enacted environment is not about 
connecting to a past for its own sake but rather to create a credible bridge to the future. 
Future needs drive the enactment-selection process. It is, in a sense, a triple enactment. 
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The past is enacted as retained memory is scoured for events that can provide of 
vocabulary that creates a common ground. The present is enacted as the environment is 
chosen based on what salient aspects are germane to perceived organizational needs. The 
future is enacted by creating a vision, convincing the audience what the future looks like 
when the organization arrives there. The usage of time, compressed, sliced, reconfigured 
and pressed together in order to fashion meaning is a foundation of Structuration Theory, 
the enactment-selection-retention process and Leff‘s Close Textual analysis. To utilize 
these three together is to focus on how CEOs use the past, present and future to manage 
stockholder perceptions.  
Section Summary 
 Before proceeding to the study parameters, a recap of the methods of Close 
Textual Analysis is productive. Close Textual Analysis is a process where the analyst 
engages a text from within the text, identifying commonalities, patterns connections and 
interactions. Michael Leff focuses on the usage of time as a fundamental consideration of 
the persuasive activity in a text. The historical sequence of events and their retellings as a 
rhetorical tool point to the motivations, goals and purposes of the rhetor. Leff‘s time 
based analysis is extended to include how time is sliced and related to the temporal 
considerations of Structuration theory and Weick‘s time infused process of organizational 
sensemaking. Through an investigation of how an airline CEO configures the past, 
imbues it with significance, engages the present environment and projects the meanings 
of both into the future the analyst can identify rhetorical strategies employed. These 
insights allow investigators to see what enactments the rhetor chooses in responding to 
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and creating a rhetorical situation and identify salient organizational communication 
connected to that rhetorical moment.   
Study Parameters 
Rationale for the study 
My experience as the Chaplain of the psych ward on September 11, 2001, 
attempting to make sense of unfolding events in the midst of uncertainty and ambiguity, 
was hardly unique. Leadership, even on the small scale called for by my position, 
required rhetorical presentations that persuaded folks struggling for assurance that the 
world was not spinning out of control. Likewise, CEO‘s of an industry deeply affected by 
the events of 9/11 were called upon to provide assurance, vision and insight of how to 
keep their organizations from spinning out of control. Of equal importance is the 
articulation of the remedies for crisis in order to engender confidence. The project of this 
work is not to define one answer of how a leader addresses the exigencies of an 
organizational threat situation. The project is to recognize the multiple inputs, the 
targeted audience(s), the fluidity of the circumstances and the role of the rhetor in 
enacting an environment and creating possibilities for solutions through Gidden‘s durée 
of time and the ecology of rhetoric.  
My goal is to identify the persuasive choices made by the rhetor. Once these 
choices are identified my goal is to recognize attempts at enacting of an environment. 
This will assist in determining which assigned meanings, problems and solutions the 
speakers chose. Since the meaning is contested and the reflexive loops of rhetoric – 
response – rhetoric [or in Weick‘s terms enactment – selection – retention] allow for 
many possible insights and motivations to be revealed, their choices will assist other 
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leaders in threat situations to see what is available and how it can be utilized to 
rhetorically manage a threat situation.  
Research Questions 
 The questions that form the nexus of this study are themselves imbued with 
rhetorical temporal considerations. A time frame has been identified for this study, the 
years 2001, 2002 and 2003, connections made based on logical categories of airline 
status, size and profitability.  The questions are as follows: 
1. In response to the multiple exigencies created by the 9/11 attacks, what rhetorical 
time strategies did airline CEO‘s use in their annual meeting address to stockholders 
prior to, immediately following and significantly afterwards? 
2. What are the similarities and differences in the time configurations of the chosen 
rhetorical strategies found within particular airlines and in comparison between the 
selected airlines over a three year period of time; 2001 – 2003?  
3. What factors account for the similarities and differences in the usage of time in the 
chosen rhetorical strategies both within a particular airline and between the three 
airlines in the three year study period? 
The Address of the Chief Executive Officer to Stockholders 
 The particular rhetorical situation chosen is the address of the CEO to 
shareholders at the annual meeting of the corporation. This public address is a ―state of 
the company‖ type presentation that is always both retrospective and prospective - -  and 
often introspective. The address is intended for those shareholders present, those 
shareholders who will read and/or hear/view the presentation later, for analysts of the 
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industry and outside parties of interest both long standing and newly interested due to the 
recent threat situation.  
The Companies 
 While only two airlines were directly involved in the hijackings of September 11, 
2001 (United and American) all airlines, the industry and the economy as a whole were 
severely impacted by the events of that day. The choices of which of the 45 United 
States-based airlines to consider was based on three factors.  
1. Leadership during the scope of the study.  
While the original intent was to seek the same CEO for each company throughout the 
three years of the study this became problematic. The turnover in CEO leadership at this 
time was significant, in part, I would guess because of the events of 9/11 and in part due 
to volatility in the marketplace. This is reflected in no small part to the reactions of 
shareholders to precipitous drops in value and returns on investment. Therefore Airlines 
with a high profile in the industry during this time period were selected.  
2. Impact of 9/11 events on the corporation or the CEO.  
Consideration included direct consequences on the organization in the terror actions, 
subsequent leadership created by the events of 9/1 or long term effects on the operations 
of the airline organization.  
3. Standing within the commercial passenger airline industry.  
Considering larger airlines with significant market share focuses on industry development 
as a whole and not on the unique characteristics of a niche or ―new‖ carrier. 
 The three airlines selected were American, Delta and Frontier. They fit the 
criterion established above in the following manner: Two American Airlines planes were 
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hijacked on the morning of 9/11. One flew into the North Tower of the World Trade 
Center, the other flew into the Pentagon. Delta leadership became the primary proponent 
of government loans/subsidies/bailouts of airlines following the attacks. Frontier Airlines 
is one of the few Airlines to make a profit in the years following 9/11 while climbing to 
near major airline status. 
The Time Frame and the Matrix 
 The addresses of the CEO‘s to stockholders at annual meetings will be considered 
for the years 2001, 2002 and 2003. The annual meetings consider the events of the 
previous fiscal year; hence, the 2001 meeting will consider FY 2000; 2002 will consider 
the fiscal year 2001; and 2003 will consider the events of 2002. This provides insight into 
the companies  
a. Before the events of September 11  
b. A view immediately following the terror attacks while the focus is still on the 
impact of the events  
c. The start of a return to ―normalcy,‖ where the immediate events of 9/11 do not 
occupy center stage.  
The three-year rhetorical history, if you will, invites comparisons of rhetoric in each of 
the individual corporations by the rhetors dealing with particular circumstances within 
their particular organization. This descriptive rhetorical analysis will reveal enacted 
exigencies and enacted strategies and capacities of the organization and CEO 
highlighting how they line up and play out across the movement of time. The in company 
continuity addresses the first research question. 
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Addressing the second research question is a comparative analysis between the 
organizations. There is a contiguity of situation for the airlines in a common economic, 
social reaction to the attacks. This analysis will seek factors that seem to account for the 
differences, similarities and rhetorical strategies based upon these various exigencies 
across the organizations as an enactment of this contiguous environment. This three by 
three comparison of time and airlines should prove a trove of information concerning 
rhetoric, communicative enactments, threat and leadership. 
Likely findings and their potential impact on theory and practice. 
 Leff‘s time oriented Close Textual Analysis will elicit an understanding of the 
rhetor‘s enactment of the environment, the perceived needs of the audience and projected 
capabilities and capacities of the organization.  This study will advance the theory of 
leadership and its rhetorical dimensions. This advancement of theory will add to a small 
list of studies of the rhetoric of long term crisis response. It will also advance the 
concepts and provide insight into how organizations are constructed, maintained and 
given meaning by their communication. By addressing the many constituencies, the 
CEO‘s focus creates an image of the organization that they symbolically represent, that 
then lays the framework for alterations and perturbations to that image. 
 The practice of organizational rhetoric will be advanced in so far that leaders have 
another means of understanding their role and potential choices for fulfilling their tasks. 
By recognizing the critical importance of their rhetoric as an enactment of the 
environment and a creation, instantiation and contestation with the structures and culture 
of their organization in the durée of time, they will recognize parallels between their 
particular organization and other organizations in similar circumstances. These parallels 
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reflect the process of structuration for their organizations. Cognizance of their role in 
what Weick describes as the enactment of the environments and the process of 
structuration as defined by Gidden‘s allows for recognition of greater possibilities of a 
coherent rhetoric. Even more important is that this study invites leaders to think of their 
role differently; not as an application of techniques to achieve pre-selected results but to 
understand, as a whole, their task as rhetorical agents within a persuasive ecology. It 
invites them to recognize they have a choice to see, frame, give meaning, enact an 
environment and create a co-orientation in the sea of scrutiny that crises elicit. It also 
allows them flexibility in the selection of options within the changing needs of a crisis 
situation. If an understanding of how rhetorical choices can define outcomes, how 
rhetorically limited enactments pre-determines available options, how linguistic choices 
constructs protective barriers as well as creates walls, then intentional choices can be 
made with maneuverability, flexibility, ambiguity, and reflexivity built in.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Organizational and Social Context of the Presentations 
 
Introduction 
Financier Warren Buffet commented,  
―If a capitalist had been present at Kittyhawk back in the early 
1900s, he should have shot Orville Wright. He would have 
saved his progeny money. But seriously, the airline business 
has been extraordinary. It has eaten up capital over the past 
century like almost no other business because people seem to 
keep coming back to it and putting fresh money in.  
  You've got huge fixed costs, you've got strong labor unions 
and you've got commodity pricing. That is not a great recipe 
for success. I have an 800 (free call) number now that I call if I 
get the urge to buy an airline stock. I call at two in the morning 
and I say: ‗My name is Warren and I'm an aeroholic.‘ And then 
they talk me down. (Buffett, 1991) 
Legendary American Airlines CEO Robert Crandall noted,  
―Ladies and gentlemen, our industry is in big time trouble! The 
massive losses of late 1990 and early 1991 have wiped out all 
the accumulated profits commercial airlines have ever earned. 
Today, U. S. Carriers, believe it or not, have a retained net 
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deficit of $1.4 billion. That means from their founding through 
June of this year, United States airlines have lost $1.4 Billion.‖ 
(Reed, 1993, p. 282) 
The events of 9 - 11 took an unprofitable industry into a full blown crisis 
situation. Following six years of record profits, the economy had slowed down well 
before the events of 9/11. Its effects were felt throughout the airline industry (Jiang, 
Hansom, 2004). What was a normal slide in revenues and profits in a fluctuating industry 
became, with the economic impact of 9/11, a struggle for survival. What happened to 
revenues and profits was not new. The cyclical pressures placed on an industry that is 
used to bankruptcies, mergers, and consolidations were uniquely intensified by the 
precipitous nature of the decline and the length and breadth of the downturn. We have 
seen in chapter one that this crisis was unusual in that its origins were created by forces 
outside the industry, where the airlines were not the main target but a form of collateral 
damage. This provided some latitude in the presentations of CEO‘s to shareholders 
because they were not defending their organization from accusations that their actions or 
inactions started a crisis, but it did create some unique conundrums; the plans of the past 
did not fit the ―new‖ circumstances. The time continuum that is the background of all the 
presentations and the foundation of organizational identity, reconstitution and social 
construction, has been breached and must be reestablished. 
Before addressing the unusual circumstances and the persuasive responses of the 
CEOs, to shareholders it is helpful to know a brief history of the airline industry and of 
the individual corporations involved in this study. The focus of this dissertation is how 
CEO‘s construct time and use it to achieve their organizational and personal goals in the 
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midst of crisis situations. Rooted in previous decisions and organizational culture, CEOs 
use the past in their stockholder addresses as the foundation of their views of the future. 
Stockholder presentations simultaneously look to the past year and make statements 
about the future.  These are meaning making activities where the retrospective view 
serves the main function of acquiring a language for the purpose of establishing 
confidence in what will be done in the future. In stockholder presentations CEOs refer to 
the retained past and to organizational and personal integrity to envision the future. More 
than a historical accounting or linear events CEOs, U. S. Presidents, the scions of 
families, use time as the cornerstone of the bridge between the past, present and future.  
In a crisis, the need for this grounding is intensified because of the inherent uncertainty of 
the future that defines a crisis. Invoking the past becomes critical to engender confidence 
that the successful lessons from the past can be reenacted in the future. It is therefore 
necessary to understand the past to understand how it is used rhetorically in the crisis of 
9/11. 
In this chapter a brief history of the airline industry in the United States, a 
synopsis of the three airlines of study and the context of the U S economy as it relates to 
the airline industry in the latter years of the 20th century is presented. Before that is 
undertaken, it is helpful to consider the role of Al Qaeda in these events.  
The work of the ―jihad‖ of Al Qaeda against the United States and the subsequent 
―War on Terror‖ prosecuted by the Administration as a ―result‖ of 9/11 will not be 
discussed. Ironically, the motivation for the attacks is irrelevant to the effects it had on 
the airline industry. As was noted in chapter two, the content of the message of bin Laden 
is negligible in its significance when compared to his ability to conjure a presence over 
 60 
 
the airways in the ―rhetorical battle‖ with the President. Likewise, while the 
psychological significance and upset of the status quo is remarkable, the symbolic impact 
of the use of airliners as weapons and its effect on the economy are the significant factors 
for this study. It is what the airlines represent to a modern society, their practical and 
symbolic function in a global economy that is of note. 
Profitability, symbolism and the airline industry 
Air craft and air travel are seen as a symbolic representation of great scientific, 
technological achievement. Affordable air travel is a sign of wealth and power. Once 
measured by their navies, air power has become the marker of military strength and 
national pride for nations. Chairman of the government owned Air France noted, ―It is 
obvious we are fighting for the Air France Group. . . . But in actual fact, we are also 
fighting for France. (Christian Blanc, 1996).  The buildings targeted on 9/11 were chosen 
because of their symbolic meaning (9/11 commission). The means of attack; fuel laden 
transcontinental jumbo jets, are classic examples of an inferior force using the strengths 
of a superior enemy against them. The Al Qaeda network had made clear they wanted to 
―bring these towers down‖ (Lessons of First…, 2003) because the Twin Towers were the 
symbol of American capitalism. They defined the skyline of the economic center of the 
world and significantly served Wall Street through the brokerage firms ensconced in its 
two towers. The 1993 Al Qaeda fertilizer bomb exploded in the garage below the Towers 
was the first attempt to destroy these symbols of capitalism and power. Likewise, the 
airplanes and the airline industry were a symbolic and practical tool designed to inflict 
not only a military impact but create fear by turning these iconic symbols of American 
capitalism into missiles of war (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004). The 
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symbolic and practical role of airlines in the American economy and the American 
psyche developed in the last 70 years as the industry grew from the womb of government 
oversight, funded by government contracts, to a free market industry. It is to this 
nascence, regulation and subsequent market driven freedom that I now turn.       
The airline industry, government participation and regulation 
In one form or another, the government has always been involved in the U. S. 
airline industry. This started in the early days through granting licenses for carrying mail, 
creating the Civil Aeronautics Board in 1936 [CAB] and further regulation by 
establishing the FAA (1938) in response to a series of  mid-air collisions. The United 
States Government regulated and controlled various aspects of air travel by licensing 
airlines, limiting routes, controlling the number of competitors and influencing 
profitability. Governments around the world, on many levels, subsidize or even own 
national airlines (Kahn, 2002). In the U. S., the government has not owned airlines but 
has treated them as a public commodity; guaranteeing profitability and setting prices. 
With a spate of hijackings in the late 60‘s and 70‘s federal Marshals were placed on 
planes to insure safety. (Cohen, 2002 ). Until 1978, air travel, the use of air space, what 
cities have air service, and the configuration of routes were part of this government - 
industry coalition and a source of national pride as well as an engine for economic 
growth.  CAB regulated airline travel for safety and guaranteed a reasonable rate of 
return through setting fares and limiting competition (Barnum, J. 1998).  
In 1978, after much debate, Congress passed Public Law 95-504, the Airline 
Deregulation Act. Over the next four years, the following actions were phased in:  
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1. Competitive pricing was encouraged among existing airlines without 
government  
regulation.  
2. Standards for the establishment of new airlines were liberalized.  
3. CAB received authority to grant antitrust immunity.  
4. Most mail-carrying subsidies were ended immediately. 
5. By 1988 all government subsidies for providing ―essential air service‖ would  
be eliminated 
6. Gradually phasing out CAB by transferring remaining regulatory duties to the  
Department of Transportation. (PL 95-504).   
The results of no longer treating airlines as a regulated public utility were like 
going to a NASCAR race to watch the crashes; someone would win but there is great 
―interest‖ in the spectacular crashes and the drama of who would survive.  
―Only six of the 21 US airlines that were publicly traded at the time of deregulation in 
1978 survived through 1992. Eleven of the 21 airlines were taken over and six filed for 
bankruptcy ……. deregulation injected considerable instability into the airline industry 
and resulted in a Darwinian experiment in which assets were reallocated to firms that 
adapted to the shock of deregulation most effectively‖ (Lehn, 2002). For many, these 
birth pangs of moving to a modified market economy, the competition and ―survival of 
the fittest‖ marketplace has increased service options and lowered inflation adjusted 
prices between 30 – 40 % (GAO 1996; Robson 1998; Kahn 2002). The benefits not 
withstanding, ―…it is striking that so few of the formerly regulated airlines survive as 
independent carriers after deregulation‖ (Kole, Lehn, 1999). 
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The industry experienced unprecedented losses from 1990 – 1993. The turn 
around in the years 1995 – 2000 saw unprecedented profits (Jiang, Hansom 2004). Both 
the losses and profits were nearly triple any year under government regulation. 
Coincident with leading the economic growth of the late nineties, the airline industry also 
led the way into a downturn. The changing climate saw that profitability starting to wane 
in the first and second quarters of 2001 (annual reports of AMR, Delta and Frontier). At 
the turn of the milennium, deregulation had been in force for greater than two decades.  
In many ways the 1990s had been a learning period as the industry attempted to 
cope with the full affects of deregulation. A primary concern was learning what to expect 
in a free market environment, dealing with the dialectics of expansion/contraction, 
profit/loss, and capital costs/employees by recognizing what works and what does not 
work in this volatile environment. While the task is still the same; transport people and 
cargo from point A to point B, how to do so profitably on an expanding scale against 
subsidized, international competition and a bevy of new competitors with changing 
technology and the prospect of catastrophic events only a landing away makes the 
industry, as Warren Buffet remarked in the opening quote, ―extraordinary.‖ The longing 
of the human heart to soar with the birds and the romance of flight makes Buffet, 
Crandall and others, ―aeroholics‖.  
Rhetorically, the strategic plans and the tactical maneuvering of organizations in 
this environment are rationalized through a series of presentations and reconfigurations of 
time and events. The need for leaders to present the appearance of control, especially in a 
crisis situation, is problematic since causative factors and clear lines of relationships are 
often murky or nonexistent. The enactment of the environment to align with the 
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organization‘s practices, interpretations, and configuration of the world is, at times, 
putting square pegs in round holes. As Buffet and Crandall noted, investing in airlines is 
risky at best. For CEO‘s to instill confidence in the future for those with an ―urge to buy 
airline stock‖ utilizes appeals to the storied past and the romance of breaking the bounds 
of earth to soar in the heavens.  
  Robert Robinson (2000) notes 
One hundred years ago, Wilbur Wright and his kid brother, Orville, 
embarked on one of the most enthralling adventures of all time: 
uncovering the mysteries of powered human flight….  
The rest is history, as aviation quickly shrank the globe, tying together 
nations and states in a matter of hours, instead of days and weeks. Today, 
flying has become an unquestioned fact of life (p 32).  
This ―unquestioned fact of life‖ is a given in our society. Airlines will operate and people 
will fly. The demand is projected to be 1 billion passengers a year in 2013 (Mullins 
2002). For the U. S. airline industry, the questions of air travel center around what 
companies will survive which business models win out and how does the constantly 
changing shape of the industry effect travel at any given moment. ―Since the original 
1978 [Deregulation] Act, the number of airlines has shrunk by more than half, yet there 
are still too many seats and not enough passengers.‖ (Andres, 2003, p. A 21). Three 
airlines that have navigated through the changing landscape and made it into the new 
millennium are American Airlines, Delta Airlines and Frontier Airlines. A brief history 
placing these airlines in context of the new millennium follows. 
American : “Something special in the air”   
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 Of the six remaining pre-deregulation carriers, American Airlines [AA] is the 
oldest and has the most storied past. AA traces its roots to the 1926 Robertson Aircraft 
Corporation with chief pilot, Charles Lindberg, carrying mail for federal government 
contracts. They later added passengers to their mail routes. The consolidation of scores of 
airlines led in 1934 to the start of the thirty-four year leadership of C. R. Smith as 
President. That same year it adopted the name American Airlines. In 1936, all 
commercial air service was placed under the oversight of the newly created Civil 
Aeronautics Board. AA carried its millionth passenger by 1937 and maintained a cutting 
edge technologically as the first to fly the Douglas DC - 3 jet in commercial service. In 
June, 1939 American Airlines became a publicly traded company on the New York Stock 
Exchange (AA web site History).  
 With many adaptations of marketing and aircraft purchases, one of the more 
significant innovations engineered by American was its SABRE [Semi Automated 
Business Research Environment] system. The largest, private data processing system of 
the late 1950s, it was used first to coordinate air travel and track reservations within the 
airline from airports and ticketing offices. It was then adapted to make reservations 
available to travel agents from their desks. This service was sold to other carriers who did 
not have the wherewithal to create their own system. It became the standard for the 
industry. This type of innovation and industry leadership became the hallmark of AA and 
part of its corporate culture (Reed 1993).  
Through acquisitions and expansion of markets based upon successful lobbying of 
CAB, American grew in market share and size. Continued leadership in innovations saw 
the first frequent flyer program and development of the hub and spoke flight service 
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plans. The hub and spoke is the model for air travel today for many airlines, especially 
the legacy carriers. It uses centralized airports for coordinated travel that delivers 
passengers from a variety of destinations and, in a time-coordinated effort of ―beehive-
like‖ activity, sends them from the hub to their final destination (Reed).   
Not all of AA industry leading activities are positive. Since the 1940s American 
has located its central maintenance center in Tulsa, Oklahoma. Unlike many other airlines 
that contract out their maintenance, American maintains all of the planes it flies. In 1992 
The FAA fined American a record 10 million dollars for maintenance violations (Reed, 
1993). In this area AA has also held a dubious leadership position.  Encompassing a 15 
year period before the turn of the century it is noted, ―… American Airlines has had 270 
fatalities, 741 FAA incidents, 158 NTSB incidents, and 505 FAA violations/fines in 
1997-2000, making it the U.S. leader in FAA violations and fines‖ (NTSB, 2007). In 
comparison Delta and Frontier airlines have had none. Their problematic ―leadership‖ 
was furthered by the 156 lives lost in the 9/11 hijackings of two airliners by hijackers. 
This dubious leadership was extended even further by a November 12, 2001 crash 
resulting in the second largest single loss of life for air passengers and crew on United 
States soil.  Two hundred sixty-five people died when AA flight 589 crashed into 
Queens, New York shortly after take off.  
 While the safety record is leading the industry in a negative fashion the leadership 
of AA has been notable for its longevity and success. Albert Casey was named CEO four 
years after C. R Smith‘s 34 year tenure ended.  Shortly after assuming the helm Casey 
hired Robert Crandall. Crandall led the AA fight in Congress against deregulation in 
1977-78. He was appointed as President in 1980 and became CEO half way through the 
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decade. Crandall became synonymous with cutting edge leadership in the deregulated 
airline industry while making AA the largest airline in the world in terms of passengers 
transported (Reed 1993).  Dubbed, ―the man who changed the way the world flies‖ by 
The Wall Street Journal, Robert Crandall transformed the entire airline industry during 25 
years with American Airlines.‖ (WSJ), There are four areas of Crandall‘s influence that 
are most notable for this study.  
1. His initial opposition to and later adaptation to deregulation.  
2. Simultaneous cost cutting and expansion of the airline.  
3. Labor conflicts from all the major unions of AA.  
4. An innovative business model that dealt with the realities of conditions in air 
travel following deregulation. 
Each of these will be briefly touched on because they provide a foundation for the CEO 
presentations to shareholders for all three airlines at the turn of the century.   
 Robert Crandall, a former TWA executive, began at AA as the movement for 
deregulation gained steam on Capitol Hill. He used his passionate personality and 
expletive-filled communication practices as a point man in opposition to deregulation. 
Addressing a government lawyer before a Senate hearing he decried, ―You fucking 
academic eggheads! You don't know shit. You can't deregulate this industry. You're 
going to wreck it. You don't know a goddamn thing!‖ (Dempsey, Goetz, 1992, p. 17). 
Once deregulation became law, Crandall became President and COO during the four year 
phase-in period of deregulation. Under his leadership, the airline‘s adaptation to the new 
environment saw a quick expansion of routes, a series of takeovers of smaller airlines and 
increasing prominence in the industry in size, revenues and leadership. The ―American 
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Airlines Way‖ became the focus of attention, a model for other airlines, and a culture 
within the organization. Under Crandall, AA did not follow competitors, they set the 
standard. Its economic performance became the benchmark for returns by other legacy1 
airlines (Reed). This was done through simultaneously expanding and cutting costs. 
 Known as a grueling boss, he would summon underlings to his office for 
expletive filled Q & A sessions where, through intimidation, browbeating and insightful 
attention to the details, procedures and practices of all aspects of airline operation he 
would extract information and develop policies for cutting costs throughout the 
organization. While increasing the bottom line and giving voice to middle level 
management, they rued their summons to appear before Crandall (Reed, 1993). It also 
created a culture of cost cutting that spilled over in similar grilling of lower level 
employees by their bosses. The domestic expansion was accompanied by international 
expansion as AA returned to overseas markets. As a capital intensive and labor intensive 
operation, air travel constantly struggles with balancing fixed costs of airplane fleets and 
the personnel costs. For AA this resulted in labor relations wars. 
 ―Labor represents the single biggest category of airline costs, currently 28%.‖ 
Labor costs for legacy carriers are not very flexible. (Morrison, Winston, 2005). 
Unionization of mechanics, airline pilots and flight attendants has created a rolling series 
of negotiations with the result that any of these three unions can shut down operations. In 
1993 flight attendants stopped travel on American Airlines with a strike over the busiest 
travel time of the year, the Thanksgiving holiday (Handbook of Texas). During a pilot‘s 
sickout in 1999, U.S. District Judge Joe Kendall stated, ―If you would look up bad labor 
                                                 
1 Legacy airlines are those that started before deregulation. (Morrison, S., Winston, C. 2005) 
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relations in the dictionary, you would have an American Airlines logo beside it‖ 
(Honolulu Star Bulletin, 1999 p. B 1). Crandall, when asked about union troubles mused 
about an employee takeover similar to Eastern Airlines and expressed frustration with the 
comment  ―I've said many times that I'd be thrilled to sell the airline to the employees and 
our [union] guys said ‗No, we'll take all the money, anyway.‘ ‖ (Crandall, 1997).  Despite 
this ongoing animosity, Crandall and his leadership team were able to work within the 
changed landscape brought on by deregulation and creatively respond by developing a 
business model cognizant of the new needs that developed. Crandall and AA recognized 
two realities. 
 1. As other legacy carriers folded many new airlines entered the market as low 
cost carriers [LCC]. While most of them folding quickly they created a significant 
amount of competition.  
2. The cyclical nature of the profitability of operating an airline, a result of 
deregulation, requires large amounts of cash reserves to deal with the downturns in the 
market. 
Competition was no longer just with the other legacy airlines but with the LCC s 
and regional airlines. They attempted to compete through innovation and creativity. 
American Airline became a wholly owned subsidiary of AMR Corporation [1982] adding 
new regional carrier - American Eagle two years later. AA created consulting firms to 
assist other airlines, and held controlling ownership in the SABRE Holdings that were 
spun off into an independent corporation (AA web site history). AA flexed its corporate 
leadership muscles resulting in charges of predatory pricing in regional markets where 
they tried to drive smaller start ups out of business (Edlin, 2001 ). AA concentrated on 
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the more lucrative business travel market, avoiding the discounts traditionally offered to 
the leisure traveler. They also built a nearly $2 billion cash reserve while expanding and 
cutting costs. After 19 years at the helm Crandall was succeeded by Don Carty. Carty 
used a similar strategy as Crandall in the takeover of TWA in 2000-2001; assuming 
planes, routes and personnel [sans their unions] without assuming any debt from the 
takeover. The deal was completed in January 2001, eight months before two AA planes 
were used in the September 11, Al Qaeda attacks. 
Delta: “You’ll love the way we fly” 
 Another legacy airline, Delta Airlines began as Huff Daland Dusting, a crop 
dusting service spreading calcium arsenate over cotton fields to eradicate the boll weevils 
plaguing that cash crop. The first passenger flights began in 1929 but were suspended 
during the Great Depression. The seasonal nature of crop dusting led to air service and 
mail contracts in South America. Like many other airlines of the day, passenger service 
was an add-on to the government, state-side mail contracts. A regional airline that moved 
from its base in the river ―Delta‖ of Louisiana to Atlanta in 1941 founder, C. E. Woolman 
used the new headquarters to participate in the war effort; training pilots and mechanics, 
transforming planes for military use and servicing military planes for The Army Air Corp 
(Delta web site). Transporting its millionth passenger in 1946, Delta became known for 
its impeccable safety record and customer oriented service.   
 Like most airlines of the day, Delta grew with the increasing demand for air travel 
and through mergers and acquisitions. One of the unique characteristics of the airline was 
Woolman‘s view that, ― ‗If you put three cows in a pasture where there is only grass 
enough for two, they all get thin,‘ he favored mergers between competing airlines‖ 
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(NAHF web site). In a series of mergers between 1952 and 1987 Delta expanded from its 
southern base by adding on routes and service to the rest of the country (Delta Museum). 
Additionally, Delta partnered with TWA in 1948 for the first interchange service, where 
pilots from another airline flew planes of their competitor (Delta). This was a result of the 
regional boundaries of air travel before deregulation. Able to fly only from their allotted 
cities by CAB route restrictions and competition limiting rules, cooperative efforts such 
as interchange were developed. This allowed pilots from other airlines to fly Delta planes 
[and vice versa] in connecting service routes. This was the forerunner of the code sharing 
cooperation that developed after deregulation. 
 In many ways that spirit of cooperation has worked for labor relations within the 
airline as well. A 2003 report from MIT noted, ―Our case study research suggested that at 
least three airlines have been able to build a positive workplace culture with employees at 
different points during the past twenty years: (1) Delta, from at least the early 1980s up 
until it began imposing wage cuts and layoffs in 1992;‖ (Kochan, von Nordenflycht, 
McJersie, Gittell, 2003, p. 7). This cooperative spirit had an effect on unionization itself. 
While most ―major‖2 airlines are heavily unionized, Delta is an exception to that rule 
(Kochan, et al., 2003).  
      ―With the exception of its pilots and dispatchers, Delta has 
remained non union by following a union substitution strategy. Delta‘s 
historic approach to labor relations involved an implicit commitment 
to high wages, lifetime employment and a ‗family‘ culture with the 
intention of avoiding union representation and inducing high levels of 
service from its employees. For example, Delta‘s first unprofitable 
                                                 
2 FAA definition of major airlines are those over $1billion in annual revenue ( FAA) 
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year came during the industry slump in 1982, but that year Delta made 
good on its implicit no-layoffs promise and even gave employees an 
average raise of 8.5%. In return, employees jointly purchased a $30 
million jet for the carrier as a token of appreciation (Financial Times) 
      ―For a long time, this approach helped Delta maintain a reputation 
as a high-quality, high-service carrier. But in 1994, after four 
consecutive years of losses the carrier broke its implicit guarantee 
when it laid off 15,000 employees and unilaterally cut wages… Not 
surprisingly Delta‘s service levels quickly deteriorated…. As part of 
its return to financial health, Delta also strove to reestablish its good 
relationship. By 2002 it had significantly improved its service levels‖ 
(Kochan, et al. 2004, p.14)  
Of the sixteen strikes, six Presidential interventions and ten non-strike work 
actions that have occurred for major carriers since deregulation to 2001, only one 
involved Delta and their union, the Airline Pilots Association. By contrast American 
Airlines has been involved in 10 of the 32 union related activities. The single incident of 
Delta‘s ―official‖ labor troubles fall within the time frame of this study, occurring during 
the winter of 2000-2001; pilots refused to accept overtime, resulting in a slow down. 
(GAO 2003). The overall effect of the slowdown was negligible (Gittel, von  
Nordenflycht, Kochan, 2003). This flexing of union muscle did not impact unionization 
efforts of other employees at Delta. ―On February 1, 2002, Delta's approximately 19,000 
flight attendants rejected union representation by a 71% to 29% margin‖ (Delta Annual 
Report, 2001). The well known Delta service was created because of the work of the 
 73 
 
mostly non – unionized employees. This enabled Delta to have the most passenger 
emplanements of any airline in the world in 2002 (Bureau of Transportation Statistics 
2004). 
 While some airlines developed their own computerized reservation system [e.g. 
United Airline‘s Apollo System], Delta became a co-sharing partner with American 
Airline‘s SABRE system. Buying space and promoting the system with agents allowed 
for national coverage without competing at another level with the other airlines, keeps 
costs down, and lowers resource allocation for design, implementation and maintenance 
of its own system. Delta‘s management focus has always been customer service. 
Innovation, while sometimes present, is not the focus. 
 However, one innovation that has made a difference with Delta is its use of 
regional jets [RJ] as a feeder system for its longer flights. With over 30% of industry 
capacity of RJs Delta‘s ComAir generates nearly $2 billion a year for the airline. This 
allowed Delta, in the time frame of this study, to claim being the world‘s largest airline 
when passenger enplanement is used as the measurement. Many passengers were 
transported short distances by the regional jets. While this justifies Delta‘s claim as the 
largest airline in the world due to the number of people who board a plane, the industry 
standard for size is based on passengers per air seat miles. The RJ dependency actually 
lowers profitability for revenue per air seat mile (Babika, Lukachko, Waitz, 2001).  
 Like American, Delta‘s top leadership has been stable with five CEOs in its first 
six decades. Woolman led the airline for twenty-one years until 1965. After the 5 year 
term of Charles Dolson, W. T. Beebe served as CEO for 16 years; starting seven years 
before deregulation and leading through full implementation of deregulation. Ronald 
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Allen followed Beebe with an 11 year turn at the helm until 1997 when Leo Mullin was 
appointed CEO. Mullin assumed command when the industry was making record profits 
and continued at the helm when four hijacked planes changed the American landscape 
and significantly altered airline operations. With a long history and a differing focus of 
leadership in the industry Delta and American led the way into the new century. The third 
airline under consideration had neither a legacy history nor a leadership role. In the late 
1980‘s Frontier Airlines was a minor3 legacy airline, disappeared into bankruptcy, and 
then was resurrected as a low cost carrier in the early 1990‘s.  
Frontier Airlines : “A different kind of animal” 
Three of the five main goals of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 are 
―(2) placing maximum reliance on competition in providing air transportation services;  
(3) the encouragement of air service at major urban areas through secondary or satellite 
airports;  
(5) the encouragement of entry into air transportation markets by new air carriers, the 
encouragement of entry into additional markets by existing air carriers, and the continued 
strengthening of small air carriers‖ (PL 95-504).  
What the legacy carriers feared is the foundation of the competition the government 
wanted to create with deregulation. The effects of these goals are found throughout the 
industry. 
The Frontier Airlines operating in 2001 was both the victim and the beneficiary of 
that act. The original Frontier Airline started in 1950 as a merger of three regional 
airlines. Serving as Denver‘s airline, deregulation brought direct and significant 
                                                 
3 Major and minor airlines are designated with the demarcation of $1 billion dollars in revenues. In 2001 
American and Delta revenues exceeded this dividing line while Frontier did not.  
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competition from United and Continental. When Continental went into the first of its 
bankruptcies, favorable laws enabled it to offer services at costs significantly below 
market charges, eroding Frontier‘s bottom line. In addition, Frontier‘s failure to partner 
with United‘s Apollo Group reservation system further eroded accessibility to the market. 
Frontier brought fraud charges and the US government brought anti trust suits against 
United for its monopolistic Apollo Group practices. In financial distress, Frontier was 
bought by People Express in 1985 and then was completely disbanded when People, 
overburdened with debt due to its acquisitions, was purchased by Continental in 1987. 
Continental, due to its own financial difficulties vacated its routes from Denver seven 
years later. Shortly thereafter a new Frontier Airlines was formed by executives of the 
original company and new investors, resuming its role as ―Denver‘s airline‖. It now 
chose to compete using different business tactics. Its business model was based on 
Southwest Airlines successful expansion from an intra state carrier to a national Low 
Cost Carrier [LCC].     
 Of all the changes enabled by deregulation the LCC is perhaps the most 
significant. It was pioneered by an intrastate Texas airline and its charismatic CEO, Herb 
Kelleher. Taking over in the year of deregulation, Kelleher developed a formula that led 
the seven year old Southwest Airlines to unparalleled success beyond the Lone Star State. 
That formula is as follows:  1. A simple air fare structure 2. A limited number of airplane 
types, thereby providing uniformity of maintenance costs and parts 3. Staffing with a 
lower ratio of employees coupled with low costs and higher productivity than their 
counterparts in legacy airlines. 4. Flights located in airports where gate and 
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arrival/departure costs are lower. 5.  Unique brand identity. 6. A point to point route 
structure. (Wybrandt, 2004). 
 Alfred Kahn (2002), Chair of CAB throughout the deregulation process noted, 
―Decontrol of prices allowed airlines to fill their planes by offering large numbers of 
heavily discounted fares for seats that would otherwise go unused. Decontrol of routes 
permitted them to plan their operations as they see fit. And deregulation has compelled 
improvements in efficiency through the intense pressures of the price competition it 
unleashed.‖ The emphasis on low fares, low cost and the ―fun branding‖ of Southwest is 
seen in the typically humorous, Kelleher style comment ―If the Wright brothers were 
alive today Wilbur would have to fire Orville to reduce costs‖ (Jones, 1994). Again 
eschewing the typical CEO stockholder presentation formula Kelleher never used a text 
or notes in any of his presentations (personal communication, investor relations at SW 
Airlines March 8, 2005). The only airline to be consistently profitable in all economic 
conditions, Southwest Airlines is a model for the deregulated airline and a major 
challenge to the other legacy airlines.  
 The reemergence of Frontier followed the pioneering Southwest LCC pattern in 
all areas except point to point travel.  ―Frontier began operations with two 737s serving 
Denver, Bismarck, Fargo, Grand Forks and Minot, North Dakota‖ (Frontier web site). 
The formula of using only 737s, low fares, and working with employees to provide a 
personalized level of service in a cooperative management mode are all part of their 
corporate culture. The airline grew and received awards and recognition. By mid 2001 
Frontier had carried over 11 million passengers, initiated a 3 for 2 stock split stock, had 8 
quarters in a row of profitable operation, was named One of Business Week’s hot growth 
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companies (Arndt, 2001) and one of Fortune magazines 50 fastest growing companies 
(Fortune) and Best Domestic Low cost Carrier by Entrepreneur Magazine (2002).  It also 
adjusted to changing labor relations as its mechanics voted for unionization followed by 
Pilots and dispatchers. By 2001 it was not a major airline but was steadily growing 
toward the billion dollar revenue marker established by the FAA for that designation. It is 
a leader in maintenance procedures, receiving the highest award for mechanic/technician 
training; the only airline to have 100% employee participation in this award. One unique 
aspect of Frontier‘s operation is that it developed on a hub and spoke operational plan. 
Most LCCs are point to point service providers whereas FA uses the hub and spoke 
model of the legacy carriers with Denver as its sole hub.   
The newly formed company has had two CEO‘ s. The leader of the group  that 
recreated the airline, Samuel Addoms served from 1994 to 2002.  Jeff Potter was with 
Frontier from 1995 to 2000 when he left to become President of Vanguard Airlines only 
to return to Frontier as Chief Operating Officer in May 2001, becoming President in 
August 2001 and was elected in April 2002 as the CEO. The Fiscal year for FA ends on 
March 31st and the shareholder‘s meeting is held in September.  Although Addoms was 
CEO at the 2001 shareholder‘s meeting, the newly returned Potter delivered the address 
to the shareholders.  
Summary 
It is within the context of their corporate histories, the organizational cultures, the 
industry fluctuations and the personal actions of its leaders that these three airlines moved 
into the new millennium. Their histories are not archived practices of past glories, 
traumas and difficulties overcome. They are a repository of meaning, a resource to be 
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mined to meet the exigencies of the current situation. How the past is conjured up, 
represented and connected to the present difficulties and future goals is a rhetorical 
activity. Time becomes the currency, not in a linear sense but in rhetorical practice. The 
events of the past are relived, reoriented, reconfigured and reconnected to the present so 
that a continuous ―natural‖ flow is created. The durée becomes a driving force as the 
structures are reaffirmed in practice and rhetorical application. Social constructionist 
practices are employed that proclaim ―who they are is what they were‖. While the future 
is uncertain the meaning of the past is clear, at least as persuasively created at a moment 
in time to meet particular needs. Belief in the future is based on the persuasive force of 
the past. It is in light of who they are and what they represent that the CEOs attempt to 
maintain the confidence and financial support of the shareholders against the ever 
changing, always interesting, often volatile world of airline transportation.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Chief Executive Officers Speak 
American, Delta and Frontier in the years 2001, 2002 and 2003 
This chapter addresses research question number one: In response to the multiple 
exigencies created by the 9/11 attacks, what rhetorical strategies did airline CEO‘s 
use in their annual meeting address to stockholders prior to, immediately following 
and significantly afterwards? Research question two and three will be addressed in 
Chapter Five.  
Annual Meetings 
Annual General Meetings of corporations, i.e. shareholder meetings, have 
inherent multiple purposes independent of the circumstances of the particular year they 
are given. Shareholder meetings are required by the Security and Exchange commission 
for companies that issue common stocks. They open with legal statements about the 
accuracy and the binding nature of the information presented therein. They are governed 
by the laws of the state in which they are incorporated. They are opportunities for 
shareholder votes to be cast on the election of director‘s, non-binding and binding 
proposals on company policies and practices and social and political statements of 
interest to shareholders. They also approve mergers, allow the sale of significant assets, 
and change company by-laws and articles of incorporation. They can be lengthy, all day 
affairs, or as short as one-half hour (Baue, 2006). However, meeting all the legal 
requirements is only one aspect of these meetings. 
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As a state of the corporation address that is both retrospective and prospective, 
shareholder meetings are communicative tools that serve to inform, persuade, explain, 
interact, and most important, engender confidence in the leadership and the corporation. 
One of the primary tasks of the CEO is shareholder management. Since shareholder 
meetings are a primary contact opportunity and possibly the only face to face meeting 
between the owners of the corporation and the leadership in a given year, this function is 
significant for CEOs. The address is not only to those present but to shareholders, 
analysts, communities, employees and many others. In chapter 2 a connection was made 
to the form and goals of State of the Union Addresses of the U. S. President with 
similarity of purpose and presentation. For corporations " ‗It's important to remember that 
the CEOs want to use their annual shareholder meetings to show off how well the 
company is doing,‘ Passoff says….The good esteem of the shareholders — even minor 
ones — is a commodity in its own right.‘‖ (Frel, 2005)  For CEO‘s this becomes critical 
in the midst of a crisis since, as I have shown, stock value is inexorably linked to 
confidence of investors in the future profitability and stability of the corporation and its 
leadership.  
The annual meetings under consideration in this dissertation are notable because 
they address the crisis of the individual corporation as well as the social, political and 
economic crisis that occurred with the events of 9/11. As such they are both universal and 
particular. There is an understanding that the larger circumstances creating these 
exigencies are understood and do not need explanation and analysis. Their particular 
impact and how they altered the plans, goals and practices of the corporations and created 
a new set of circumstances to be addressed is their focus. As previously noted, the 9/11 
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crisis engenders a different tactic of response because outsiders created the problem. 
Hidden by the magnitude of the social and political impact of the crisis is the economic 
downturn that started in the last quarter of 2000. Also hidden is the industry overcapacity 
and the innate volatility of airlines operation after deregulation. In some ways the attacks 
of 9/11 remove attention from a downturn that promised to become a significant problem 
for the industry as a variety of economic factors congealed together prior to hijacked 
planes crashing into the twin towers and Pentagon.  
In this chapter, each address of the CEOs airline will be considered for the three 
year period that is the focus of this study. In the following chapter the presentations will 
be considered between the airlines and similarities, differences and conclusions will be 
drawn. The industry and individual airline contexts highlighted in chapter 3 are assumed 
as the background for making sense and giving meaning to the presentations. The 
emphasis of this analysis will be the persuasive elements found in the configuration of 
time by the CEOs to achieve their individual, professional and corporation‘s goals. As the 
largest and most influential corporation American Airlines will be considered followed 
by Delta and then Frontier Airlines. 
American  Airlines : Don Carty and Gerard Arpey 
The three presentations to the shareholders for American Airlines are notable for 
their contrast of length and scope of information. The May 2001, pre 9 – 11 and 2003 
Post 9 – 11 speeches are over 2118 and 2463 words respectively. They are thematically 
organized in lists based on an analysis of past events and future projections. These lists 
are the major organizational pattern of the speeches for 2001 and 2003. In contrast, the 
speech of 2002, immediately following 9 -11, is 623 words; less than 29% of the shortest 
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of the other two speeches. This is significant because threat situations are known for their 
ambiguity, uncertainty and questions. While this will be visited in detail later, perhaps the 
amount of the shared knowledge and common ground of the audience lessened the 
―need‖ for elaboration. It may have been that since there was not a whole lot that could 
be done about the situation at this point, the strategy was to say little. It may also be due 
to the fact that once again maintenance issues and the significant loss of life in the 
November crash of Flight 587 in Queens created a circumstance where less was more.  
2001 
The 2001 speech uses two lists that are interwoven along the lines of 
internal/external orientation. In the second paragraph of the pre 9 – 11, CEO Don Carty 
lists the significant events and challenges that have occurred in the last year. They 
involve  
 the sale of a SABRE reservation system,  
 purchase of TWA,  
 sharing of the Northeast Shuttle 
 investing in the DC shuttle  
 air traffic control issues and  
 a federal lawsuit for predatory pricing  
 Resolution of issues with the Pilot‘s Union and mediation with Flight 
attendants (lines 10-13). 
The second list he offers is that of the Airline Leadership Plan that was developed by AA 
in 1999. The 6 critical areas of the plan are listed in the third paragraph,  
 safety 
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 service 
 product 
 technology 
 culture 
 network (line 19) 
It is the latter list that is addressed in a systematic fashion with the former list nested 
within in relation to how it affects the Airline Leadership Plan. The orientation of the 
presentation is to consider how the external activities will impact the vital internal 
functioning of the organization. After speaking 694 words, one third of the entire 
presentation, about the impact of the TWA acquisition on the AA network he states, ―I 
don‘t want to leave you today with the impression that we spent all our time working on 
deals. We have taken great strides along the other critical paths of our Airline Leadership 
Plan….‖ (lines 74-75).  
With AA, their legendary past and industry leadership role is an iconic frame that 
is utilized in overt and subtle ways. As the industry leader and trend setter, the legendary 
CEO Robert Crandall tripled the size, tripled revenues and doubled profitability while 
making AA the industry leader in nearly every significant performance category. From 
this culture of excellence, this culture of ruthless leadership (Reed, 1993) arose the 
mentality of being the biggest dog on the block. This expectation of industry leadership 
and innovation and this goal of seeking to do things in such a way that the rest of the 
industry copied you is evident in these speeches. With its roots in the legendary activity 
of Charles Lindbergh, American Airline does not move into the future, it controls it. The 
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view that all airlines want to be like American is a ―natural‖ result of a slice of time 
beginning with Lindbergh following a continuous thread from the past to the present.    
This can be seen even in the naming of the plan that encompasses the six critical 
areas referred to in the 2001 speech. The 2000 American Airlines Annual Report notes, 
―… the overarching goal of the Airline Leadership Plan, the strategic program that we 
launched in 1999 that focuses the Company‘s activities on the six areas that we believe 
defines success for any airline…. In 2000 we made important strides toward industry 
leadership in all six‖ (p. 3) [emphasis added]. In line with its place in history, AA‘s 
Airline Leadership Plan draws attention to the ―reality‖ that before the plan has been 
implemented and its value shown in actual conditions, people will know it leads not only 
AA but defines the industry itself. Carty continues this thread as he speaks about another 
plan ―Last January former President Clinton recognized ASAP, our Aviation Safety 
Action Partnership, as a model to be implemented throughout the industry‖ (line 105).   
This framing as an industry leader extends to the CEO and management team 
through a mixture of personal/organizational statements that establishes individual and 
organizational credibility. Carty‘s statement concerning the increasing network made 
available through the TWA acquisition is hyperbolic in tone. ―I personally feel confident 
in saying to you, our shareholders, that we could not have devised a more responsible, 
more economic way to do it‖ (lines 49-51). More than leadership optimism he is stating 
that the management team, the self proclaimed top management team of the industry of 
which he is the head, has done the penultimate job of creating a network unparalleled in 
the industry. Again this is stated within a month of the purchase being finalized, before 
the actual consolidation of assets, flights and personnel would occur. One would not 
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expect anything less from the best of the best that stand upon the shoulders of Lindbergh. 
While the meeting opens with the statement that these forward looking statements are no 
guarantee of future activity, it is clear that as part of the industry leader, the future is 
bright because of what we have done in the past and who we are now.  
The entire presentation of 2001 is tied to this storied past by noting it is ―our  75th 
year‖ (line 9). This is further emphasized with reference to Charles Lindbergh (line 28). 
Throughout the 2001 speech there is an interplay between industry leadership, significant 
past events and confidence for the future. Dominated by the Airline Leadership Plan‘s 
network and the purchase of TWA [735 words] and the AA culture [463 words], one half 
of the presentation heralds glimpses of storied pasts and a leadership that is on task. 
Events are rearranged on the basis of the significance Carty ascribes to them. Even the 
years are compressed. The 2000 fiscal year is the focus of the meeting yet many events, 
including the centerpiece April 2001 TWA acquisition, are included. The positive events 
are used in multiple years as highlights of the speech are repeated from the previous year 
and brought to the fore again next year [sale of SABRE, 75th Anniversary, TWA].   
With the Airline Leadership Plan‘s concept of control comes the necessity of 
commitment. Carty closes with, ―With the flexibility we have built into our fleet plan, our 
fuel hedging program and our strong commitment to the Airline Leadership Plan, we 
believe we will be very well positioned for whatever happens going forward‖  (line 149). 
Ironically the events of 9/11 will test that statement in a way unimaginable at the time. 
The future is not discussed unless it is connected to the past. The configuration of time to 
construct meaning, to use the past to enact a present environment, to create a link 
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between the ―giants‖ and lesser lights of the past, to give insight to the choices of today 
and the goals of the future is a primary rhetorical technique in Carty‘s presentation.  
Similar to 2001, the 2003 presentation centers on a new set of lists. The 
presentation of 2002 does not. It is centered on a singular event that is seen as the cause 
of all others. Even though two catastrophic events occurred in 2001, only one is 
highlighted with all conditions attributed to it. Even in the abbreviated form of 2002 the 
compression and slicing of time is a central focus. Instead of making connections across 
decades Carty makes connections across weeks. 
2002 
Carty begins the speech to the shareholders in 2002 with irony, ―You know, in 
some respects 2001 was like most other years‖ (line 4). Burke (1945) notes that the effect 
of irony is to establish a dialectic, framing a perspective (p. 512). Carty creates an 
incongruity that is plain to the hearers. By line 8 Carty resolves the incongruity with, ―As 
everyone in this room knows, 2001 was not just another year.‖ Sixty percent of the 
speech deals with a brief introduction and comments directly about 9/11 and the airline 
industry. The other 40% deals with the changes for AA; most of those are related directly 
to 9/11. Only 108 words are used to describe, in the sparsest of terms, three significant 
activities of the year; the 75th anniversary, the TWA merger, and a More Room in Coach 
campaign. The term 2001 is used as a replacement for 9/11. The 12 month year is implied 
but the focus of ―2001‖ is on the events of 9/11. As stated, 2001 was not just another year 
– it was a singular event from which all other activities are filtered. This quality of the 
year, established before the meeting and assumed by Carty in the speech, allows for a 
significant time compression that simultaneously focuses and deflects.  
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The two big events for AA in 2001 were the simultaneous hijackings of planes 
that were flown into the World Trade Center [flight 11] and the Pentagon [flight 77] and 
the Nov 12 crash of AA flight 587 shortly after takeoff into a Queens, New York 
neighborhood. A total of 147 passengers and crew members died on the two hijacked 
flights. A total of 260 passengers and crew died on the Nov. 12 flight. (NTSB). The first 
event was an outsider caused incident with the responsibility for airline security resting 
more with the government than the airline. Flight 587 is another story. The NTSB found 
that the probable cause of the accident to be the first officer‘s excessive force on the 
rudder pedals (NTSB). Avionic technicians were servicing and resetting malfunctioning 
stabilizing equipment shortly before takeoff. Given the history of AA maintenance 
programs there was potential fallout about the safety of traveling on the world‘s largest 
carrier. Rhetorically, Carty ignores these problems and focuses all attention on the 9/11 
attacks. 
 After making explicit the irony in line 8, Carty states, ―For American Airlines 
every accomplishment, indeed every other event was overshadowed by the twin 
calamities of the September 11th attacks and the terrible crash of an American plane in 
Queens, New York on November 12‖ (lines 10-12). This is the only time the November 
12 crash is mentioned. It is lumped together with the events of 9/11 and treated as if they 
have the same causative factors. The key is the use of the word ―twin‖. All knew of the 
planes crashing into the ―twin‖ towers of the World Trade Center. This was the dominant 
media framing of the events of 9/11. Two American Airlines planes, a ―twin‖ hijacking 
occurred. Linking the events of 9/11 and the crash of November 12 by the word ―twin‖ 
evokes a similarity of origin and effect. It compresses two months of time into a single 
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act. As Burke notes, statements are simultaneously a reflection and a deflection (Burke, 
1945). By focusing on the outsider created crisis of 9/11, Carty is deflecting the gaze and 
consideration of  airline culpability for the crash of Nov 12.  
 As stated above, the year 2001 is used as a representation for the events of 9/11. 
The phrase ―September 11‖ is used only 3 times in the speech. The first time is in the 
quote at the beginning of the last paragraph. The second time immediately follows that 
quote at the start of Carty‘s next paragraph, ―Prior to September 11th our company's 
greatest obstacle…‖ (line 13). Hence the phrase, ―the terrible crash of an American plane 
in Queens, New York on November 12‖ is sandwiched between two explicit references to 
September 11. Introduced as the ―twin calamities‖ it is reasonable to expect that having 
had significant exposure to reporting of the events of 9/11 and imprinted with the 
language, phrasing and sequencing of the media accounts the order of delivery of these 
words , 
―For American Airlines every accomplishment, indeed every other event 
was overshadowed by the twin calamities of the September 11th attacks 
and the terrible crash of an American plane in Queens, New York on 
November 12. 
 Prior to September 11th our company's greatest obstacle…‖ 
was referring to 9/11.  
The only other time the phrase ―September 11‖ is used is 3 lines later 
when Carty states, ―And obviously after September 11 things got much, much 
worse‖ (line 16). Whether expanding the connection intentionally or not, he may 
be more correct than he realized. The events surrounding the second largest loss 
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of life in an airline accident on US soil (NTSB) was reported well after the 
meeting by the NTSB. It was due to AA pilot error. With all the legal and 
financial ramifications it could easily be defined as ―much, much worse,‖ not for 
the country, but for AA. Using a common language about 9/11 that an audience 
readily understands , then rhetorically connecting other potential difficulties to 
9/11 serves to combine the non-related difficulties, creating groupings that are not 
logically valid but are emotionally acceptable. The mantra of 9/11 as the source of 
the troubles, the usage of 2001 as a substitute for the events that morning in 
September and the brevity of the speech served to deflect attention away from the 
problems of Flight 587. The umbrella of understanding created by the attacks of 
9/11 was large enough to downplay the culpability and the implications of the 
airline for the Nov 12 crash within its shade. 
Michael Leff notes that one can find motivation revealed in how someone uses 
the chronological sequence of events in the retelling of those events and creating 
significance and meaning through the retelling. The activity of 9/11 was an act of war in 
which the airlines are unwilling participants. The crash of Flight 587 is the opposite.  
Linking them plays into the emotions of the audience and deflects scrutiny. It is the only 
reference to the November crash in the entire meeting, including any stockholder 
questions, votes or other activities recorded in the minutes of the AGM.   
The center third of the speech re-focuses attention away from the crashes creating 
three slices of time in rapid succession. He orients them back to the founding of the 
company in briefly mentioning that AA is celebrating 75 years of history. Carty looks at 
the past year‘s accomplishments by noting that ―despite all of the aforementioned 
 90 
 
problems in our business, completed the biggest, the most complex and most successful 
integration of two airlines in the history of our industry‖ (lines 28-30) and invoking the 
―nightmare‖ of deregulation as an analogy for the current situation (line 34).  
The roller coaster of emotions created by this trio of the distant and recent past 
serves three rhetorical functions. The first is that it invokes the concept of longevity 
through changing circumstances. Although Lindbergh is not mentioned his presence is 
there. Secondly, the problems do not deter the leadership team from ―the biggest, most 
complex and MOST SUCCESSFUL merger. The crisis created by the events does not 
have control, the management team remains in charge. Thirdly, we have been here 
before. Deregulation created a financial circumstance analogous to the one we are in 
now. The unstated connection is made – we were successful in negotiating that 
environment, we will be successful in this one also. In 179 words Carty slices time to 
look back in order to gain confidence as they focus on the future. Carty invokes the 
images that in times of crisis the anchors are found in two places – our history and our 
leadership. Even calamity does not deter us from being the MOST successful. Our past 
teaches us that we have been here before and the shareholders need to know, we will be 
fine.  
Similar to 2001, the 2003 presentation centers on a new set of lists. However, The 
speaker in 2003 is not Carty. Financial promises and decisions made in the aftermath of 
9/11 to the management team were hard to justify in the wake of subsequent givebacks 
by the union. In April of 2003, Carty was forced to resign as CEO. Gerard Arpey was 
named the leader of American Airlines. 
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2003 
By the Shareholder‘s meeting of May, 2003 the events of 9/11 were twenty 
months in the past. The negative financial effects were still significant in many sectors of 
the economy but the ―understanding‖ of investors that time was needed for adjustments 
to the newly created circumstances created by 9/11 had faded. AMR stock had fallen 
from a May 15 2001 value of 37.01 a share to a May 15, 2003 value of 6.72 a share 
(Marketwatch, 2003) with a reported net earnings loss of $ 4.7 billion in the previous four 
quarters (AA SEC 10K filing 2002, p. 21). In trying to keep the airline on course, 
leadership sought yearly expense reductions by reducing fleet costs of $2 billion, gaining 
concessions from their suppliers for $175 million, and negotiating salary give backs from 
all of their unions equaling $2 billion (lines 31 – 52). Carty was instrumental in gaining 
these concessions. 
 The problem was not with the concessions but with pension protections and 
contractual bonuses promised to upper level executives shortly following 9/11. Executive 
leadership received these guarantees totaling millions of dollars if they remained with the 
company through this turbulent time. In 2001 it was felt that AA needed the best 
available people who were familiar with the company to make it through the upcoming 
financial difficulties. The problem was that disclosure of these payments was not made 
until a few days after the union concessions were signed. Business Week noted of the 
man who by his own admission in 2001 stated ―no one could have devised a more 
responsible, more economic way‖ to acquire TWA,  
CEO Donald J. Carty snatched defeat from the jaws of victory by 
revealing the details of executive-retention bonuses and pension 
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protections after most union members had narrowly voted to accept $1.62 
billion worth of annual concessions. Suddenly, Carty's calls for "shared 
sacrifice" rang hollow. Almost immediately, two of the three unions were 
calling for new votes -- endangering the contracts Carty fought so hard to 
win. "This has been probably the most badly handled transaction in my 30 
years in the industry," says airline expert Mo Garfinkle of GCW 
Consulting.  (Zellner, 2003) 
Gerard Arpey was thrown into the breach a few weeks before the 2003 annual 
shareholders meeting. He begins his presentation with a personal statement noting he has 
spent his entire career at AA, using the metaphor of ―calling it home‖ (line 5). He later 
refers to his 20 years at AA (line 19) (line 144). He notes what he has done ―in the short 
time he has been CEO‖, bracketing the talk with details of his face to face interactions 
and letter correspondence with employees (line 12) (line 148). This personal history 
lesson is given primacy and recency (German, Gronbeck, Ehninger, Monroe, 2004). 
When measured by total words spoken about his personal history it may seem of minor in 
importance despite its dual position. It is, however, significant because of its weaving of 
personal time and corporate history. Arpey does not invoke the legacy of Lindbergh but 
his own legacy. Arpey uses his past to connect to the struggles of the individuals trying to 
save an airline. This slicing of time in the presentation by his personal activity is a 
microcosm of what is needed under these circumstances, the company‘s perseverance 
that is akin to his own.  
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The focus of the talk is the means by which AA will ―survive‖ then ―thrive‖. Like 
Carty before him, Arpey centers his speech on four tenets of a new plan, ―The American 
Turnaround Plan‖ (line 27). The plan ―is summed up in the following four tenets:  
 lower costs to compete;  
 fly smart, give customers what they value  
 pull together, win together 
 build a financial foundation for our future (lines 27-30). 
 The American Turnaround Plan takes nearly 2000 of the 2469 words, or 81% of 
the presentation. Of this the second tenet, ―fly smart, give customers what they value‖ 
accounts for 885 words and the first and third tenets are nearly 425 words each. Stating 
the last tenet ―in a sense sums up the rest of the plan‖ (line 165), Arpey emphasizes the 
present and immediate future while giving a nod to long term implications. When a 
company has lost over $4 billion in the last year, seen its CEO resign under fire and its 
major competitors sliding into bankruptcy, focusing on the long term would be 
irresponsible and counterproductive. Fixing the issues that must be addressed now is 
paramount. Arpey focuses on two areas of major concern that are both related to his 
configuration of time. His first focus is his setting the clock of the corporation to start on 
September 11, 2001. In the second focus, similar to his personal reflections, he looks at 
the past, not only for its benefits but for the problems the AA family has had. 
 After his personal introduction and reminisces,  Arpey begins in line 7 with these 
words, ―Since September 11, 2001, the nearly 100,000 members of the American Airlines 
and American Eagle family have been engaged in the noble effort of trying to save this 
great company.‖ Two thirds of the way through his talk he states, ―As everyone here 
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knows, the revenue picture today bears little resemblance to the year 2000‖ (line 112). He 
refers to fleet capacity in 2001 (line 95) and decisions made about seating size in the year 
2000 (line 104) placing each of these under the scrutiny of changes within the ―past three 
years‖ (line 173). The 77 years of a storied past and the hubris of industry leadership has 
given way to the crisis reality of survival starting in the events of September 2001. Gone 
is the Airline Leadership Plan defining an industry.  In its place is the more modestly 
named American Turnaround Plan, focused solely on his company. The images of home, 
family, cooperation, pulling together, noble efforts, sacrifice, and shared commitment are 
juxtaposed against the challenges, struggle for survival, enormous financial constraints 
and turbulent and difficult period foisted upon them. Selected historical recountings 
eliminate the downturn that started before 9/11 and projected losses throughout a 
changing industry on par with the early years of the 1990s (Andres, 2003) as noteworthy. 
Crisis brings its own problems with them but it also brings a causation that allows 
attribution of most of the present difficulties on the crisis event whether the connection is 
accurate or not. In this case the crises of the events of 9/11 are rhetorically configured to 
mask the underlying problems of the industry. By refocusing on 9/11 and attributing 
today‘s issues to its affects, Arpey attributes problems to outside forces not lack of 
planning, the nature of the industry or poor leadership.  
 Another connection Arpey makes is the connection between leadership tactics and 
past problems within the corporation. When he reaches to events and attitudes before the 
September 2001 era he valorizes the employees and AA culture and indirectly implicates 
the problems created by organizational leadership attitudes.  In the opening paragraphs he 
mentions the ―guts and determination‖ of employees (line 10), the aforementioned noble 
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efforts and the commitment and sacrifices made, while reminding the shareholders that 
he told employees, ―while we won't be abandoning the values and strengths that have 
always defined American Airlines, we will be bringing new leadership, new thinking, and 
fresh approaches to the challenges confronting us‖ (lines 15-18). I have shown in 
considering Presidential State of the Union messages that crisis intensifies the need to 
hearken back to values. One reason is the changes that crises demand. Assurance that the 
changes are not fundamentally altering the landscape of the company is designed to breed 
confidence. Investors bought into the AA culture, not some form of unproven altered 
company.  This theme of the need for ―a new leadership‖ approach is repeated by 
highlighting what was wrong with the old way while holding on to the time tested values 
that have made AA what it was and will be again.  
 The third tenet of the Turnaround Plan is explicit; the only way to deal with the 
crisis is to pull together. These admissions of past wrongs are found not overtly but built 
into the descriptions of what is needed. To pull together will take a ―transformation‖ (line 
131) and all of this hinges upon the need to ―build trust and teamwork back into the 
fabric of this company‖ (line 133 emphasis added). A cultural, interactional change is 
needed ―creating an atmosphere at American where every employee feels valued, where 
everyone is treated with fairness, respect and appreciation, and where rancor and 
suspicion are replaced with cooperation and a shared commitment to our collective 
success‖ (lines 139-142, emphasis added). What was there did not work. Now, at a time 
of crisis, a new path needs chosen and it is up to leadership to initiate and sustain it.  
 Throughout the presentation Arpey emphasizes this change by his use of the 
plural pronoun ―we‖ or its cognates. It is found 77 times, or once every 32 words of the 
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presentation. In the front two thirds of the speech most of these refer to the corporation. 
―We‖ could be replaced by ―American Airlines‖ or ―the corporation‖. In the latter third 
the ―we‖ refers mostly to the people, not the organization. The ―we‖ is management, or 
union and management, or employees, or Arpey and senior leadership. We are not a 
faceless entity but living, breathing, choice making human beings. ―We‖ or its cognates 
appear once every 26 words near the end. Out of this adversarial sparring match that has 
gone on throughout the decades a unity must be created and management understands 
both its role in creating the problem and the stakes involved in solving it. In conclusion of 
his third tenet Arpey speaks of the task of senior leadership, including himself, ―We do, 
however, recognize that we will ultimately be judged by what we do, not by what we say, 
and we welcome that‖ (lines 163-164). With a candor that is bred in part by the exigency 
of survival, Arpey places the onus squarely on the shoulders of the leadership to right the 
wrongs of the past, build on the heroic struggle of the present and give AA a chance to 
continue. It is not a singular effort by the CEO but one that ―engages every member of 
the AA team.‖ At its core is a man who sums up his 20 years at American Airlines by 
presenting himself as one of them. His time with the corporation, his perseverance, his 
friendships and face to face interactions make him one of them, schooled in the time 
tested traditions of the AA way. His recounting of time makes him trustworthy. The 
meaning of his service is the foundation for their future together.   
American Airlines Summary 
 The struggles for American Airlines in the time period under consideration are 
considerable. The loss of three airplanes and over 400 passengers and crew in a two 
month period, hemorrhaging funds at unparalleled levels, leadership missteps and 
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historical antipathy between labor and management threatened the survival of the 
enterprise. The three year period under consideration saw the circumstances demand an 
alteration of the rhetoric as hubris was set aside, at least for a time, as frictions were 
eased with the oil of cooperation poured on the troubled waters of harsh economic and 
political exigencies. Reconstructed time and slices of time serving as rhetorical filters are 
a significant factor in addressing these exigencies. Using the legacy of the past to invoke 
the necessary lessons of the present, rolling the self-created difficulties of the present into 
a more acceptable outsider attack, or using one‘s own history as a door to gain acceptance 
and provide assurance that they are all in this together, time is the building block of the 
Carty/Arpey presentations. How the organizational and personal pasts are conjured up to 
give explanation, to enact an environment and to make sensible the present choices and 
future visions hinges on the CEO‘s abilities to use time persuasively.  
American Airlines was not alone in this. The entire industry was forced to make 
choices of how to stem the precipitous downturn in business and the changing face of air 
travel as the very measures taken to prevent another 9/11 type attack served as a reminder 
of the threat to one‘s safety. Delta Airlines did not suffer the trauma of the hijacking of its 
airplanes. It did however, find itself dealing with a similar rhetorical ecology, one where 
understanding of the unforeseen effects could be expected by its employees and 
shareholders as adjustments were made to the new reality, at least for a time. It is to the 
presentations by the CEO of Delta that we now turn. 
Delta Airlines: Leo Mullin 
 At the turn of the millennium Delta Airlines [DAL] laid claim to being the largest 
airline in the world on the basis of total passenger emplanements and net income. Its 
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legacy status and cooperative leadership in the airline industry was an integral part of the 
corporate culture that Mullin inherited in 1997 as he assumed leadership in the midst of 
the greatest profits the industry has seen. The Mullin presentations for 2001, 2002 and 
2003 are 2051, 3316, and 3167 words respectively. Unlike leadership at AA, Mullin‘s 
presentations increased after 9/11 in an effort to make sense of the fallout of the attacks 
and flesh out the implications for the airline. Unlike the AA presentations there is only a 
passing reference to a systematic plan. This is found only in Mullin‘s presentation in 
2003. The plan is not used as a skeletal structure for the speech, it is auxiliary at best. 
While the similarity of topics is evident, the explanations of individual and leadership 
decision making takes greater precedence as Delta moves from the ―largest airline‖ in 
2001 to dancing on the edge of bankruptcy in 2003. Leo Mullin seeks to persuade the 
shareholders and the audiences not present that he is in charge and the leadership team 
can maneuver through the crisis, despite all indications to the contrary. 
2001 
 The April 2001 meeting in Atlanta was held only 6 months after the last 
shareholder meeting in Cincinnati. This was to place them in line with other corporations 
holding spring meetings (personal communication, Carrie Weaver, Investor Relations, 
DAL June 5, 2005).  Mullin‘s opens by stating that the six months brought significant 
changes, ―While our last Annual Meeting for Shareowners convened just six month ago 
in Cincinnati, the speed and import of intervening events has had a significant impact on 
the aviation industry and on Delta Air Lines, disproportionate to the actual elapsed time‖ 
(line 6). This begins an organization of the speech that is based on time. Mullins sticks 
within the time period designated for the meeting, discussing the events of 2000, 
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spending 58% [1189/2051] of his speech reviewing and making sense of the events of the 
calendar year 2000. He calls them ―context for the events of the last few months (line 17). 
In contrast, only 18% [362/2051] of the time is spent addressing the present 
circumstances and 12% [245/2051] of the words are spoken on consideration of the 
future. The remainder is found in the conclusion.  
 The preponderance of information on 2000 serves two purposes. First, it 
highlights the mostly good news of the year before he addresses the current problem, the 
pilot‘s strike of its subsidiary, Com Air that is in its 32nd day (line 143). This strike 
followed another pilot created issue as Delta pilots were involved in a slow down in 
November and December that reduced capacity by 3-4% and negatively affected 
passenger service (line 125). The slow down occurred as pilots refused overtime. To 
settle the dispute and negotiate a new contract required federal government intervention. 
Second, it serves to show a pattern and disturbing trends in the industry that Delta must 
address in addition to the pilot problems. Both of these current issues are challenges to 
the two pillars of Delta‘s corporate culture; satisfied customers as a result of happy 
employees (Delta Airlines Annual Report, 2000, pp. 12-13). 
 The two pilot issues: the last two months of 2000 and the current strike, go against 
the historic cooperation that the company has enjoyed with its unions as highlighted in 
the last chapter. The impact of these problems hits to the heart of Delta‘s core culture 
which is customer service. Mullin conjures fundamental corporate values as he speaks of 
the ―long-standing service reputation derived from over 70 years of operation‖ (line 56) 
and that customer service was a focus of his leadership from 1997 onward (line 54 & 57). 
The slow down and strike are seen as an aberration from the historic foundation and the 
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goals of his leadership. It is, however, not all the pilots creating the problem. In fact ―the 
vast majority of [Delta] pilots, exhibited the best of our service tradition by responding 
heroically to minimize the impact on customers…‖ (line131). While most follow the 
Delta tradition some have broken with the values of the past. He later makes the point 
that settling the pilot slowdown was done by reaching an ―industry-leading pilot contract‖ 
(line 119). This is within the management modus operandi of ―top pay for top 
performance‖ (line 112). That federal negotiators were needed to achieve the settlement 
and that it sullied customer relations and Delta‘s reputation is not the Delta culture.  
 The corporate culture that allowed the airline to climb back to the number one 
position in on time service is also threatened by outside forces, ―The business news today 
provides a constant litany of downward economic trends and corporate losses, indicating 
that few companies are escaping the effects of the current economic environment‖ (line 
85-87). This threatens what Mullin calls in his opening, ―…issues in almost every arena 
that have challenged our ability to deliver on commitments to our constituencies, 
especially to customers and shareholders‖ (line 9). Faced with a context that is unyielding 
and a few rogue employees, Mullin gives reason for the $122 million in losses in the first 
quarter of 2001 and why the record profitability of the past 25 quarters (line 97) cannot 
be expected to last. He uses these slices of time to explain recent circumstances and to 
lessen expectation while not losing confidence. This is not an easy duality to achieve. It is 
at the end, when his points have been made and the reminders of the successes of 2000 
have been used to contextualize the present difficulties that he turns to the American 
Civil War to find a focus that reveals more about his outlook and viewpoints than he 
planned.  
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 Dealing with two rancorous union negotiations for the first time in company 
history Mullin looks to Abraham Lincoln for a vision that addresses the breach in this 
heretofore unit of teamwork, civility and harmony known as Delta Airlines, where 
customer service is paramount. He chooses the ending of the Second Inaugural address 
given by the victorious President, ― ‗With malice toward none, with charity for all; with 
firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right, let us…do all which may achieve 
and cherish a just and lasting peace among ourselves‘ ‖ (lines 184-186). In using this he 
is drawing a parallel between the Civil War, whose ongoing rancor and alienation was so 
great these epic words were needed to give a moral reason for stopping the animus and 
healing a broken shattered nation, and Delta‘s contract negotiations.  
While I cannot speak for Mullin‘s internal framing, his perception of the degree to 
which there is a violation of the character and culture of the organization by the pilot‘s 
self-serving actions must have seemed like a civil war. This is a breach that needs 
restoration in order to establish ―a lasting peace‖. For Mullin, invoking this iconic quote 
and sentiment from the past reveals that this is not just business, it is personal. He saw 
these actions as threatening the very integrity of the corporation and his leadership. 
Before the pilot‘s contract dispute is fully settled, he uses the words of the victorious 
President and invokes God‘s blessings to call for peace. He reaches back to the 
divisiveness of the Civil War to establish the degree of brokenness and prescribe a 
remedy for healing. Speaking from Atlanta, arguably the city most devastated by the 
events of the Civil War, he uses the words of the victorious northern commander to 
reclaim the airline‘s heritage. Time is sliced so that the lessons of our country‘s past are 
brought to bear on this corporate betrayal. 
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 In the next few months of 2001, Delta and its pilots would settle the disputes and 
get back to ―normal‖. That is, until the events of 9/11changed the dynamics of the 
industry.  It is in light of this breakdown in corporate culture and a perturbation of the 
formal and informal rules of interaction so long practiced at Delta that we turn to 
consider the rhetorical responses to the events and impact of 9/11 on this major, legacy 
airline.  
2002 
 The April 26, 2002 address to the shareholders contains no references to the loss 
of corporate culture or rancorous relationships. It would seem that the Lincoln quote of 
2001 had worked, re-establishing right relationships at the airline. Sixty percent longer 
than last year‘s speech, Mullin establishes an orientation to 9/11 and repeatedly uses it as 
the time referent for the entire presentation. He filters past events through the events of 
9/11 and projects future accomplishments based on the tasks that must be overcome as a 
result of 9/11.  Thirty times, or once every 110 words, he reorients the listener‘s focus 
with reference to September 11. In this presentation he highlights six crucial areas for 
business success and briefly touches on them. They comprise 26% [879/3316] of the 
presentation and are clearly subordinate to the time orientation of 9/11 which comprises 
100% of the text, from the first word to the 3231st word. While the previous year was 
about potential problems, none of these are mentioned, he does not even refer to the Com 
Air strike that was settled in 2001. In fact, teamwork, sacrifice and only the positives of 
industry leading revenues and emplanements are mentioned. Before anything is 
elucidated in the talk he opens by evoking the feeling of 9/11 with a narrative account 
that sets the stage for the rest of the speech.  
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 He states, ―We all felt disbelief, horror, and concern and compassion…‖, ―…our 
emotions were quickly overtaken…‖, he tells of tracking screens that ―slowly went 
vacant‖,  of ―the absence of sound… as the airport went eerily silent…‖,  and the 
realization that people and planes ―were scattered at unplanned destinations‖ (line 14 - 
26). This re-creation of emotions is critical in establishing the difficulty of operating in 
this environment. It is only under these circumstances that one can see the heroic effort, 
sacrifice and diligence of the employees. These characteristics are the foundation of the 
corporate culture and are now applied to the challenges of 9/11. Because of this 
foundation not only will Delta survive, but it will thrive (line 86). Juxtaposing these two 
words Mullin queries, ―Hence, the question before us today is, will we simply survive, or 
have we laid the right foundation, taken the right steps, and made the right plans to ensure 
that Delta will thrive…‖ (line 98). He uses the word ―survive‖ only twice but repeats 
thrive and its cognates more than 20 times. This gives the talk a future orientation as seen 
through a 9/11 lens. In fact on line 101, with 30 percent of the speech completed, he 
states ―and the theme of my remaining remarks today, is this: Delta will thrive.…‖ 
Whereas the context [and rogue pilots] in the previous year‘s address prevented Delta‘s 
customer service foundation from going forward, the events of 9/11 are not seen as 
controlling or as debilitating. Organizational crisis demands some form of control. Being 
able to thrive places the control within the aegis of management 
 Bennis notes one of the key characteristics of leadership is a positive attitude 
(Bennis, Nanus, 1997). This becomes crucial during a crisis. Addressing shareholders 
that have already seen stock value drop precipitously and the debt load of the company 
dramatically increase (lines 205-208) Mullin emphasizes why the plans in place establish 
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a foundation for overcoming the emotional jarring of 9/11 and reestablishing a solid 
financial footing. His confidence and the public‘s confidence and, by implication, 
investor confidence, should be high despite the difficulty. As long as we engage in that 
most difficult of all tasks, and that is to "think" (line 285), we can get through this. Mullin 
incarnates the emotion at the opening and ―solves‖ the emotional dilemma with brain 
power. He is saying, the head will win out over the heart. Near the end he asks, 
―Colloquially, when asked the simple questions, ‗What do you want Delta to be?‘, we 
have always answered, ‗The world‘s greatest airline.‘ Is this possible? Clearly, in my 
view, it is‖ (lines 281-284). 
 One of the differences between leadership and management is the communication 
of vision (O‘Hair, et al., 2005). He slices time back to the defining calamity of few 
months ago and uses that as the anchor for his presentation. The focus is on the future. To 
see beyond the present difficulties and present a view of a different destination than 
where the present paths lead requires the skills of the evangelist and the prophet. It 
involves enacting an environment; selecting what may not appear possible and making it 
salient to the organization, providing an impetus and rationale to try to achieve it. Mullin 
serves as both prophet and architect, calling forth a Delta arisen from the ashes of 9/11. 
His present tense emotive narrative at the outset seeks a future oriented creation of the 
―world‘s greatest airline‖. This presentation is as much a sermon as it is a discourse of 
commerce. The persuasive act rests upon the emotion and the many positive statistics 
(lines 137-228) that he uses to provide a sound mathematical complement to the 
visionary, redemptive rhetoric. The past is a distant blur, the statistics of the last few 
months are necessary because people are leery of seers. The statistics are useful because 
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investors are concerned about the finances. It is here that some of the statistics presented 
in such a positive light mask the underlying problem that will by this time next year 
create a crisis that threatens the entire organization. Solving the problem of cash flow and 
reduced income in the short term sows the seed for long term problems.  
 Structuration theory defines the communicative processes by which groups affirm 
their structures and cultures as well as allows for a re creation of them. Through the 
durée, participation and resistance in actions and language creates, reaffirms and alters 
the rules, practices and self understanding of a group. In a crisis such as the airlines in the 
aftermath of 9/11, the attempts to create a new reality, to take ―responsibility for our 
future‖ (line 256), was a necessity of survival. But an ancient proverb notes ―Between 
speaking and doing there is an ocean.‖ The constitutionality of communication 
participates with materiality, structures and practices to define the organization. Mullin‘s 
words by themselves cannot create the organizational conditions to thrive. The additional 
debts that Delta takes on in response to 9/11 become a weight under which it struggles to 
escape. Mullin leads the industry team in negotiating with Congress and the Bush 
administration for the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act (line 47, 
line 209) securing monies to support airlines in the midst of the crisis. It does not fix the 
crisis in his own company. Without the cash on hand to weather the downturn, the debt 
load becomes an overwhelming problem. The presentation in 2003 will speak to its 
effect.  
2003 
 The 2002 speech ends by repeating the themes of thriving and confidence with 
these words, ―And -- finally and most importantly -- in the coming months, we stand 
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ready to prove that our confidence in this airline and the people who will make it the 
world‘s greatest airline is well deserved.‖ The response to the immediate crisis effects is 
to proclaim they were on a foundation of confidence.  The succeeding year saw the 
challenge of September 11 give way to the pounding of increasing problems that created 
a synergy all their own. The opening of the 2003 speech is light years away from the 
thriving motif. Mullin begins in 2003,  
That environment …. may well be the most difficult in airline history.  
As such, it now presents Delta with a task that would have seemed 
unimaginable just two years ago, which is to restructure our company, 
remain solvent, and form the basis for sustained success in the future. 
And we must accomplish this task in the midst of significant macro-
economic and competitive changes that, given the recent experiences of 
our competitors, suggest the odds may be against us. (lines 8-14) 
Trying to survive won, thriving has been sent packing. Yet in 2003, even surviving is in 
serious doubt. 
 ―When is a crisis reached? When questions arise that can‘t be answered‖ 
(Kapuscinski, 2003). By this definition, 2003 was an overwhelming crisis time for Mullin 
and Delta. Immediately following the introduction, Mullin moves into an explanation of 
leadership compensation, including his own. Similar to the American Airlines retention 
bonuses that led to Carty‘s ouster, Delta considered retaining top leadership a paramount 
goal immediately following 9/11. Promised bonuses and his own contract renewal were 
problematic in the midst of record losses and negotiating union and employee give backs. 
The questions of 2003 did not go away when answered by the responses fashioned in 
 107 
 
2001 strategies. Likewise, understanding and enacting an environment proved 
problematic. ―However, as I reviewed last year‘s speech, it was clear that none of us at 
that time yet knew the degree of profound, fundamental change which still lay ahead‖ 
(line 76). Again a reassessment is given, ―In retrospect, that portrayal, which I thought 
was quite bleak at the time, now looks incredibly optimistic, given the reality of the past 
year‖ (line 84). Throughout this entire presentation Mullin explains that the views from 
last year were wrong and how this year is something no one foresaw. Obviously what 
was seen was not what was salient. What was acted upon did not provide a solution. The 
preacher‘s zeal did not withstand the withering economic realities. Time, restarted to 
begin on September 11, 2001 no longer even relates to 9/11. Time now relates to last 
year‘s assessment of 9/11 and the errors made in that assessment. Unlike AA the storied 
past is not invoked, the problems are not what 9/11 has done but how they were 
interpreted, framed and the solutions offered from last year have become the issue. This 
shrinking of time is a significant rhetorical move. Caught in the swirling vortex of a crisis 
there is only now, only today, only us.  
 The context setting of 2001 has given way to an understanding that none of the 
rules apply any more, that there are no answers, only questions. The time frame for this 
speech is the present because, to Mullin, history is no guide in this uncharted territory.  It 
is clear, there may not be a future for Delta or the industry. Combining these two themes 
he states, ―And as to my point [last year] that low profit levels would likely be the 
industry‘s primary problem in 2002, that issue has been fully displaced by the urgent 
issues of day-to-day airline survival and the related concerns of maintaining an effective, 
efficient national aviation system‖ (line 91). Day to day survival and trying to remain 
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solvent is a full time task with no room for nostalgia or future plans. He expands the 
struggle beyond Delta to the entire system. Survival and financial solvency are presented 
as ―ifs‖. The misreading of the future in 2002 leaves Mullin casting about for a means to 
move these ifs to a yes. He finds one way to articulate the path through five processes.  
 It is significant that Mullin does not call these a plan. Perhaps the tenuous 
circumstances are such that the word itself provides too much hope. They are instead 
conveyed as ―underpinnings‖ – foundations upon which to build, maybe even out of the 
ashes. A plan implies control and that is not available in this new territory. The zeal of 
evangelism has given way to the harsh realities that may consume the organization. Even 
the focus of 9/11 has faded as it is mentioned only six times throughout the speech and 
most of them are direct references to something said in last year‘s speech. The 
understanding that allowed extra patience for companies to adjust to the 9/11 attacks is no 
longer available. If a plan cannot be used perhaps these foundations will set the stage for 
recovery. In a crisis, leaders are called upon to project some sense of control. Mullin‘s 
presentation demonstrates that when a crisis evolves to a threat, when control seems 
impossible, time narrows to the present and foundational values are the only vestige to 
hold onto. 
 The five underpinnings are as follows: 
 First, an unwavering focus on our fundamental customer service 
obligation, which has as its most basic element an absolute commitment to 
safety. 
 Second, a balance sheet with strong enough liquidity to provide the 
staying power required to weather a sustained financial crisis. 
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 Third, the ability to maintain this staying power by minimizing the 
cash required for daily operating expenses, otherwise known as cash burn. 
 Fourth, a cost structure that, in the immediate term, enables 
survival and, in the period thereafter, would be competitive with all other 
carriers, and responsive to the continued growth of low-cost airlines.  
 And finally, despite the surrounding crisis, steady movement 
towards our longer-term strategic objectives (lines 104-114). 
They are remarkable for two reasons. The first is their complicated nature. These are not 
campaign slogans or even remarks that are easily understood. No PR jingle is found here. 
There is no time to create clever, catchy phrases that the media and stakeholders can 
remember by a mnemonic device. Secondly, they are, in many ways, the same responses 
to the problems found in the previous two years. The difference is they are unrelated to 
the past, lopped off from a historical context. Time is sliced very thinly in this section. 
Other than a vague comment about strategic objectives, they are seen as originating in the 
present crisis, devoid of historical precedent, analogy or connection. Mullin‘s burden is to 
create a new world out of whole cloth, unable to piece together the lessons of the past the 
present alone connects to the future.  
Despite the call for new thinking because the old ways do not work in the new 
environment, Mullin presents the same old formulas. Despite the pleas that state 
otherwise, the past is merely reconfigured to meet the new exigencies without proper 
citation. Fifty-nine percent [1857/3167] of the words of this presentation are used to 
explain the details of these underpinnings. The threat is addressed as Delta renovates 81 
airport lobbies for better customer service (line 135), receives federal aid reimbursement 
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for security measures, (line 150), optimizes the network and simplifies the fleet (line 
159), continues partnership with pilots and employee groups for effective competition 
(line 200) and adds flights at the Atlanta hub, (line 230). These five foundations could fit 
as part of the strategy for any year, at any time. Organizations solve the problems they are 
capable of solving. The new looks suspiciously similar to the old. The retained memories 
of past success are repackaged as new, innovative solutions to present crises. The enacted 
environment, despite all the statements to the contrary is but a reflection of the retained 
memories of the organization. 
Delta Airlines Summary 
 Seeking answers, Delta‘s leadership revisited familiar ground. Crises are defined 
in part by their uncertainty and ambiguity. Whether it be the crisis of altered 
organizational culture that creates and publicly projects antipathies likened to the Civil 
War, that the crisis elicits a spiritual revival mentality as an ideal vision is shared, or that 
a crisis results in trying to force the new world into a map case that is handy, the rhetoric 
of crisis management is imbued with time considerations. Gaining bearings from the past 
that impact the present in order to achieve an envisioned future seeks connections that 
transcend time, a way of clutching onto the time honored values of the organization. 
When the crush of events threatens to obliterate the history of the organization Mullin 
eschews the past to focus only on the present. In so doing he seeks trust placed in his 
leadership while at the same time calling into question his own assessments of events 
from the year before.  At a time when American Airline‘s Arpey was standing on the 
shoulders of giants, Mullin chose to stand alone, hat in hand explaining why the thriving 
of the last year‘s speech has given way to the ―can we survive?‖ of this year‘s speech. 
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This was not a rhetorical move that would breed investor confidence of his leadership or 
the future profitability of the airline. 
 9/11 affected the legacy carriers in significant ways. It also impacted the 
operation of smaller airlines and newer airlines. The low cost carriers had their own 
unique problems and unique ways of seeing and addressing the crisis of 9/11.  The final 
airline under consideration is Denver-based Frontier Airline.  
Frontier Airlines: Jeff Potter 
  Frontier Airlines [FA] adopted the practices of a Low Cost Carrier but adapted it 
to its own business model. Most LCCs operate from a traditional point to point flight 
pattern as pioneered by Southwest. Most legacy carriers operate with the American 
Airlines pioneered hub and spoke model. Frontier operates as a LCC with a hub and 
spoke model. It also adapted a standard business meeting practice for its CEO 
presentations. Unlike American or Delta, Frontier Airlines uses PowerPoint as the format 
for the presentation of the CEO to the shareholders. Using slides with graphics, pictures 
and text, the audience in attendance hears the state of the company from its leader and 
sees the representation of the information in graphs, charts, pictures and text. Usually the 
text is supplemented with speaker‘s notes that expand the abbreviated on screen 
presentation. This technology allows for visual reinforcement of the information. It is 
conducive to the sharing of large amounts of numerical data through chart and graph 
representation that makes the comparisons sensible in a glance. In this section I will 
consider the presentations of the CEO in two different formats. The years 2001 and 2002 
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will use the PowerPoint presentations from the annual shareholder‘s meetings. For the 
year 2003 the letter from the CEO to the shareholders in the Annual Report will be used.4 
 PowerPoint also allows for uniformity and repetition of data from year to year. 
Creating a similarity not often achieved in oral presentations, the background and format 
of the slides can easily remain the same while the data is changed each year. It is this 
factor that stands out when considering the presentations for 2001 and 2002. Leadership 
at Frontier utilizes the PowerPoint format to explain where it stands in relation to other 
airlines. As a relatively new airline its identity is fashioned, in part, against how it 
compares to the competition. All three presentations have a very clear chronological 
structure to the presentations. It is to these 3 presentations that I now turn. 
2001 
 All three Frontier presentations contain an opening that defines the legalities, 
scope and trustworthiness of the forward looking statements contained in what follows. 
These standard statements are SEC required and speak to the potential fluctuations of the 
marketplace and the lack of control any corporation has over its business environment. In 
this standard practice is the element of time configuration as the past can be trusted but 
the future is uncertain and uncontrollable and statements about the future are ―based on 
information available to the Company as of the date of this presentation‖ (slide 2).5 The 
                                                 
4 A file containing the PowerPoint presentation for 2003 was sent to me by Frontier Airlines PR 
Department.  Unfortunately, the file was corrupt and not only would not open but erased itself. Repeated 
attempts to have a clean copy sent resulted, after many months, in the corporation saying they had purged 
their files and none were available. At the suggestion of the secretary of the corporation and the head of 
Public Relations I contacted a number of financial analysts that follow Frontier. No extant copy of the 
presentation was found. Since the benefit of comparing an LCC to the other two airlines was more 
beneficial for the purpose of this study than an exact match in format, the letter to the shareholders was 
deemed a good approximation to the presentation of the CEO at the annual meeting.  
5 Citations related to slides will use the year of the slide (if needed) and the number of the slide. Material 
from the slide will be shown with the slide number only. Material from the notes will add the word ―notes‖ 
to the slide number. 
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SEC requires that companies in their shareholder meetings, annual reports and quarterly 
conference calls proclaim at the start that what they say about the future are enactments 
of an environment. Once enacted, the salient aspects of the environment are selected to 
give shape to an envisioned future. Once this common process is acknowledged all may 
go forward, according to the SEC, with a clear understanding of reasonable expectations. 
The formal procedure of presenting these statements at the start of the CEO presentations, 
conference calls, and Annual Reports displays a tenet of Structuration theory. These 
communications are repeated in a variety of venues and official documents over time 
giving them greater authority and force by the expectation they create and their repetition. 
The letter in the Annual Report has similar language but is expanded to include a variety 
of specific references to material contained in the Report itself. It is reinforced and 
altered based upon organizational need and government requirements. 
 One clear impression from the Frontier slide presentations is the preponderance of 
numbers, particularly financial data. There is minimal interpretation of the numbers and 
some generalized statements that do not always coincide with the other slides. Slide 4 is 
an 8 line, double-columned set of numbers with rows designated by the acronyms ASM, 
RPM, RASM, CASM6 and Load factor and Gap. All are standard abbreviations for 
airline performance measurements. These dollar amounts are compared in the second 
column labeled ―Variance‖. This contains percentages to the tenths place showing a 
comparison to the unseen data from a year ago.  Potter states ―As you see on Slide 6, 
operating income, net income before taxes and net income all more than doubled over the 
                                                 
6 ASM is available seat mile; RPM is revenue per mile, RASM is revenue per available seat mile. CASM is cost per available seat 
mile. Load factor is the average percent of seats sold per flight and Gap is the difference between revenue and cost. 
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prior year‖ (slide 4 notes). The problem is these are not seen on this slide where the 
comment is made or on slide six. They appear in slide 5.  
 This proclivity for exactness of numbers extends to defining each action by 
months. The fleet is not merely increased in FY 2001, but FA will have ―27 aircraft (24 
Boeing jets after the early return of a Boeing 737-300 in Sept. ‗01 and 3 Airbus aircraft)‖ 
that means that it is  ―Soon to be 29 aircraft due to the addition of two more Airbus 
aircraft during Sept.‖ (slide 3, notes). This detail is found throughout the 7 slides that 
contain number filled charts as well as the 7 descriptive sides. This preciseness creates 
unintended humor as Potter announces that a new agreement providing regional jet 
service allows for an average of 7.5 connection choices on Frontier when flying through 
our Denver hub. I hope the .5 connection comes with a parachute. 
 There are inaccuracies in the midst of the certitudes of the numbers. The Houston 
service is proclaimed to start in May 2001 on slide 7 after stating that it ―started‖ on May 
2002 in the notes of slide 6. The discrepancies are not just in transposed numbers. The 
FA fiscal year runs from April to March and their annual meeting is in September. The 
first 6 slides address FY 2001 which ended in March 2001. Industry comparisons and 
economic forecasts are made for calendar year 2001 (slide 8). In slide 13 notes, a cryptic 
remark is made about hundreds of planes being returned, ―(this includes 270 which we‘re 
hoping to return early in December but that we have not announced as well as the sixth 
Airbus we‘ll take delivery of in Feb.02)‖ (slide 13 notes). Even though these are in the 
notes and subject to oral corrections at the time of presentation, they indicate some 
uncertainty in the main form of expression chosen for this presentation, numerical data. 
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  It is clear that most of the presentation is informational, offering a picture of the 
airline and a picture of the industry as it relates to national and global economic factors. 
There is little in the way of interpretative sections and no narrative sections that tell the 
Frontier story directly. Yet the form itself tells a story of intent and goals. Burke notes 
that constitutionality determines outcome. The construction of the presentation pre-
determines where the presentation will end up. (Burke 1945 p 196). The story is found in 
the presentation of mathematical figures to tell the story. It may be that the size of the 
airline or lack of a long term history of FA minimizes what Potter has to work with. It 
may be that the type of investors present makes this an audience specific choice. 
Whatever the reason, this form requires the audience to be learned in accounting 
principals, airline lingo, industry metrics and possess the mathematical acumen to make 
these figure sensible. Seven years in, while FA is still trying to purchase its first planes 
and carve out a niche in the marketplace, the numbers become a statement of who they 
are and why they will be here next year. Like a recent graduate seeing if their college 
grades can translate into confidence in the work place, Potter uses the numbers to help 
confirm organizational legitimacy in an industry where corporations open and close with 
speedy regularity. He slices time thinly to look at quarterly and yearly results with 
passing reference to what has happened in their brief history.  
 The time configurations in the presentation serve a similar purpose but extend 
beyond establishing legitimacy of the corporation, it reaffirms the ability of Frontier 
Airlines leaders. Other than the sometimes lack of clarity about the fiscal year 2001 and 
the calendar year report, the preciseness of time used in the presentation, represents that 
the management team is keeping track of the business activities in a diligent, detailed 
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manner. Variances are reported to the tenth of a percentage point, revenues and expenses 
to the dollar instead of the normal thousands of dollars. Reports on the number of the 
present cities served are made then updated, ―Current route map serving 22 cities out of 
Denver, adding Reno/Tahoe NV and Austin TX on October 1. (24 counting Reno and 
Austin)‖ (Slide 3, notes) as if the investors that are asked to follow all the other numerical 
data cannot add on two more. Like parents noting a half pound increase in the weight of 
their newborn the preciseness is demonstrative. 
 Slide 13 is a detailed, 12 column quarterly projection of the intended replacement 
of the leased Boeing fleet with an Airbus fleet. Four colored columns project which of the 
2 types of  Boeings will be replaced by which of the 2 types of Airbus planes in which 
quarter. Even as a visual aid it is hard to determine specific numbers seeing only orders 
of magnitude as FA grows from 25 to 37 planes. The future is shown as a time of growth 
as the old [shown in green and purple] is replaced by the new [shown in metallic silver 
and white]. Time, like money is a commodity not to be wasted or altered. Meaning is not 
made by making connections across time, meaning is made, albeit by inference, by 
attending properly to the expenditure of time. 
  Without asking for the shareholders confidence Potter attempts to speak ―their 
language‖ and trust that these types of presentations demonstrate good stewardship of 
their money. Frontier Airlines is a growth company being properly nurtured by a 
leadership that is detail oriented and in control. Through the proper counting of time and 
accounting for dollars the presentation form proclaims, you can count on us - you can 
know we will be here in the future. 
 117 
 
2002 
 Five slides longer than the year before, the 2002 presentation had 11 slides that 
have the titles and information formatting that is the same as 2001. Additional slides 
include a post September 11 environment slide, a business strategy, a flashback to the 
2001 industry assessment, 9-11 effects on income, a series of charts comparing FA to the 
rest of the industry, two slides on Frontier‘s focus and an Awards and recognition slide. 
The same dependency on numbers prevails although the slides that are not charts, tables 
or graphs contain more explanatory prose than the previous year. One marked difference 
between the 2002 presentation and the previous one is that there are no speaker‘s notes. 
 Relying on numbers as in 2001 there is a loss of some preciseness in financial 
statements that revert to the traditional form of reporting in the thousands of dollars. 
More important is the fact that FA lost money in the first quarter of the 2002 fiscal year. 
The June figures show a 2.9% loss, the first time in 4 years a quarterly loss is posted. 
Slide nine shows this on a dual, y-axis graph that has bars representing net income over 
time and a red line showing operating margins over that same quarterly time frame. With 
airlines reporting record losses and bankruptcy rumors and filings common in the 
industry, including their major Denver competitor United Airlines, Potter chose to show a 
graph that highlighted previous success as much as it did the present loss.  Four years of 
profitability and one quarter of losses are displayed. It is clear that this is due to 
September 11. A small arrow indicating September 11 in the only red print on the page 
serves to link the business metaphor of red numbers on the balance sheet to the events of 
9/11. The overwhelming successes are reason enough to see that this loss is an aberration 
as the scope of time is expanded to include all of the last 4 years. A four year time slice 
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of time is not used in any other data given. Without saying the slice of time makes the 
meaning clear, profitability and growth are the norm, the events of 9/11 created an 
aberration.  
 The slide nine graph is one of five graphs in the presentation. A more 
understandable repeat of the Airbus fleet conversion graph of 2001 is given in slide six 
under the title of ―Business Strategy- Steady Conservative Growth‖. The other three 
graph slides are consecutive and linked because they are comparisons to the performance 
of other airlines in a series of metrics where FA is seen in a favorable light. They are 
entitled ―Low Operating Costs‖ (slides 11 & 12) and ―Breakeven Load Factor Results, 
Quarter ended June ‗02‖ (slide 13). The first Low Operating Costs graph uses an industry 
standard CASM measurement to show that FA has the third lowest costs in the industry 
over the last 3 months. The next slide with the same title shows Frontier as the industry 
leader in the percentage that it has reduced its costs in the last year ending on June 30. 
This is a measurement not found in other airline reports and is not known to financial 
analysts that cover the industry (McAdoo, B., personal communication, June 14, 2007). 
The subheading reads ―Frontier has reduced its costs more than its peers over the last 
year.‖ Time is sliced according to its persuasive effect. The graphs encompass a time 
when Frontier appears favorably against its competition. Potter conveys that while the 
airline may be suffering losses the essential metrics show that they are holding their own 
on against the competition. This grading on a curve is fashioned by the slices of time 
represented.  
 The final comparison to other airlines uses a graph showing a recognized industry 
data set of a break-even load factor. There are two aspects of the presentation that make it 
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misleading and confusing. Again the time frame is the quarter ended June 30, 2002. This 
is a report given at an annual meeting considering the entire year that looks only at one 
quarter of the year. Time is sliced to FA advantage. The visual representation of the 
graph is also misleading because it appears that FA has a break even load factor that is 
less than one-half its biggest competitor in Denver, United Airlines. It appears this way 
because the scale starts at 50%. The difference in whole numbers is that a breakeven 
passenger requirement for FA is 65% while United‘s is 87%. Visually, it looks as if the 
difference is much greater because of the starting point [50%] of the y axis.  
 Jeff Potter‘s 2002 presentation to the shareholders is characterized by carefully 
selected time frames, contrived visual representations and created comparisons. Each of 
these is designed to place the most favorable light possible on the operations of FA and 
thereby instill investor confidence in Frontier. There is very little explicit reference to 
9/11. Unlike the legacy carriers, time is not recalibrated to 9/11. For Frontier, 9/11 is not 
the focus, survival and staying the course are. The impact of the events is seen in a larger 
context but the events themselves are not significant. The slices of time are expanded and 
contracted from 4 years to 3 months, limited to the Frontier fiscal year 2002, or contained 
within the calendar year 2002, or established for a specific quarter in either year. The 
choice of time frames is a rhetorical choice to create a favorable representation of the 
numerical data contained within. Time, the valuable commodity from 2001 when its 
chronology was precise, is now maneuvered into position to create persuasive texts in 
which to encase the ―appropriate data‖. Appropriate at least for bolstering investor 
confidence.  
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 Already reporting on the revenue loss of the first quarter of the 2003 fiscal year, 
Potter‘s confidence in the ability of FA to weather the economic downturn faces a test in 
the coming months. No matter what metric is used, industry standard or Frontier created,  
the impact of 9/11, an economy attempting to find its bearings and a deepening crisis that 
threatened many airlines‘ survival, the coming year would be a trying one.  
2003 
 As stated in the opening of this section, the 2003 presentation is not a PowerPoint 
slide show but a letter contained within the annual report in late spring. The annual 
shareholders meeting is held in September which allows the reporting of the first quarter 
that ends June 30. The Annual Report comes out in May and uses projections of quarterly 
data for the quarter ending June 30. This is not a significant or detrimental difference 
between the two sources. While there are certainly differences in the overall presentation, 
feel and symbolic capacities between letters, slide shows and speeches the content is 
similar enough to warrant comparison. It is aligned with the expanding concept of a text  
(Putnam, 2004) but more importantly it fits within the tenets of structuration theory 
through the repetition of communication and practices over time as constituent of the 
organization. Organizations construct their identity by communicating similar meaning in 
multiple forms that become, in some ways self fulfillments of their visions, 
interpretations and socially constructed selves. It is therefore not surprising that the CEO 
letter in Annual Reports to shareholders should contain a lot of the same information as 
the face to face presentations to shareholders at the annual meeting. Given the previously 
stated difficulties in obtaining the original PowerPoint presentation this is a reasonable 
substitute.  
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 While not in a slide show format the annual letter to shareholders for 2003 
contains many of the same topics and even the same order as the presentations of 2001 
and 2002;  introduction, achievements, difficulties/opportunities, a presentation of the 
data of the first quarter of 2004 and projections of changes and plans for the coming year. 
Like the slide shows, the letter is chronological in its sequencing and identifies clearly 
what time period each item presented is related to. Connections are made as historical 
and contemporary exigencies of the industry, the economy and the geo-political 
circumstances are placed in context for the efforts of the organization and vice versa.  
 Potter begins by noting that 2003 was a ―turbulent year‖ in the airline industry 
and couples that with a mixed bag of items. ―Continued threats of terrorism, the war with 
Iraq, and several significant Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings were just some of the many 
obstacles Frontier faced in fiscal year 2003‖ (line 5). From the outset, Potter frames this 
with the understanding that there are factors outside the airline industry pertinent to the 
events of 2003. The employees, met these challenges by ―working harder than ever‖ (line 
9) with the benefit of ―reporting significantly lower losses than those suffered by the 
majority of airlines over the last year‖ (line 12). Potter continues his trend of evaluating 
Frontier on a curve, of identification based on comparison. His focus in this letter is 
found in the three themes of fleet transition, action and growth in the midst of challenges 
and difference based on branding.   
 Eight times in the letter Potter mentions the fleet, starting on line 15 and finishing 
on line 103. It is, in the midst of uncertainty, the guide to the future, the star guiding FA 
to future profitability.  It is accomplished ―in spite of the external challenges‖ (line 14), 
the foremost milestone of 2002, part of the continued transition (line 20), ―a key message 
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about our service‖ (line 90) and part of the plan for 2004‖ (line 97). As in past years, the 
same detail is shown by doing the math for the audience when planes are added and 
subtracted and then re- emphasized to make sure that the total is understood. (lines 20 & 
100). The emphasis on the details of the fleet plan is twofold, to show growth and activity 
while reinforcing a future orientation. 
 The growth is seen in moving back and forth across the boundary of the last fiscal 
year and the current fiscal year. The airline has ―reduced‖, ―improved‖, ―successfully 
created‖  ―implemented‖, ―introduced,‖ ―completed‖, ―expanded‖ and ―unveiled. It is 
―focusing on factors we can control,‖ ―inaugurating service‖, ―working harder than ever‖, 
and ―simplifying‖. The one thing FA is not doing is sitting still. This action is not carried 
out in typical times, but against the backdrop of ―challenges‖. These challenges are 
characterized as ―unprecedented‖ (line 70), ―external‖ (line 14), ―business challenges‖ 
(line 77), in a ―very challenging economy‖ (line 8) filled with ―obstacles‖ (lines 7 & 8), 
―unemployment…at its highest level since Frontier‘s inception‖ (line 71) and ―unlike 
any…ever faced before‖ (line 70). Rejecting ―engaging in excessive hand wringing‖ FA 
met these multiple challenges with a can-do attitude.  
 Repeated reinforcement of the growth realized and the challenges faced is found 
in the paragraphs starting on lines 60 and 69. The time is reoriented to 1994, highlighting 
the highest load factor ―achieved in one month since its inception in 1994‖ (line 63) and 
―National  unemployment… is at its highest levels since Frontier‘s inception in 1994‖ 
(line 71). Time is sliced to rhetorical advantage. It is designed to show unparalleled 
achievement against unparalleled challenges for Frontier. Although the actual 
unemployment rate was higher in 1994 than in 2002 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2007) 
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this fact is not relevant as the parallel demonstrates the unique situation Frontier is in and 
the creative forward looking responses made. 
 Once the unique circumstances of doing business in the environment of 2002 are 
established, all are assured FA is meeting the challenges with ―unique ways‖ (line 78). 
The time focus is shifted to the new ―Different Animal‖ branding campaign of ―last 
spring‖ (line 80). The sequencing ties the three events together and back to the inception 
of the airline through the ―unique‖ and ―different‖ word usage found in these passages. 
The branding campaign is also connected to the 1994 inception because it is based on 
―four cornerstones‖ (line 82).  These 3 paragraphs constitute 37% of the 1086 word letter. 
Combined with the 8 milestones (lines 18-46) and the last two paragraphs, this letter is a 
testament to positive thinking and action in the midst of daunting odds. Potter‘s letter 
creates a clear impression, it‘s the worst conditions we have ever seen in this company, 
but we are doing well. He persuades with slices of time that connect recent actions to 
future gains and by reclaiming their brief history, not the profitable years, but the initial 
struggles. He sets the clock back and then leaps into the future with hope, energy and 
excitement. We will be successful in present difficulties as we were in our original ones 
is the theme. 
Frontier Airlines Summary 
 The work of the CEO for Frontier is the work of identification and organizational 
creation. The struggle to restart in Denver, the climb to profitability and the unusual way 
that Frontier uses a low cost carrier model and the hub and spoke structure gives them a 
unique place in the industry. The downturn of late 2000 and the predictions for 2001 
before 9/11 is the first economic slump that Frontier has had to weather. They had neither 
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past accomplishments working in these economic storms or storied heroes to invoke to 
gain confidence. Without this cache, Jeff Potter uses that which has stood them well so 
far, their goals, plans, industry comparisons and their business plan. He uses all four in a 
series of time configurations to persuade investors that as their past commitment brought 
positive returns they can be confident in the  future profitability of Frontier Airlines 
Chapter Summary 
 The CEOs of American, Frontier and Delta airlines address the issues of their 
individual airline and the exigencies of the common circumstances through a variety of 
persuasive means with configurations of time being a dominant one. With unique styles, 
each uses chronological time in various configurations to make connections for their 
audience as they conjure up the spirits of the past, explain the present, and provide insight 
into the future. The heyday of the late 1990‘s gives way to the downturn of 2000 and the 
crisis of 9/11. By the time their 2002 fiscal year annual meetings are held the crisis has 
evolved to a threat and unprecedented forces are at work in the industry. CEOs become 
casualties as the crisis management plans implemented in 2001 become answers to the 
wrong questions for 2003. The threat of bankruptcy looms large for the legacy carriers as 
attempts to enact an environment fail to address the changing needs of the corporation‘s 
crisis. The CEO, the possibility of survival and the needs of the corporation are not the 
only thing that changes. Rhetorically and materially, the crisis also changes. At first the 
crisis of 9/11 is utilized to explain chronic, systemic problems in the industry that are 
unrelated to any particular crisis. After some time has passed, 9/11 moves from center 
stage to the periphery as solutions for problems are needed regardless of their origin but 
the centrality of time configurations remains.  
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Research Question one asks what time strategies were used by CEOs.  The 
Rhetorical time strategies of CEOs in the 3 years of this study include recalibrating when 
time begins, compressing time to obscure events, slicing time to connect to distant history 
or recent events, using personal historical lessons, creating measurements across time to 
bring favorable comparisons,  recalling iconic figures, past successes and well managed 
previous crises. As historians and visionaries CEOs stand in the present with temporal 
malleability as a means to define and give meaning to the past in order to create a sense 
of the future. Their role is to explain, exhibit control and proffer solutions to present 
dilemmas so stockholders might maintain confidence in the organization. Using time to 
achieve their goals in the present they turn to a time before things fell apart. Crisis 
increase the need to control the future because the present is so uncertain. The past 
provides the vocabulary for creating visions of a future where full recovery is made and 
―normal‖ is restored. In crisis the past takes on added importance, for values, for icons, 
for lessons and for reassurance. CEOs enact the past in order to broker an assent for the 
envisioned future that will be shared. In the next chapter these presentations that have 
been considered individually will be examined as a group, first within each airline then 
across the airlines for each of the years. 
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Chapter 5 
A Comparative Study Within and Between the Airlines 
A Three Year View 
 Research question two seeks answers on two sets of comparison. The first is a 
comparison of the individual airline within all three years. The second is a comparison of 
all three airlines within a single year. The third question seeks to find possible reasons for 
the similarities and differences. The questions are stated as follows:  
2. What are the similarities and differences in the time configurations of the chosen 
rhetorical strategies found within particular airlines and in comparison between 
the selected airlines over a three year period of time; 2001 – 2003?  
3. What factors account for the similarities and differences in the usage of time in 
the chosen rhetorical strategies both within a particular airline and between the 
three airlines in the three year study period? 
Following the format established throughout this dissertation, American, Delta and 
Frontier will be considered respectively.  
A Summary of AA 2001 – 2003 
 American Airlines culture centers on being the best and leading all other airlines. 
Their innovative programs and first place status allows them to breathe the air of a 
stratosphere where no one else is found. This is seen in the presentations of 2001 and 
2003 as other airlines are minimized or ignored.  The only time the names of other 
airlines are mentioned is eight times in 2001; all within the same context, in regards to a 
potential joint venture of the DC Shuttle with United Airlines and minority ownership of 
DC Air. United, U S Airways and DC Air are clustered in references to these ventures 
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(line 11, lines 59-62). Mentioned in the section where the TWA acquisition is 
highlighted, Carty speaks as a king does, from the perspective of the effect commoners 
have on royalty and the kingdom, ―If United's deal does go through, we are going to add 
additional important assets. If it does not, it in no way diminishes the tremendous value 
of the TWA transaction‖ (lines 62-64). The only other time competitors are alluded to is 
in Arpey‘s 2003 presentation. He uses the generic phrase ―low cost competitors‖ (line 51) 
and the possessive ―our competitors‖ (lines 63, 70, 114 & 115). American does not 
condescend to recognize anyone else; airlines are competing with AA not the other way 
around. Even the competition is ―our‖ competition. In the heady atmosphere of AA 
culture there is only the horizon in front of them; let the others try to keep up.  
 As the pacesetter for the industry everything is subject to the AA power, even 
time. Compressed, expanded, or ignored, time is a tool to be used to engender 
confidence, obscure problems, highlight achievements and multiply anniversaries. The 
75th anniversary is mentioned in three consecutive years as the calendar year and the 
months of the following year leading up to the annual meeting are melded together as 
needed. Likewise the TWA merger takes center stage in 2001 and is mentioned as one of 
the three highlights in the short address of 2002. Chronology is ignored as the highlights 
of 2001 and 2003 are reordered based on significance and meaning. In chapter 4 it is 
shown how time is compressed as events are placed together to minimize the negative 
impact on AA by taking the emotion of 9/11 and implying its causation for Flight 587. 
This persuasive tactic highlights the final part of this summary. 
 Regardless of their origin or cause, the events of 9/11 become a cipher by which 
many calculations and representations are made concerning American Airlines and the 
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environment. In Weick‘s terms, enacted environments are first filtered through the lens of 
9/11. Carty notes that the future is founded on the effects of 9/11, ―The airline industry 
landscape has been dramatically altered during the past year and that means more change 
than we've already seen is absolutely inevitable‖ (2002, line 39). Other causative factors 
that were part of the landscape; LCC competition, a downturn in the economy, over 
capacity, union difficulties, aging airplanes, rising fuel prices, and the lessening of the 
need for business travel are all subsumed into the causation of the singular event, 
September 11. This shaking of the foundations leads AA back to its historical roots, to 
the days of Lindberg and the dedicated staff, ―One thing I have learned in my 20 plus 
years here is that when the men and women of American get their hearts and minds 
around a mission, that mission almost always gets accomplished‖ (line 19). As was noted 
earlier about presidential presentations given in the midst of crisis and the accompanying 
uncertainty, a return to the principles of the past becomes the means to successfully 
navigate the present.  
 By 2003 some of the hubris of AA had been muted as it watched its competitors 
file for bankruptcy and record losses appear on its bottom line. Despite all this, its place 
of entitlement, its earned dominance, its focus on AA and no one else, continues. The 
crisis of 9/11 exacerbated what appeared to be an already significant downturn and yet 
9/11 was rhetorically utilized to absorb all other difficulties into it. By 2003, with AA 
maintaining solvency despite its losses, Gerard Arpey, like Carty before him, asks 
investors to trust in AAs leadership as ―we believe the Turnaround Plan that I have 
outlined this morning is the road map we need to guide us to the stable and successful 
future that everyone here wants for our company‖ (2003, line 171).   
 129 
 
American Airlines held true to form amidst the changing circumstances of the 3 
years of this study. Always seeing the competition below as it looked down from the 
mountaintop, the years of the crisis and the aftermath saw it become, if possible, even 
more self absorbed. By the time Arpey took over the bruised and battered corporation, 
leadership still projected its control, creating ―maps‖ that lead it out of the wilderness to 
profitability and its rightful place, atop the pantheon of the airline industry. In the 
uncertainty of a crisis, a return to the principles and values of the past becomes the means 
by which to navigate the present. It is necessary to return to a beginning point, but not 
just the one of historical origin. It is necessary to slice out a new start, returning, as Payne 
notes, not just to a time but to a place in order to regain those values. Time is a rhetorical 
tool that allows the CEOs to simultaneously restart the clock at 9/11 and call forth a more 
distant past as a place to find and reclaim the techniques, attitudes and values necessary 
to deal with the present crisis. AA does not look outside the organization but to itself, to 
its own past accomplishments and achievements to steer the company on the right path 
through perilous waters. The leadership does not try to control the future and predict what 
will happen, they attempt to breed confidence by returning to the past. They have been 
here before and will continue to find a way through. For AA, through the use of time, 
who they were, is why you can be assured of who they are now and will be in the future.  
AA uses its own identity in the midst of crisis as a foundation of maintaining 
investor confidence for all three of the presentations in this study. Unlike, American, 
Delta loses its sense of history, focusing on the present leadership and their analytical 
ability to maneuver through the crisis. As present needs press in, the focus of time 
becomes narrower. Losing control of time Leo Mullin bounces through the present, 
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making then retracting his visions, seeking some formula to maintain investor confidence 
while weathering the storm of a post 9/11 airline industry.     
A Summary of DAL 2001 – 2003 
 Over the years Delta Airlines grew on its reputation for customer service and 
strong commitment of its employees to the welfare of the company through their focus on 
customer service. Since crises are self determined, based on its reputation and corporate 
culture, it is possible to consider that all three presentations by Leo Mullin were delivered 
in the midst of a crisis. The first is the crisis of corporate culture created by the impacts of 
the strike actions of the pilots for ComAir and the slowdown by Delta pilots. The second 
crisis was created by the events of 9/11. The third crisis, constructed as a result of 9/11 
but just as easily construed as a leadership and management crisis, by the inability to 
enact an environment that was sensible and effective for their exigencies.  
 In 2001 the crisis centers on a loss of the corporate culture. Oddly this is seen in 
two opposite ways; the first in attempting to show that Delta is the number one airline in 
the world and the second in the pilot‘s actions of 2000 and 2001. The highest net income 
in the industry (line 23) and the most emplanements (line 49) are presented as ―more than 
any other airline in the world‖. Characterized as ―excellent achievements‖ Mullin then 
makes them subordinate to DAL‘s core value, ―But the most gratifying of all our 
accomplishments was Delta‘s continued improvement in customer service‖ (line 54). 
Delta has seldom been the industry financial leader and these numbers are not, by 
Mullin‘s estimation, the measurement of industry leadership. Almost always a follower 
and seldom a leader, DAL culture is displayed in its smooth coordination of a system that 
keeps customers happy. This downplay of the successes of 2000 may be a result of the 
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first quarter losses of 2001 reaching $122 million. Too much emphasis on gains could 
easily bring the same scrutiny to loss. 
 It is, after all, the core value of customer service that is touted as ―improved‖ that 
suffers the greatest damage at the end of 2000 and the first and second quarter of 2001. 
He laments, ―Given the high-level of customer-service orientation resident in the people 
of Delta Air Lines, these reliability failures [of the 2000 slow down] were painful and 
difficult for us all‖ (line 129). While the ―vast majority‖ of pilots were ―heroic‖, the 
unstated implication is this loss of corporate culture is due to a select few. Given the 
corporate ethos of teamwork and commitment the outside help of the federal government 
is an intrusion into a heretofore harmonious family, a public admission of family turmoil, 
the exposure of dirty laundry. What matters from the past for Mullin are the values of the 
corporation. There is no iconic figure that he recalls, no particular leadership 
accomplishments are revisited. The values of the past are what matters. These values are 
plucked out of the historical fog, disembodied from materiality or person. Even its 
present successes are minimized in light of this core value. It is an outside source, 
Lincoln‘s second inaugural that is used to address the perceived needs of the 
organization. Time is sliced but the place it is sliced from is not their own story but 
someone else‘s, a dubious reference at best. 
 The crisis of 9/11 returns DAL to its core values. Mullin highlights over and over 
again in the 2002 speech that the people of DAL are the difference. They are ―highly 
professional, showing unity and support‖ (line 8), ―highly qualified‖ (line 94), one of the 
3 main constituencies (line 96), those for which we seek to ―ease the disruption‖ (line 
239), ―unified and in action, successfully overcoming challenges previously unknown in 
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our industry‖ (line 314) and those in which you can have ―confidence in‖ (line 319). 
Crisis has a way of clarifying and uniting, of removing the chaff and reclaiming the 
essence. The ―rogue‖ element has been rehabilitated, or at least ignored for a while, its 
recidivism held at bay, as everyone pulls together in the culture that has served so well so 
far and will once again ―make it the world‘s greatest airline‖ (line 319). But, as shown in 
Chapter 4, crisis also reveals weakness that may remain hidden in the midst of success. 
Again the usage of time focuses on the present. It is as if the specific successes of the past 
are forgotten and the only sound is the mantra of past values displayed in the present. The 
organization of 2002 is linked to concepts and ideas called forth in a generic fashion. 
Crisis response is anchored in visionary talk of thriving. A contiguous line of an 
ambiguous concept of the past - customer service - is connected to an ambiguous concept 
for the future - thriving. The vestiges of the past are concepts and the present is subsumed 
into an equally nebulous future. It may have seemed too much smoke and mirrors for 
skittish investors who are concerned with material gain. 
 If the presentation of 2001 displays an interruption of corporate narrative and 
culture then 2002 is an attempt to reclaim core values in the midst of an outsider created 
crisis. In light of the exigencies of the moment and the lack of understanding and 
preparation by leadership, Mullin‘s multiple mea culpas simultaneously recognize one 
crisis and create another. One of the central problems of a crisis is the lack of control. 
Delta views its success as built upon teamwork that is focused on customer service. A 
crisis of confidence is created by negotiating givebacks from employees while giving 
bonuses to management. This has Mullins spending one-fourth of his speech justifying, 
repairing the breach and ―sincerely apologizing‖ for the problem. However, the more 
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damaging part is the admission and details of the miscalculations and misunderstanding 
of the economic environment practiced in 2002. In a series of ―confessions‖, he states,  
―it was clear that none of us at that time yet knew the degree of profound, 
fundamental change which still lay ahead.(line 76) 
―In retrospect, that portrayal, which I thought was quite bleak at the time, 
now looks incredibly optimistic, given the reality of the past year.‖ (line 
84) 
―Regarding my observation last year that passenger demand and revenue 
were slowly returning to normal levels, that trend ended abruptly‖ (line 
86) 
―And as to my point that low profit levels would likely be the industry‘s 
primary problem in 2002, that issue has been fully displaced by the urgent 
issues of day-to-day airline survival…‖ (line 90).  
Summarizing his miscalculations as he moves into the response he calls it a ―much 
grimmer picture‖ (line 94).  
 Mullin‘s attempt to repair the breach caused by the bonuses and explain why the 
optimism of last year did not pan out violates expectations of the corporate culture 
thereby articulating a new crisis – the crisis of leadership. The failure to foresee the 
effects of the compensation process and the failure to enact the proper environment is 
doubly focused because of the language Mullin uses. In the ―confessions‖ starting on line 
20 and ending in the grimmer picture phrase Mullin uses ―I‖ or its cognates twenty five 
times. Despite an occasional ―we‖ the focus is clearly on what he did and then what he 
did not do. Its indictment is multiplied because of the order of the presentation. Placed 
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sequentially in the presentation, Mullin‘s responsibility taking is magnified from the first 
policy problem to the second leadership problem. In a crisis leadership exhibits control. If 
control cannot be exhibited, the successes of the past and the shoulders of the 
mythologized historical figures can be used to bolster confidence. In this case Mullin 
narrows the focus of time to begin with 9/11 and focuses on his own actions. By 
addressing the internal crisis and assuming full responsibility for it he unwittingly links it, 
with the same ―formula‖, to the crisis of understanding and vision of last year‘s 
presentation - so much for teamwork.  
He reaches into the past and gets no further than last year. He does not to conjure 
up epic figures and daunting tasks accomplished but seeks to clarify why he was wrong 
and how he misread the signs. Even though Mullin addresses the former issue with his 
own givebacks, he links his personal culpability to the lack of vision. His attempt to 
address the latter is not with a plan but with ―underpinnings‖. In so doing he 
exponentially multiplies the impact of his failure to enact an appropriate environment and 
detaches himself and his organization from its past. His failure to go beyond the events of 
9/11 boxes him in and allows him no rhetorical room to operate. The further back in time, 
the less concrete the hearer‘s images, the more malleable they are to meet current 
rhetorical needs. The closer the invoked past events are to the present the more 
competing personal interpretations, experiences and images the audience has of them. 
This makes it harder rhetorically to create shared meaning from the past to apply to 
present exigencies. By anchoring time to 9/11 Mullin creates a situation where sense is 
made in an arena that everyone has experience, interpretation and opinions. The ―safety‖ 
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of the past is rendered inoperable. This has a major impact on the interpretation of the 
contractual bonuses. 
 To fail to understand, immediately following 9/11, the impact these contracted 
bonuses would have in 2003 is at least rhetorically defensible. But, to evangelize that all 
is well and claim the industry is coming back, without a proper sense of the looming, dire 
circumstances or taking drastic actions to forestall it, is an exhibition of lack of control. 
Focusing, by presentation structure, language usage and time slices that lack of control on 
the CEO, Mullin intensifies the crisis and has the opposite effect of gaining shareholder 
confidence. Within 6 months, he announces his ―unexpected‖ retirement from the 
position (Reuters, 2003).  What he lost more than anything is control of time. A crisis 
needs an expanded vision, it needs the history of the past, the lessons and the people of 
the past to mitigate, soften and provide an alternative vision to the present circumstances. 
Past stories need told, not to valorize the ―good old days‖ but to provide perspective, a 
common language and an anchor. By controlling time the myopia of the present exigence 
is treated with panoramas of past successes. Once the myopia has been cured, the bounty 
of distant future shores can be envisioned. Mullin attempts to create the latter without the 
former by focusing more intently on the present and leaping into the unknown future.  
Unlike Delta, Frontier Airlines has a well defined organizational plan not 
dependent on leadership. This plan becomes the stabilizing center for its three 
presentations. Like Delta, there is no reference to iconic figures. In response to the first 
economic downturn faced in Frontier‘s brief history, creative, comparative measurements 
become the tour de force of the presentations. Unlike Delta, the future is envisioned 
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based on what is happening in the larger scope of the industry, economy, the Frontier 
plan and  Frontier‘s founding activities.  
A Summary of FA 2001 – 2003 
 One of the advantages of a smaller size is that small changes can make significant 
differences in the overall operation. One of the advantages of being relatively young is 
that behaviors are not as entrenched and therefore more malleable. Structuration theory 
recognizes the impact of processes over time as an organization is socially constructed 
from its communication processes. With less to fall back on, with less history to combat, 
Frontier Airlines is able to maneuver through these years, in part based on its historical 
tabula rosa. Founded at the end of the early 90‘s industry slump, it took 3 years to 
become profitable. Positive returns on investment lasted for 4 more years. The economic 
downturn exacerbated by the problems of 9/11 is the first foray into the traditional 
cyclical airline modus operandi for the fledgling airline. In each of the years of this study 
FA is attempting to create a name for itself, to identify internally and externally who it is 
and establish credibility so that investors will have confidence in the short term and the 
long term. This is accomplished in three ways: a focus on rational metrics, a minimal 
narrative expression of its corporate culture and the constant advocacy of its fleet plan.  
 Frontier is displayed in these presentations by charts and numbers. Speaking the 
―language‖ of investment, Jeff Potter uses a series of numerical and graphic snapshots to 
show the achievements and difficulties of the past year. Precise orientations based on 
months and numbers creates not only a common bond and common language but a 
comparison year to year. The form is the foundation of the persuasive process. Potter‘s 
ability and personal influence are minimized, the company, through the numbers, speaks 
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for itself. The time focus is narrow, year to year, quarter to quarter, with an occasional 
reference to its early struggles and successes.   
 This numerically based presentation is not supplemented with a lot of meaning 
making or discussions of core values and corporate policies as is found in the two legacy 
carriers. If the numbers speak for themselves then Potter does not have to place them 
within a specific historical context of the organization‘s roots, goals and values. The 
context given is twofold: toward the larger economic climate and toward other airlines. 
We are all in the same boat is the mantra of the economic story told. Once that is 
established, FA is not content to be pigeonholed by comparison to like-sized or like-aged 
airlines - FA takes on all contestants. Like the smaller man who fights the largest guy in 
the bar to establish his place, Frontier creates an identity by measuring up, even if the 
metric is unrecognizable to anyone else. This measurement is not as important as what it 
reveals: progress, zeal, fearlessness and detailed leadership. The one constant that 
displays all of this is the advocacy of the FA fleet Plan.  
 The foundation of LCC operation is streamlined maintenance costs and fuel 
efficiency (Wybrandt, 2004). This is accomplished through a modern, homogenous fleet. 
Starting with leased Boeing 727‘s and 737s Frontier‘s success enabled an upgrade to the 
newer, more fuel efficient Airbus 300‘s. Seen as the foundation for future profitability, 
orders and options were taken on 37 planes that would replace the Boeing‘s and increase 
the fleet size over the six year period from 2000 - 2006. Each year Potter gives detailed 
updates on what is happening with this plan through graphs, charts and repetition. It is 
even seen as the singular effective response to 9/11 (2002, slides 4,5)  because it exhibits 
control. The first heading on slide 5 states ―Scaled Back….‖ Followed by 4 points. The 
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section heading  reads ―…. But Maintained Our Ability To Plan For The Future‖ 
followed by 4 points including ―Retained Air Bus delivery schedule‖. Staying the course, 
no matter what the exigencies, is a significant test for this fledgling airline and its second 
CEO. Scaling back is fiscally responsible response to the problems. Maintaining one‘s 
abilities to plan for the future is a means of control of an otherwise out of control 
situation. 
 Unlike the major legacy carriers, survival is always in question for Frontier. 
Carving out a market share in Denver against the behemoth United, establishing brand 
identity and creating an effective mix of people, planes, customers, and confident 
investors, Frontier does not have the luxury or the burden of the past to fall back on. Its 
sensemaking is forward looking in its plans as it takes on each issue. The CEO answers 
the questions ―Who is Frontier Airlines‖ and ―What are we?‖ each year as it takes on all 
airlines to make a name for itself and financial returns for its investors. In some ways 
9/11 is just another obstacle, another factor to be dealt with. It changes the environment 
and makes it harder, but while living on the edge, a few more issues doesn‘t change 
much. Going with what they know, the fleet plan contains within it its own response, one 
of projected stability and dogged determination to go forward in this process of 
becoming. A telling remark by Potter in the 2003 letter highlights this. ―We have always 
managed our airline by focusing on factors we can control, as opposed to engaging in 
excessive hand-wringing over those that we cannot, and looking for opportunities in the 
challenges that face us‖ (line 47). Potter answers the question ―What we are?‖ in many 
ways. No matter what way he answers they all mean, ―We are determined‖.  
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 Children slice time in fine increments, they are four and a half years old not just 
four. Potter and Frontier do the same. Quarterly measurements are touted as signs of 
progress. The ―good old days‖ are easily remembered by all those present because they 
were just a few years ago. Without a legacy to invoke, appeals to history are limited. 
Without a legacy to invoke, options are limitless. The present and recent past are the time 
slices of confidence building. Likewise, future visions are limited by the fragile nature of 
youth and the need for maneuverability in an uncertain landscape. Time is sliced but it is 
sliced thinly in both directions.  
Across the Years Summary 
 Seen across the three years the progression from the normal business activities 
and their cyclical pressure points to the crisis of 9/11 and beyond, the CEOs attempted to 
retain and create confidence from the shareholders by various means. A significant 
rhetorical means is their usage of time. Attributing blame and seeking understanding, the 
context of a changing economy ―‗None of us has ever seen this kind of collapse in 
business travel‘‖ (Potter, 2001, slide 8) and later, the effects of 9/11, gave way to a new 
crisis, a crisis of confidence. The issue evolved into whether leadership had the tools to 
address the long term exigencies they now faced. American and Frontier were consistent 
in their approaches, even in not saying much after 9/11, American held forth its aloof 
demeanor and historical foundations, no explanation was needed. Delta failed to 
capitalize on its ascendancy to industry statistical leadership and focused instead on what 
it considers a core principal [customer service] disembodied from a material past. The 
miscalculations [it could be labeled hubris but that seems a stretch] expressed in the 
sermonic presentation, gave way to the personal focus of 2003. In considering the 
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presentations across the defined time span it may be that maintaining one‘s identity 
despite the external changes is the most important rhetorical response in any form by any 
airline. That identity is founded in past experiences and successes. It is this past that 
diverts undo focus from the present and allows a concrete past to materialize. Once the 
myopia is broken, the future can be envisioned. 
 In the next section, the presentations will be considered as a function of the year 
in which they are given, comparing the shareholder presentations of the individual 
airlines against the backdrop of the events within their comparative fiscal years.   
American Airlines, Delta Airlines and Frontier Airlines. 
2001 
 Across the airlines for each year it can be said that they held true to their character 
and ethos in 2001. The corporate culture of dominance shined through for AA. The 
corporate culture of teamwork and service is at the heart of Delta airlines in principle if 
not in practice. Frontier continues its climb, enjoying the heady feeling of 15% growth 
and a rational plan. The slackening economy is a concern as the advances and dividends 
of the last few years start to dissipate on unsettling economic forecasts and losses for the 
quarter. Each airline sees outside elements as inhibiting their potential for growth. For 
American it is ―the pitiable state of the nation's air traffic control system and its 
universally adverse effects on the service that we and other carriers are able to offer on 
any given day‖ (line 133). For Delta the outsider is an insider. Not the union but those 
few pilots who failed to accept the corporate culture and act like outsiders by engineering 
a slowdown and a strike. For Frontier the industry forecast are the biggest threat, ―[The] 
Industry is expected to lose $2.0 billion during calendar 2001‖ (slide 8). 
 141 
 
 For 2001 it is business as usual in the airline industry; living on the edge and 
swinging from record profits to staggering deficits. Those who have been here before, 
AA & DAL tell their story and revert to core values that have worked in the past to see 
them through. AAs values are embodied in people while Delta‘s remains an disembodied 
concept. This application of lessons learned over time crosses both Structuration theory‘s 
duree and Weick‘s retained memories.  For those like Frontier who have not been here 
before, they let their figures show that the losses have been kept at bay a while longer. 
Reminding themselves and others that they are cut from a different cloth than their legacy 
brethren, they maintain profitability despite the downturn and predictions.  
 It is interesting to note the taken for granted attitude of American when it comes 
to labor troubles compared to Delta‘s reaction to them. Federal assistance via the 
National Mediation Board is old hat to American. ―Even as we work towards positive 
outcomes with all three [unions], it is hard not to recognize how uncertain and how 
unpredictable the relationship with labor has grown not just for our company, but 
throughout the entire airline industry‖ (AA, line 123).  For Delta it means a whole lot 
more than solving a dispute, it means a break in the corporate culture where the 
customers play a large role in healing it, ―We are gratified, too, by the loyalty of Delta‘s 
customers, and by their patience during these often frustrating and uncertain weeks and 
months‖ (DAL, line 133). Each airline remains within their corporate culture, applying it, 
celebrating it, trying to claim it or reveling in its success in the year 2001 against the 
changing economic climate. Without enumerating past troubles AA links the present 
disputes to past activity, it‘s just more of the same. For Delta labor disputes are seen as an 
aberration, a violation of company culture by a few malcontent employees. Delta fails to 
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admit its growing labor difficulties and blames the malcontents for a decline in customer 
service (line 130). The problems of all three airlines in early 2001 will pale in comparison 
to the effects of 9/11 on their industry. 
2002 
 The three airlines of this study approach the events of 9/11 and its impact in very 
different ways. Carty of American speaks little and uses the events of 9/11 as cover for 
other events of the year. Without lengthy meaning making of connections to what has 
happened, he spends time praising employees who have ―been an inspiration to us all‖ 
(line 47). In the finest tradition of the leader of the industry the ironic statement that 
opens his talk includes the statement ―like most other years, the American Airlines and 
the American Eagle teams rose to meet a number of incredible challenges. And from a 
strategic standpoint I think we did accomplish quite a bit in terms of positioning our 
airline for long-term competitive success‖ (line 5). The challenges may have been 
different but for American overcoming them has been the norm once again. Their history 
of success bears witness and anchors their present difficulties. No big promises are made 
for the future, no claim of understanding of the current situation, just trust in the airline, 
as the past places its imprimatur onto the future.  
 Delta sees the success of the past derailed for a time but the current crisis is an 
opportunity to ―survive then thrive‘. Mullin highlights much about how the economy and 
the industry have fared as it weathered the storm and has ―turned the corner‖. The 
Government industry wide intervention that was engineered by Mullin, has done its job 
and the industry can see brighter days ahead. This sermon is for the stakeholders to have 
heart, the worst is over and there is light at the end of the tunnel. If Carty says too little 
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lest he complicates and reveals what he seeks to obscure, Mullin speaks too much, with 
too much professed insight that he retracts in painful detail the following year. For 
Mullin, time escapes him. He acts as a man with no past to recall and a future that he 
cannot articulate because he has no words to express what it will be like. Without 
historical referent he is creating a future without grounding it in the past.  
 Frontier seeks positives in any way it can get them. Nearly a full year after 9/11, 
with the first loss in four years on the books in the quarter ending in June 2002, Potter 
finds ways to show that investors should still be confident. He displays to investors once 
again, the fleet plan, that they are winners of the reduction percentage, and, despite recent 
losses, he reinforces the four years of profits that just ended. They do not lead nor do they 
lag behind, patience as ―steady conservative growth‖ (slide 6) is the mantra that replaces 
the ―15% growth strategy‖ of the previous year. He walks the fine line of lessening 
expectations while maintaining confidence. The central focus of this confidence is the 
control of the future exhibited by an airline acquisition plan that will not be deterred. 
Without a significant corporate culture to fall back on or stories of past glories, Potter 
shows how a flexible FA continues forward against the odds of the economic climate and 
industry difficulties. 
 The crisis of 9/11 is used to reflect and deflect the issues and problems of the 
individual airlines. At the feet of 9/11 lay all types of demons, industry problems, 
corporate decisions and professional foibles. Some are presented with a clear logic, others 
through emotional parsing, association by proximity, evangelical zeal and strategies of 
identification. Cost control and cutbacks are touted as an effective response as all wait 
and see, especially investors, whose ideas win out and which plans are effective 
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responses to the crisis. The events of 9/11 become a temporary cover as the problems of 
the present are focused on these events. 9/11 receives too much blame and is used to buy 
time for the problems that were already rolling through the economy and the industry.  
The focus of time is narrow for FA as it has been since its inception. AA focuses on the 
past year but maintains its mooring in historical precedence and past successes, including 
deregulation. Delta is forwarding looking with confidence while disengaged from all but 
the ideals of the past. The crisis of 9/11 creates problems but it also buys time. By 2003 
that patience has worn thin. The focus is on which direction the organization is moving.  
2003 
 By 2003 the ―pass‖ investors patiently gave to the companies because of the crisis 
is over. While the initial crisis was outsider created, the follow up, after an ―appropriate 
amount of time‖, is focused on administrative ability and strategic maneuverings to 
become profitable again. This affected all three airlines in 2003. The two legacy carriers 
had similar issues, losses and compensation bonuses in the midst of union give backs. 
They dealt with the fall-out in different ways. Frontier dealt with the financial losses but 
had less of a corporate ability to absorb the losses and, in my view, less investor wiggle 
room. It could be argued that the losses created leadership issues for each airline because 
an answer was needed NOW to build confidence for the future. However, the 
compensation issues of the legacy carriers created an undeniable leadership crisis. After 
consideration of how the legacy boards of directors dealt with the leadership crisis, the 
larger question of profitability will be addressed.  
 The issues of executive compensation became an issue for Delta and American 
about the same time, when the SEC required10K Annual Reports were filed listing 
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executive compensation. These reports are due April 1 but AAs was delayed for two 
weeks (Zellner, 2003). The AA Shareholder‘s meeting was scheduled for May 15, while 
the Delta meeting was to take place April 25.  Carty was ousted by the Board when the 
unions threatened to re-vote on the agreed upon givebacks. Mullin retained his post. 
Carty‘s replacement, Arpey, does not directly mention the issue of executive 
compensation once in his presentation. Mullin on the other hand, spends one-fourth of the 
speech dealing with it. Coupled with the ―confessions‖ of the errors in last year‘s speech, 
Mullin presents an overall impression of errors and lack of control. Arpey presents a plan 
and Mullin presents ―underpinnings‖. The appearance of control and assuredness that 
breeds confidence in leadership by investors is shown in leaders providing answers to 
questions not mea culpas. That Carty was ousted by the Board presented a view that AA 
was decisive and willing to do whatever it takes to work through the current economic 
trials. This was coupled with the significant cutbacks in costs that AA had already 
implemented. Mullin‘s actions of reducing his compensation package was an effort to re-
establish good faith with the unions. Unfortunately it maintained the focus on him instead 
of corporation. As such it could be also construed as self serving, especially in light of the 
concomitant forced retirement of Carty.  
 It is of interest to note that the executive compensation issue that had such an 
impact on both airlines was a failure to control time. It is not the future that is out of 
control but the past. Sound business decisions made in the darkness of crisis are hard to 
justify in the light of present circumstances. One of the ironies is that many analysts see 
these executive compensation packages as a necessary part of keeping the airline solvent 
in 2001 (Zellner).  In 2001 it was clear that skills of leadership transfer across industry 
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lines. Airline executive pay incentives in 2006 brought this response, ―‗Compare airline 
CEOs with the automotive and technology industries, and you'll find they're grossly 
underpaid. If you want the best, you've got to pay for the best,‖ says David Castelveter of 
the Air Transport Association, a trade group that represents major U.S. carriers‖ 
(Johnson, 2006, p. C1). These troubles were time related, created because the 
announcement of their bonuses granted in the past coincided with the union give backs 
and the airline‘s continued steady loss of income. The failure to make appropriate 
rhetorical justification for these past decisions or to modify the contracts intensified the 
focus on the losses. The non disclosure of the bonuses were perceived as a betrayal, 
playing into the antipathy between the sacrificing union and ―overpaid‖ management. 
This side show did not diminish the focus on the central issue – their financial losses that 
threatened bankruptcy (Reed, 2003).  
 Each airline CEO sought to express the way in which their organization would 
return to profitability. This is of critical importance in managing investors and 
maintaining confidence. Before that could happen the losses needed to be first stemmed 
then stopped. Regardless of the origin, actions need to be taken to instill investor 
confidence enough to maintain share value. Arpey sets forth American‘s plan while 
rooting that confidence in the actions and responses of the past. Mullin, after raising 
questions about leadership abilities, tries to set a foundation based on ambiguous future 
and past values. Potter sandwiches Frontier‘s losses between progress on fleet 
replacements and a cautionary reading of signs of a turnaround.  
 Each of them addresses the larger context of the ―unprecedented [economic] 
challenges‖ as a limiting factor to deal with. This is expressed as, ―National 
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unemployment, including long-term unemployment, is at its highest level since Frontier‘s 
inception in 1994‖ (Potter, 2003, line 71), Mullin notes about the 2001 compensation 
decisions,  ―Yet, in the current timeframe, with new and different challenges, these 
actions, when considered cumulatively, no longer appear appropriate‖ (line 48). Arpey 
agrees, ―As everyone here knows, the revenue picture today bears little resemblance to 
the year 2000‖ (line 112). The world has changed the CEOs state and the expectations 
must change also.  
 Gone, however, is the focus on September 11. Only 8 times in the nearly 8000 
words of the three texts for this year is 9/11 mentioned. Once in each of FAs and AAs 
meeting and 6 times by Leo Mullin. Of Mullin‘s six, most of them are in the confessions 
part, quoting what was said in the previous year. No longer able to place the blame for 
the current conditions with 9/11, the changed circumstances and economic realities are 
brought to the fore. As has been shown in other areas, AA focuses on its own reactions 
and plans more than the outside forces in which it labors. FA emphasizes the positives 
and DAL recognizes the outcome is uncertain. This is seen in the endings each CEO 
chooses to use for their 2003 presentation.  
 To take hold of the future, to capture the vision you promote and to create a new 
reality takes rhetorical skill. Daniel Boorstein, in his study of the settling of the American 
west, tells of newspapers that proclaimed a new town in the midst of the prairie grasses, 
describing buildings and a way of life that existed only in the presenter‘s mind. 
(Boorstein, 1965). Similarly, shareholder relations for an organization require enacting a 
future environment that is sometimes just as visionary. This is done rhetorically by 
linking the past through the present creating something that makes sense for the future. 
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Each CEO attempts to do this. In their conclusions they offer the essence of that vision. 
Arpey creates a map through the uncertainty, ―we believe the Turnaround Plan that I have 
outlined this morning is the road map we need to guide us to the stable and successful 
future that everyone here wants for our company‖ (line 176). Potter reiterates the fleet 
plan and expansions into new markets, growth in the midst of losses, and partnership with 
the investors, ―We believe we are on track to weather the current storm and position 
Frontier for a bright future. As a valued shareholder, you contribute to that future‖ (line 
107). Both CEO‘s present an unambiguous vision. The vision however, is not presented 
as a certainty but as something ―we believe‖. Mullin however, chooses a different 
rhetorical tactic. 
 The final two bulleted points of Mullin‘s presentation deal with winning…..  or 
losing. He states,  
 ―At this point, the battle is ours to lose – or to win. 
 Based on the foundation we have built and – most importantly -- the capabilities 
and the fierce spirit of Delta people ….. I am confident that the outcome can and 
will be not a battle lost, but a battle won.‖  (line 286). 
Mullin presents the choices and the possibility of loss. Unlike the ―survive and thrive‖ of 
the previous year, he uses the first person singular ―I‖ to persuade the shareholders of the 
―win‖ The same ―I‖ that he used so often in his earlier apologizing. The use of the word 
―lose‖ twice within the last 68 words may be realistic but creates rhetorical ambiguity 
when the situation calls for certainty. Even the ―can and will be‖ injects the possibility 
that it may not happen. A dialectical possibility in times of uncertainty seldom breeds 
confidence. His team is paid to create a ―map‖, to buck the odds and ―grow‖, to at least, 
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be certain of its vision. Instead he offers possibilities and his personal assurance. By 
contrast, in the next to last line Arpey states ―You have my word, we will do our very 
best…..‖ His personal assurance is followed up by a corporate ―we.‖ Perhaps the 
certainty of vision the previous year led Mullin to shy away from reducing the ambiguity 
of 2003. Perhaps he learned too much. The ongoing negative effects of the economy on 
the airlines made the crisis of 2003 worse than the previous year. 9/11 was no longer 
rhetorically available to absorb the blame and all the federal supplements had been used 
up. The societal crisis had found other expressions and satisfactions. The airlines were, to 
a large degree, on their own when it came to addressing these severe issues. When Mullin 
gazed about for an acceptable scapegoat, he only found what seemed an acceptable 
rhetorical device from which to project the problems of 2002. Unfortunately that device 
was a mirror. Time for Mullin became very narrow indeed and rhetorically, no escape 
was provided as all eyes were on him.  
It is not the rearranging of chronologies and jumping across time spans to create 
connections that matters, it is reconfiguring the meaning of the past so it meets the needs 
of the present and bridges to the future that gives persuasive force. Rhetorical purpose 
resurrects the past‘s significance as the speaker offers to explain the present in that light. 
Once grounded in an event, person or value the enacted past can be bridged to a coherent 
future. Investor confidence depends not only on what the CEO thinks might happen in the 
future but what has been done in the past to justify that future expectation. While the 
legalese at the start of the meetings states that previous returns are no guarantee of future 
returns, investors use previous returns and links to the past to determine the salience of 
 150 
 
future visions. Since investor management is about managing expectations, enacting a 
sensible past gives credence to future visions.    
Within the Years Summary 
 Each year the CEO‘s were called upon to address circumstances that had striking 
similarities as they addressed their stockholders. The boom then bust of the industry 
affected the plans and goals for each of the airlines in this study. Relying on their past, or 
without a sufficient past their plans, they attempted to show control by warning of the 
downturn and its possible effects. Later, as they were overwhelmed by the events of 9/11 
and the precipitous declines it engendered, they sought to enact environments, to see 
about them the relevant aspects that would make sense of the equivocality in a world and 
an industry that no longer was sensible. These enactments were shared in different ways, 
from parsimonious utterances to certainty and assurances to new ways of measuring the 
world; all the while using 9/11 as the explanation of the problems. Finally, when the 
effect of 9/11 wore off sufficiently that investors would no longer accept its direct 
consequences as an explanation, the CEOs attempted to create a vision from the edge of 
non existence, attempting to gain the confidence of shareholder‘s in the professional 
abilities of the CEO and the abilities of their leadership team. 
 In each year, caught between the ―facts‖ of the past and the uncertain projections 
into the future they offered their interpretation of the meaning of the events that occurred. 
Time is the commodity by which they made their connections, created an interpretation 
and proffered a future. Slicing it in different chunks, depending on what impression they 
sought to make, the ―past‖ was anywhere from the last few weeks to 77 years ago. Weeks 
were compressed into single events and personal stories intersected with corporate 
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actions and histories. Meanings were created by logical connections that rendered time 
irrelevant or amplified the significance of prescient time that found them ready to deal 
with the onset of a crisis. While one aspect of these shareholder‘s presentations is 
retrospective their goal is always prospective. By defining the past they hope not to serve 
as historians but as visionaries in historian‘s garb. It is not only Leo Mullin who speaks 
with a prophetic voice in 2002. Each of the CEOs seeks to create the future they 
pronounce by the act of proclaiming it. How well they accomplish this rhetorical task is 
seen, in some measure, by the stock value maintained, rising or diminished. As sense 
makers for the organization their presentations in the midst of crisis takes on added 
significance because of the inherent ambiguity, uncertainty and equivocality of the crisis. 
Abigail Adams once noted to her future President son, ―The habits of a vigorous mind are 
formed in contending with difficulties. Great necessities call out great virtues‖ (Adams, 
Adams, McCullough, 2002, p. 253).  The great necessities of the airline industry, inherent 
in its deregulated state, were exacerbated to crisis proportions by the events of 9/11. This 
crisis threatened the survival of many airlines, shook the confidence of investors and 
challenged the ―vigorous minds‖ of its leaders in ways they had not been challenged 
before.  
 Crises call forth vigorous minds that must addresss the materiality of the crisis, in 
this case; financial losses, layoffs, employee give backs, bonuses, increased security 
costs, management ethics and rising fuel prices. As stated in chapter one, addressing the 
materiality is only part of the equation of crisis management. The communication of the 
decisions is vital if the crisis is to be solved for those stakeholders within the corporation 
and the public that is now aware of the issues of the organization in crisis. For 
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stockholders, on the cusp of the internal/external division of the organization, 
communication of how a crisis is being addressed is critical for their decisions because 
they hold a financial stake in the organization and will directly benefit or be penalized for 
the actions of the organization. These ―explanations and plans‖ of the organization are 
rhetorical tools for gaining, maintaining and fostering confidence so that private and 
institutional investor will keep their stock and maintain the stock‘s value. With these 
goals in mind the presentations to shareholders represent the best that the organization 
has to offer in both its interpretations of the past and its vision for the future.  
 Imbued throughout with time considerations, time becomes a central tool for this 
rhetorical management. To address a crisis, CEOs must use time, not just the linear, 
experienced time of the retelling of events but more importantly, interpreted rhetorical 
time. A major task is the utilization of meaning making time, the time of connecting 
disparate events by their enacted commonalities that makes sense of equivocalities and 
gives direction to the future in the midst of present uncertainties. Moving seamlessly 
from their task as historians CEOs assume a prophet-like role as they proclaim an 
―attainable‖ future. The past is displayed again in the duree, not for its historical 
significance but for its future salience. When the present is out of control, the ability to 
rhetorically manage time, to slice it, compress it, mold it, reshape it, becomes a central 
means of CEOs achieving their goals with shareholders. Crisis is by definition about loss 
of control. A crisis is certainly about the loss of control of the material portion of the 
organization. But more significantly, it is about the loss of the control of time, 
specifically the future. To regain the future CEOs use the retained memories and 
meanings of the past to create a vocabulary and invoke analogous circumstances, 
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pronounce implementation of present plans to create a sense of understanding and 
mastery over the current problems and to proclaim a vision of the future. To address a 
crisis effectively, particularly for shareholders in the ecology of rhetoric that exists in the 
organizational society in which we live, means to utilize the persuasiveness of rhetorical 
time. Events become the building block of meaning making where time is not a given but 
a variable.  
Study Limitations, Implications and Future Considerations 
Limitations 
       The design of this study is a rhetorical analysis of airline CEOs to shareholders   
before, during and after the crisis of 9/11. The purpose is to consider how these CEO‘s 
dealt with the persuasive requirements of presentations in the highly rhetorical 
environment of addressing shareholders at the annual shareholder‘s meetings. Under 
normal conditions a primary purpose of Annual General Meetings is to gain, maintain or 
create investor confidence in the corporation, the CEO, the leadership team, or the 
industry itself. Confidence building is a rhetorical activity. During a time of crisis the 
rhetorical elements are pervasive and significantly magnified. The methodology was to 
focus on the usage of time as the CEOs dealt with the rhetorical ecology of yearly contact 
with investors through this venue, quarterly analyst calls and annual reports. The three 
airlines chosen are selected because they are a cross section of the industry and degrees 
of participation in the events of 9/11. AA and Delta provide insight from the perspective 
as major, legacy carriers, one directly involved in the high jackings, while Frontier is 
seen from its niche as a relatively new, unique, Low Cost Carrier.  
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 As Burke (1945), notes, how a matter is constituted determines the outcome or 
range of outcomes (p. 197). Therefore, the selection of these airlines certainly limits the 
study. It may have been more fruitful to select all major legacy carriers or all minor LCCs 
in order to create a uniformity of approach, history, and commensurability. The 
differences of airline age, size, available resources and history make the comparisons 
different by orders of magnitude. For example, in 2002 American spent more on food 
services than the total revenue of Frontier Airlines. American‘s revenues were more than 
42 times that of the Denver based LCC. (AA Annual Report 2002)/FA AnnualReport , 
2002) 
 Additionally the starting point of the study influenced its outcome. Extending the 
starting point in the years before 9/11 would establish a firmer baseline of non-crisis 
presentations before attempting to discover what changes were made as a result of the 
events of September 11, 2001. This would create a comparative background of the style 
of the individual CEOs as well as what data and interpretations were considered relevant 
by the leadership team for the investors. It would also reveal the issues that have been 
presented over time and how they were rhetorically fashioned in crisis to chosen 
outcomes and influences that were sought.  
 Limiting the study to airlines where the same CEO made the presentation each 
year would have minimized differences based on personality and abilities. That being 
said, studying different CEOs allows for a greater revelation of corporate policies and 
culture because these presentations are not the work of an individual but are shared across 
leadership lines. The involvement of different CEOs allow for the organizational 
structure to be seen more closely over time. 
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 The final two limitations are inherent to the individual fields of rhetorical analysis 
and organizational communication. Rhetorical analysis has within its practice the 
understanding that the analyst is creating meanings and drawing inferences from the 
insight and research base compiled. Close Textual Analysis, seeks to allow the text to 
shape the analyst‘s vision by being immersed in the text as a grounded understanding 
emerges. The study of these enactments is itself an enactment. Attempting to limit the 
presuppositions, the analyst cannot help but bring a worldview and an understanding of 
the purposes and meanings to the techniques used to persuade. As such, my background 
in leadership positions, albeit in much smaller organizations, creates the dynamic of 
investigation based in part on how I read the situation and the leadership tasks that inhere 
to it. In addition, there is a limitation on the understanding of the impact that the 
individual personality of the presenter brings. The ways of phrasing ideas, the emotional 
sensitivity, the tone of the text may be more closely connected to the individual style than 
the organization. This individual style is mitigated in each case due to the role as 
representative of the organization speaking on behalf of the organization but is sometimes 
hard to separate.  
 Finally, at times, organizational studies suffer from their specificity to an industry 
or a niche organization within a particular industry. How much of the crisis 
communication revealed here is applicable beyond the volatile airline industry is 
questionable. Is it, for example, applicable to the study of FEMA during the response to 
Hurricane Katrina or the crisis of the shootings at Virginia Tech?  How much of the 
―official, structured‖ nature of these presentations vis a vis the SEC limits their use of 
rhetorical techniques to persuade? Since context determines availability of techniques this 
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may be a significant factor. Additionally organizations are highly symbolic in their 
creation of identities, meaning making and identity projection. Can this be measured or 
understood from textual studies or does it need to be studied over a period of time? The 
use of PowerPoint presentations compared to a letter in the case of Frontier Airlines is a 
case study by itself in retained memory of organizations and Structuration processes. 
With these limitations recognized, the study contributes to theory and practice in a variety 
of ways.   
Contributions to theory 
 Crisis communication is a growing field within the study of organizational 
communication. Leadership communication has a rich history in the disciplines of 
history, politics, military studies and rhetoric. Rhetoric has grown in significance in crisis 
communication within organizational communication studies. In my view, this will 
continue to grow as society continues to move to an ever increasing dominance of 
organizations as the major form of identification and interaction. This study contributes 
to theory in three significant ways; rhetorical responses to crisis, leadership in the midst 
of crisis and the central focus of time in addressing crisis situations.  
 Crises are rhetorical situations infused with a contestation for meaning, salience, 
relevance and significance. How one approaches a crisis, the choices of representation of 
the organization, the subject matter, tone, sequencing and perspective of the presenter all 
point to the intent and the effect of the speaker. The awareness of the contestable nature 
of the crisis is the first aspect to be understood. Once the rhetorical goals are created, 
which goals best suit the purpose of the organization in regards to the audience is 
significant. This study focused on the malleability and contestability of time as the 
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chronological history of events interacts with the meaning making recapitulation of those 
events. What connections are made, how they are rationalized and the impressions 
desired are necessary considerations of the rhetoric of crisis management. 
 Charged with a visionary role, leaders in organizations stand at the nexus of the 
past and present, making sense of the former in order to enact the latter. Utilizing their 
representational authority, they speak for the organization and for themselves as they 
attempt to give voice to the history of the organization and mold it as an indicator of the 
path to an envisioned future. As such they take control of time and bend it as a tool to 
achieve their purposes. This understanding of both the storytelling and the meaning 
making function of their office contributes to an understanding of the task, opportunity 
and responsibility before them and a process available to them. Focusing on time 
configurations in an organizational context is a nascent field in organizational 
communication literature.  
Contributions to practice  
 This study provides depth and insight for those addressing the needs and issues of 
crisis communication. It also allows those who study and practice leadership to 
understand a significant dimension of their role and task and to see the relevance of time 
from a different perspective. The methodology of the study, utilizing rhetorical analysis 
in an organizational setting, further extends the use of rhetorical analysis beyond 
traditional boundaries. By being aware of the communication processes organizations 
engage in, the constitutive nature of communication comes to the fore. Making sense of 
equivocalities and the establishment of practices that contribute to the structuration of the 
organization will assist leaders and organizational participants to heed the relevance and 
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foundational nature of what they say, how they say it and the goals of their 
communication (O Hair, et al, 2005).  
 The practice of leadership is also impacted by this study. The role of a leader is 
largely communicative. Despite all other duties their primary task is to speak for the 
organization. This is particularly true for the management of shareholders and the Annual 
General Meeting. In a crisis the communicative tasks are intensified as shareholders want 
to know what is happening and what is being done to control the crisis. The CEO 
represents organizational leadership and is attended to by all stakeholders in the 
organization through the forum of these meetings. What they say, how it is said, the 
techniques they use and the recognition of the rhetorical nature of their task is relevant to 
fulfilling these duties. Leaders of publicly owned corporations will find an additional 
avenue to accomplish their task of shareholder management and equity retention; through 
the understanding of the persuasive nature of time. The past is not merely history, it is an 
essential building block for making sense of the present and creating a future. How time 
is compressed and sliced are important choices lest implications and connections be 
created that undermine rhetorical goals. These choices should be made with recognition 
of available time related techniques and their significance. 
 Finally, practitioners of rhetoric will find, as Cheney (1992) observed, that leaders 
of organizations engage in the ―managing of multiple identities‖. The relevance of 
rhetorical studies and rhetorical techniques within organizational settings goes beyond 
public relations and ―spin‖ to encompass the very lifeblood of the organizational purpose, 
construction and identity. Rhetorical principles are at the foundation of the process of 
organizing and are found at the multiple, contestable aspects of internal and external 
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organizational activities. Shareholders are on the cusp of internal and external activities 
and are therefore a good place to start in understanding the role of rhetoric and leadership 
in the midst of crisis management within and outside of organizations.   
Future Possibilities  
 There are ample opportunities for additional studies of structured and unstructured 
presentations of CEOs and management teams to various constituencies. Quarterly calls, 
annual reports, Congressional hearings, lawsuits, media conferences, editorials, blogs, 
and analyst interviews provide additional opportunities for comparison of how CEOs and 
organizational leadership enact environments, reinstantiate the organization and use time 
to make sense of circumstances. The regular visitation of crises in organizations, self 
created and otherwise, will continue to provide a rich cross section of materials available 
to study the rhetorical response of organizations within a crisis context. Due to the nature 
of airline transportation and the daily cognizance of imminent disaster, studies of airlines 
can forward definitions and understandings of crisis management that are applicable 
beyond the scope of this particular industry. Certainly the airlines are a rich and 
sometimes chaotic field to study, perhaps in the strong dialectics at work here insights 
into those who ―swing more gently‖ will be provided as key issues are identified and 
effective rhetorical responses are developed.  
 One possible extension of this study relates to CEO pronouncements and stock 
prices. If one of the key tasks of CEOs in the twenty first century is management of stock 
prices and stockholders, what correlation is there between the presentations they make 
and stock prices? In the years after this study the trading of Delta‘s stock was suspended 
when it fell under a dollar and the airline filed for bankruptcy protection. Losing equal 
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amounts of money, American Airlines stock lost two-thirds of its value before it 
bottomed out and began to gain value. Seeking a correlation between the confidence 
stockholders have in leadership, CEO pronouncements and stock prices may prove an 
interesting and fruitful consideration.  
 Likewise, further work on the significance of time in rhetorical analysis, 
particularly for organizations and for crisis situations could be expanded. In 1905 
Einstein showed what storytellers for thousands of years already knew; time is an 
imposed structure in physics that is malleable to the forces of mass and velocity. 
Storytellers already knew that time is an imposed structure malleable to the forces of 
purposes, meaning making and connection set forth by the storyteller. The use of close 
textual analysis and linguistic ratios allows underlying intents and motivations to be seen 
in clearer focus, especially when combined with the study of rhetorical time. 
Conclusion 
Rhetoric, crisis and leadership, are all studied within the context of an industry 
that defines technological achievement for nations, an industry that is in many ways 
symbolic of the new millennium. Time moves ever onward but the meanings of the 
events it encapsulates are available to a speaker to order and reconfigure historical 
actions and relationships for persuasive effect. Connections are made and identities 
constructed by the malleability of time. Especially in a crisis, the anchors of the past 
become the potential moorings for weathering the current storm. Credibility for the future 
is established by reclaiming the past. Recognizing the centrality of time configurations, 
speakers, especially those interested in establishing and maintaining organizational 
identity and confidence, would do well to attend to its persuasive potential.   
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2001 REMARKS BY Mr. Carty 1 
CHAIRMAN CARTY:  2 
While the vote tallies are being taken, I am pleased to have the opportunity, at least for 3 
few minutes this morning, to give you a brief overview of this past year. My only concern 4 
this morning is I will not be able to do justice to all the important events that took place 5 
in the short time we have. 6 
I think it is fair to say the challenges, the disappointments, the demand for innovation and 7 
the sometimes surprising opportunities that have always characterized the airline 8 
business, are as present and robust as ever in this, our 75th year. Since we last met 9 
together, we sold our majority interest in Sabre, we bought TWA, we made plans to share 10 
the Northeast Shuttle with United and to invest in DC Air, we have been continually 11 
tested by the nation's inadequate air traffic control system, and in the past month we have 12 
seen the government's 1999 predatory pricing suit against us disappear. We have resolved 13 
the lingering and thorny issue with our pilots and have been called back into mediation 14 
with the flight attendants. And that is just the short list. 15 
Let's take these events one at a time and talk about them in the context of the Airline 16 
Leadership Plan. That is the strategic framework we launched in 1999 to organize the 17 
company's efforts and focus our energy on the six critical areas we believe define success 18 
for any airline safety, service, product, technology, culture and network. 19 
The TWA purchase all by itself is a significant-enough event that it presents us with 20 
tremendous benefits as well as, I might add, daunting challenges sometimes both at the 21 
same time. All six are the key areas that I just referred to. But an immediate impact and 22 
one that played a major role in shaping our decision to make the purchase is the 23 
tremendous benefit it provides to our network. I usually talk about network last in these 24 
discussions, because there is so much to say about it and because in a business where the 25 
goal is to get passengers where they need to go, the strategic importance of where we go 26 
cannot be overstated. 27 
It sounds simple and, of course, years ago it used to be. Back in 1926 when Charles 28 
Lindburgh made the first flight for what would then become American Airlines, it was 29 
from St. Louis to Chicago, from point A to point B. It was on that straightforward basis 30 
that routes were added one after another thereafter, until the changing needs of travelers 31 
and the changing nature of the U.S. economy made that model both costly and obsolete. 32 
Thus was born the hub-and-spoke model, which allowed us to offer on a cost-effective 33 
basis exponentially more frequency and destination options. 34 
Over the past several years technology, globalization, integration and consolidation have 35 
changed all of our lives, changed the way we all do business and propelled another 36 
quantum leap in the needs of air travelers. Fundamentally they still need exactly the same 37 
thing to move from A to B. It is just that point B is as likely to be Uzbeckistan as Illinois. 38 
We have to find ways to get them there on American, American Eagle, on one of our 39 
alliance partners or on some combination of all of those. 40 
Even without the TWA transaction, the year 2000 was significant in terms of our goal of 41 
network leadership. We expanded our operations in critical domestic cities like Boston, 42 
New York, Los Angeles and San Jose, California. We grew the American Eagle fleet 43 
network through the aggressive deployment of regional jets. In the global arena we 44 
extended our reach around the world through our Oneworld partners and a number of 45 
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other bilateral relationships. We think that the combination of all those things gives us the 46 
industry's premier set of alliances. 47 
Coming on top of those improvements, the TWA purchase represents literally a giant leap 48 
forward in our network building efforts. I personally feel confident in saying to you, our 49 
shareholders, that we could not have devised a more responsible, more economic way to 50 
do it. In St. Louis, we get a third mid-continent hub to relieve pressures building at DFW 51 
and Chicago. We take over extremely valuable real estate and slots at LaGuardia, JFK 52 
and at Washington Reagan. We add to our position as a leading east-west carrier, we gain 53 
access to markets that are new to AA network, and we do it all while maintaining a strong 54 
balance sheet and without adding incremental capacity to an industry that is perpetually 55 
and not always successfully trying to maintain the tricky balance between supply and 56 
demand. 57 
The TWA purchase was only one part of a planned three-part transaction. Parts two and 58 
three, the acquisition and lease of assets from US Airways that would allow us to share 59 
the Northeast Shuttle with United, and the acquisition of a 49 percent stake in DC Air are, 60 
of course, contingent upon the closing of United's proposed merger with US Airways. 61 
That prospect looks less certain every day, but I think it is fair to say that we are 62 
positioned well for either outcome. If United's deal does go through, we are going to add 63 
additional important assets. If it does not, it in no way diminishes the tremendous value 64 
of the TWA transaction. 65 
As all of you know, the TWA deal has already closed and on its own represents a very 66 
positive outcome not just for customers and shareholders, but for our third constituency 67 
group, our employees. We are proud to say that this deal brings together two of the 68 
strongest and most experienced workforces in the airline business. It brings them together 69 
in a way that adds more assets than employees. The net result of this will be wealth of 70 
hiring and promotional opportunities for the people of American, as well as our new 71 
colleagues from TWA. 72 
I do not want to leave you today with the impression that we spent all our time this year 73 
working on deals. We have taken great strides along the other critical paths of our Airline 74 
Leadership Plan in ways we know will substantially improve the travel experience for our 75 
passengers. How do we know that? We know it because we asked them. What they told 76 
us first and most often was they wanted more room and we gave it to them. Last year we 77 
launched the More Room Throughout Coach program, which adds from two to five 78 
inches of pitch throughout the coach cabins on virtually every aircraft throughout our 79 
fleet. We did not stop with more legroom nor did we limit our upgrades to coach. We are 80 
increasing the legroom in Business Class and we have rolled out our new Flagship Suite 81 
First Class Concept on our 777s. We have fully flat seats on our 767s in first class that 82 
serve Europe and South America. All these initiatives are complemented by the program 83 
we launched last fall to expand the storage capacity of our overhead bins. So when you 84 
combine that program with the reduction in seats, the result is going to be clearly 85 
industry-leading amount of carry-on space for our customers. 86 
If we made being on the aircraft more pleasant, we have also made getting there easier 87 
and more efficient through technological innovations, which are allowing us to better 88 
serve our customers while also increasing our productivity. Roving Agent is a wireless, 89 
hand-held device that agents use to check in passengers and issue bar-coded boarding 90 
passes on the spot. One-stop self-service allows passengers to check themselves in on 91 
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touch screens at kiosks around American's domestic terminals. And these are addition to 92 
a suite of back-office improvements in reservations that will both increase the focus on 93 
customer interaction and reduce the average transaction time. 94 
We are also making improvements to the physical infrastructure of our operation. 95 
Passengers traveling through DFW, JFK, Boston, Miami and Los Angeles are going to 96 
see the progress in our efforts to improve, and where we can, expand our terminal 97 
facilities. We continue to upgrade and refresh both the American and American Eagle 98 
fleets. American put 43 new jets into service during the year, and Eagle's fleet of regional 99 
jets grew to be 83 strong. Eagle's O'Hare operation became all RJ during the 4th quarter. 100 
With the planned delivery of 26 more RJs this year, we are going to continue replacing 101 
turbo props in the Eagle fleet and expanding our connecting service at Chicago, DFW 102 
and all our focus cities on the East Coast. 103 
One of 2000's early highlights came in the area of safety, which is one of our six 104 
Leadership categories, but is certainly the first among equals. Last January former 105 
President Clinton recognized ASAP, our Aviation Safety Action Partnership, as a model 106 
to be implemented throughout the industry. Another significant commitment to safety we 107 
have made is in the flight department, where we plan to invest more than $11 million 108 
annually to increase the frequency of recurrent pilot training. 109 
Those are just some of the highlights from last year. I can spend at least as much time 110 
talking to you about the major developments that have already occurred in 2001. As I 111 
mentioned earlier, a few weeks ago we received very good news regarding the predatory 112 
pricing lawsuit filed against us by the U.S. government in 1999. As I think all of you 113 
know, we have always maintained the suit was without merit, and while American 114 
Airlines was an intense competitor and will continue to be, it competed in the past, in the 115 
present and in the future, always within the law. And of course the judge in this case 116 
agreed and our motion for summary judgment was granted, and the suit was simply 117 
dismissed. 118 
We are obviously pleased with this and relieved to have it behind us, so we can now 119 
direct all of our energies to the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead. That is exactly 120 
how I would describe the current state of our labor relations as both an opportunity but 121 
also as a challenge. We are either negotiating or preparing to negotiate with all of our 122 
labor unions. Even as we work towards positive outcomes with all three, it is hard not to 123 
recognize how uncertain and how unpredictable the relationship with labor has grown not 124 
just for our company, but throughout the entire airline industry. It gets much more 125 
difficult to manage for both sides with every proposal that is negotiated in good faith by 126 
both parties, and then we turn around and find it rejected by the membership. 127 
This week we were very pleased to be called back by the National Mediation Board to 128 
resume talks with the flight attendants. We continue to hope that we will finally get an 129 
agreement. We are also in negotiation with the Transport Workers Union, and those 130 
discussions are going very well. We will also soon be in discussions with our pilots. I 131 
remain optimistic that we will reach agreement with these unions as well. 132 
Finally, no list of challenges would be complete without mention of the pitiable state of 133 
the nation's air traffic control system and its universally adverse effects on the service 134 
that we and other carriers are able to offer on any given day. This problem is not simply 135 
complicated; it is impossible for any single carrier to solve. It will not be solved to 136 
anyone's satisfaction in the very near future. 137 
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But there are pieces of the puzzle that we do control, and in those cases the management 138 
of American has gone about doing what we always do try to identify the problem and try 139 
to fix it. Late last year we completely overhauled the schedules of our DFW and our 140 
Chicago hubs. Those schedule adjustments, I am pleased to say, are reaping real 141 
dividends in the form of improved dependability. 142 
Compared to that list of challenges, the softening economy and rising fuel prices we 143 
experienced the last part of 2000 and continuing into the first quarter of this year, seem 144 
eminently clear-cut and at least comprehensible. Fortunately we have more experience 145 
dealing with the effects of an up-and-down economy in our business, and we are 146 
confident in our ability to manage the current downturn. Our first quarter results reflect 147 
the impact of the weakening economy. With the flexibility we have built into our fleet 148 
plan, our fuel hedging program and our strong commitment to the Airline Leadership 149 
Plan, we believe we will be very well positioned for whatever happens going forward. 150 
Again I want to thank all of you for being here today, and I do look forward to seeing you 151 
again and reporting to you more progress when we convene a year from now. 152 
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2002 Remarks by Mr. Carty 1 
MR. CARTY: While those ballots are being accumulated, let me just make a couple of 2 
comments. Again, let me reiterate my welcome and thank all of you for joining us this 3 
morning. 4 
You know, in some respects 2001 was like most other years, the American Airlines and 5 
the American Eagle teams rose to meet a number of incredible challenges. And from a 6 
strategic standpoint I think we did accomplish quite a bit in terms of positioning our 7 
airline for long-term competitive success. 8 
As everyone in this room knows, 2001 was not just another year. It was a year that 9 
brought unprecedented challenge to our country, to our industry, and obviously to AMR 10 
Corporation. For American Airlines every accomplishment, indeed every other event was 11 
overshadowed by the twin calamities of the September 11th attacks and the terrible crash 12 
of an American plane in Queens, New York on November 12. 13 
Prior to September 11th our company's greatest obstacle had been the slowing U.S. 14 
economy, which triggered a substantial decline, even before September 11, in air travel. 15 
Generally all of our business -all of our travel was affected, but business travel was 16 
affected particularly. And obviously after September 11 things got much, much worse. 17 
Demand for both leisure and business travel fell, while security, insurance, and a host of 18 
other costs increased. 19 
Now, to deal with the new business climate we made a number of very, very difficult 20 
decisions at American; shrinking the airline, dramatically cutting capital spending, and 21 
worst of all, having to furlough thousands and thousands of our colleagues. While 2001 22 
was a painful year for our customers, it was also a very painful year for our employees, 23 
and of course all of our shareholders. 24 
And yet despite all the bad news, 2001, which among other things marked our company's 25 
75th anniversary, did contain a number of important highlights and milestones. 26 
In January we signed a deal to acquire substantially all of the assets of TransWorld 27 
Airlines, and in the months that followed, our people, despite all of the aforementioned 28 
problems in our business, completed the biggest, the most complex and most successful 29 
integration of two airlines in the history of our industry. 30 
The More Room Throughout Coach campaign, which we launched in 2000, gained real 31 
traction in 2001, giving us a very important point of differentiation versus the rest of the 32 
industry. That good news notwithstanding, our company is now faced with the most 33 
severe financial challenge that we've seen, at least since deregulation a quarter of a 34 
century ago. And while the road back to profitability is likely to be long and steep, the 35 
management of this company will leave absolutely no stone unturned as we seek out 36 
opportunities to enhance our business model and once again make AMR a rewarding 37 
investment. 38 
The airline industry landscape has been dramatically altered during the past year and that 39 
means more change than we've already seen is absolutely inevitable. But as we learned in 40 
2001, the values and the principles that underlie our every success, safety, service, 41 
product, network, technology, and corporate culture are as solid as they've ever been. 42 
And the velocity of change today makes sticking to those guiding principles all the more 43 
important. 44 
However, our company's ultimate strength lies in its people who in 2001 endured more 45 
than any of us would have thought possible. The dignity and strength and grace of the 46 
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American Airlines and American Eagle teams have been an inspiration to us all. And in 47 
the year to come, those of us in senior management will do our best to live up to the 48 
example they've set for us. 49 
Again, thank you all for being with us this morning. Mr. MarLett, do we have the results 50 
of the balloting51 
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2003 Remarks by Mr. Arpey 1 
Thank you, Mr. Brennan. Good  2 
morning everyone. Thank you all for joining us this morning.  I want to preface my 3 
remarks on the state of our company by saying how honored I am to help lead the airline 4 
I have called home my entire career and the team that I consider to be the very best in the 5 
industry. 6 
Since September 11, 2001, the nearly 100,000 members of the American Airlines and 7 
American Eagle family have been engaged in the noble effort of trying to save this great 8 
company. In my first communication with them since becoming CEO, I commended 9 
them for their guts and determination and promised to apply the same guts and 10 
determination to my task of leading our company through these difficult times. In the 11 
short period I have been CEO, I have spent as much of my time as possible meeting face 12 
to face with our employees, listening to their ideas and suggestions, and thanking them 13 
for their commitment and willingness to sacrifice on behalf of our company. I also let 14 
them know that while we won't be abandoning the values and strengths that have always 15 
defined American Airlines, we will be bringing new leadership, new thinking, and fresh 16 
approaches to the challenges confronting us. 17 
It is especially important that all our people understand the "whats and whys" of our 18 
direction, because one thing I have learned in my 20 plus years here is that when the men 19 
and women of American get their hearts and minds around a mission, that mission almost 20 
always gets accomplished. While lowering costs has been our primary focus in recent 21 
months, returning the airline to health and profitability is going to require a much broader 22 
plan. So the leadership team and I have been working hard to crystallize our strategic 23 
vision into a crisp, easy to understand plan to put some context around all of our 24 
activities, and more importantly to provide a framework for the decisions we make going 25 
forward. 26 
The new plan, which we have dubbed "The American Turnaround Plan," is summed up 27 
in the following four tenets: First, lower costs to compete; second, fly smart, give 28 
customers what they value; third, pull together, win together; and fourth and finally, build 29 
a financial foundation for our future.  30 
What I would like to do is provide a little more detail on these four points, starting with 31 
the first, lower costs to compete. This is an area where we have already made a lot of 32 
progress. However, the fact that we compete with low cost airlines on an ever increasing 33 
percentage of our flights means we must continue to streamline, simplify and remove 34 
costs from our operation wherever we can. Most of you are aware that we set out to 35 
remove 4 billion dollars from our cost structure. While that's an enormous challenge for a 36 
company our size, I am pleased to report that we are well on our way to achieve that goal. 37 
Although employee costs represent our largest single expense, we began our cost 38 
reduction program by focusing on ways to reduce our non-labor costs, areas like fleet 39 
simplification, scheduling efficiency, streamlined customer interaction, distribution 40 
savings, product changes, and day-to-day operating adjustments. The initiatives we 41 
launched in these areas will, once fully implemented, save us roughly 2 billion dollars a 42 
year. That is a great result, but unfortunately it was not enough.  43 
We then turned towards our employees. And after much negotiation and interaction, we 44 
were ultimately able to reach agreements that will save us 1.8 billion dollars annually in 45 
labor expenses, and we are in the process of implementing those agreements as we speak. 46 
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Finally, we reached agreements with many of our suppliers on concessions that have 47 
brought us over $175 million in annual cost savings. Beyond the obvious financial 48 
benefit, this lowering of our cost structure is strategically important because lower costs 49 
will enable us to compete, rather than retreat, in lots of markets that are important to our 50 
customers and where our franchise has been jeopardized by the entry of low cost 51 
competitors. 52 
For example, for several years we have steadily lost market share in some important 53 
transcontinental markets, partly because we were not perceived by our customers to be 54 
price competitive. And the truth is, no airline can be price competitive unless they are 55 
reasonably cost competitive. We are determined to close the gap on both. And to that end, 56 
yesterday we introduced a new fare structure in several transcon markets including 57 
Kennedy-San Jose, Kennedy-Long Beach, and Kennedy-Orange County. The program is 58 
very simple. In each of the markets I mentioned, the walk-up one way fare does not 59 
exceed $299 in the coach cabin. What's more, our first class walk-up ticket is $599 each 60 
way, something that our low cost competitors simply cannot match. 61 
 At the same time, in addition to these low fares, we will continue to offer fares matching 62 
our competition at every price point on the curve. While this new initiative demonstrates 63 
very well the link between lowering costs and becoming more competitive, it also reflects 64 
our determination to refine our service and product offerings in response to both the fluid 65 
competitive landscape and the evolving desires of our customers. 66 
That's a great lead in to the second objective of our Turnaround Plan, fly smart, give 67 
customers what they value. For 25 years, ever since our industry was deregulated, 68 
American's success has depended on our ability to generate more revenue per unit of 69 
production than our competitors, thus compensating for our higher costs. What the 70 
second tenet of our plan is about is about capitalizing on our strengths and sustaining our 71 
revenue premium by giving customers what they truly want and are willing to pay for. It 72 
is about keeping our focus on the higher yielding business passenger, but not losing sight 73 
of the need to attract at least our fair share of all market segments.  74 
First and foremost, to do this we must continue to run a safe and dependable airline. The 75 
good news is we have made great strides in improving our on time performance the past 76 
couple of years, and this area of strength will be bolstered as the simplification of our 77 
fleet and streamlining of our entire operation picks up speed. But dependable service, 78 
while important, is just the start. To fly smart we must optimize the breadth and 79 
efficiency of our network. We continue to believe our hub and spoke approach represents 80 
the most effective way for us to take the most possible customers to the most possible 81 
places. Adding to the effectiveness of this approach is American's regional partner, 82 
American Eagle, as well as our numerous international alliances and our cargo and mail 83 
business. 84 
We will preserve the scope and breadth of our global network, but size and effectiveness 85 
are not the same thing. Flying smart sometimes means picking the right battles to fight. 86 
So building the most effective network must be a continuing process of fine tuning. 87 
Moreover, given the fall off in air travel demand, we must be vigilant about keeping 88 
supply and demand reasonably in balance. This summer, our peak capacity will be down 89 
by more than 6 percent compared to last year. That number reflects a 10 percent 90 
reduction in our domestic system and an increase in our international network of almost 2 91 
percent. 92 
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As for our fleet, by July we will have eliminated 57 aircraft compared to a year ago, and 93 
we plan to shrink the fleet by another 57 units by next summer. At that point, our fleet 94 
will be 21 percent smaller, and our network capacity will be 15 percent less than it was in 95 
the year 2001. We are likewise examining all the attributes of the American Airlines 96 
product. There are many areas of strength in addition to our network, which we believe 97 
are important contributors to the brand image we depend on for our revenue premium. 98 
The AADVANTAGE Program, Admirals Clubs, first class service and various other 99 
amenities are important to our premium customers. But again, flying smart means we 100 
must pick our battles wisely and examine every aspect of what we do and what we offer 101 
in every market we serve. And in the end, we cannot afford to provide more than our 102 
customers are willing to pay for. I'm sure every one here is familiar with the more room 103 
throughout coach campaign we launched back in the year 2000, a time when airline 104 
yields were at historically high levels and our business model was tightly focused on 105 
capturing share in what was then a very robust business travel environment. Even in that 106 
environment, we understood that taking seats off every airplane would actually cost us 107 
revenue in some more leisure-oriented markets where loads tend to be very high and fares 108 
tend to be lower. But our desire for a consistent product across all market segments 109 
combined with the benefits we expected from an increased share of business traffic 110 
outweighed that concern. 111 
As everyone here knows, the revenue picture today bears little resemblance to the year 112 
2000. The demand for business travel is no longer sufficient to warrant offering fewer 113 
seats than our competitors in many higher demand markets. So to satisfy the demand for 114 
more low fares and to match the product being offered by our competitors, we will be 115 
adding seats to our aircraft in markets where price is more important than leg room. This 116 
change will impact two of our fleet types, the 757s and the A-300s, which together 117 
represent roughly one-quarter of our total fleet. We expect the reconfiguration of those 118 
aircraft to be complete by early next year. We are making this change in markets where 119 
our more room product has not translated into a revenue advantage. We will retain the 120 
more room product and continue to promote it aggressively in markets where the 121 
customer base is weighted more toward premium travelers and corporate customers. 122 
I should also point out that adding seats back on some of our aircraft also contributes to 123 
the first objective of our plan, cutting costs to compete, by reducing unit costs associated 124 
with operating those aircraft. Moving forward to preserve our strengths and compete on 125 
both the cost and revenue fronts, we are going to have to be nimble enough to match what 126 
we offer our customers to what they truly value, and most importantly, what they are 127 
willing to pay for. We are determined to transform American into a leaner, stronger and 128 
more agile competitor in the marketplace.  129 
And the third tenet of our plan, pull together, win together, is an explicit acknowledgment 130 
that the future of every member of our team is tied to the success of that transformation. 131 
Moreover, none of the initiatives I have described this morning can fully succeed until we 132 
build trust and teamwork back into the fabric of this company. The senior officers and I 133 
are convinced that if we do our best to take care of our people despite the enormous 134 
financial constraints that we face, they will do their very best to take care of our 135 
customers. 136 
That is no small challenge and it's made even more difficult by everything our people 137 
have been through and the sacrifices they have made over the past two years to assure the 138 
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survival of our company. Nonetheless, the senior leaders and I are committed to creating 139 
an atmosphere at American where every employee feels valued, where everyone is 140 
treated with fairness, respect and appreciation, and where rancor and suspicion are 141 
replaced with cooperation and a shared commitment to our collective success. 142 
While this kind of transformation will not happen over night, I accept that this sort of 143 
change must start at the top. Throughout my two decades here, I have always been proud 144 
to be an employee of American Airlines, and I am committed to doing whatever it takes 145 
to make sure this remains a company that every member of the team can be proud of. 146 
In my first days as CEO, I made it a priority to meet face to face with as many employees 147 
as I could, I  have spent a lot of time talking and listening to employees throughout our 148 
company, and this is something I will continue to do. We are also committed to 149 
continuing the act of engagement process we have utilized with the unions representing 150 
our people, which was integral to the breakthrough restructuring agreements we reached 151 
last month. 152 
Of course, our aim is to engage every member of the American Airlines team, whether 153 
they're a part of an organized group or not. So we have used agent advisory boards, our 154 
employee resource groups, focus groups, surveys, and less formal feedback mechanisms 155 
to garner the input of our agent management and support staff groups, and we will 156 
continue to do that in the future. 157 
An important part of our "pull together, win together" initiative will be making sure 158 
through the use of stock options, profit sharing, and incentive plans that each member of 159 
the team has a personal stake in the success we're working to create. As our focus starts 160 
to slowly shift from short-term survival to long-term success, frequent and effective 161 
communication with our people will be critically important, and the senior leadership of 162 
the company and I are committed to that objective. We do, however, recognize that we 163 
will ultimately be judged by what we do, not by what we say, and we welcome that. 164 
The last tenet of our plan, build a financial foundation for our future, in a sense sums up 165 
the rest of the plan, because by lowering costs, flying smart and pulling together, we will 166 
be laying the groundwork for the future we all want for our company. But this fourth 167 
tenet is also an acknowledgment that we cannot build that future if we don't generate 168 
enough earnings and cash flow to restore our balance sheet, nor will we be able to invest 169 
in the aircraft and facilities we will need to thrive and to grow in the years to come. So 170 
the financial challenge we face to dramatically improve the profitability of our business 171 
must be at the forefront of every decision we make. 172 
The past three years have been a turbulent and difficult period for not only our 173 
employees, but also for our customers and, of course, our shareholders. While the months 174 
to come will continue to bring challenges, we believe the Turnaround Plan that I have 175 
outlined this morning is the road map we need to guide us to the stable and successful 176 
future that everyone here wants for our company. You have my word, we will do our 177 
very best on your behalf to make that happen. Thank you all very much.178 
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 6 
****AS PREPARED, NOT NECESSARILY AS DELIVERED**** 7 
While our last Annual Meeting for Shareowners convened just six month ago in 8 
Cincinnati, the speed and import of intervening events has had a significant impact on the 9 
aviation industry and on Delta Air Lines, disproportionate to the actual elapsed time.  10 
In that period, Delta has faced issues in almost every arena that have challenged our 11 
ability to deliver on commitments to our constituencies, especially to customers and 12 
shareholders. 13 
Today, I would like to talk with you about these challenges and about how Delta is 14 
responding.  15 
In addition, I‘ll review with you the reasons that, despite the noise and distraction of the 16 
last few months, we remain fully confident about our airline‘s future and we look forward 17 
with enthusiasm to the period ahead. 18 
Now, before we discuss the challenges of the last few months, it is important for context 19 
to recall that when viewed as a whole, 2000 was a year of many achievements -- many of 20 
them outstanding -- for Delta Air Lines.  21 
During those twelve months:  22 
Delta earned $897 million in net income, more than any other airline in the world. That 23 
compares, for example, to $752 million earned by American Airlines; $626 million for 24 
Southwest; and $412 million for British Airways [$348MM - Lufthansa; $281MM - 25 
United; $175MM – JAL]  26 
Moreover, during a year when the operating margin for the airline industry averaged 27 
6.5%, Delta achieved a 10.4% rate, topping 10% for the fifth year in a row. 28 
We also maintained an 8% unit cost advantage over other hub-and-spoke carriers. 29 
We sold 12% of Delta tickets on-line -- the most of any hub-and-spoke carrier – with 6% 30 
of those through delta.com. 31 
And this trend to less expensive distribution channels is particularly important since 32 
distribution costs, which totaled $1.7 billion last year, are Delta‘s third biggest expense 33 
after salaries and fuel. 34 
Also in 2000, Delta announced a major terminal expansion at the strategically important 35 
New York-JFK airport. This initiative positions our airline for continued growth in 36 
important international markets, with much improved flight frequencies and better 37 
connections to the U.S. domestic market. 38 
During 2000, we were especially pleased, to announce new service to Buenos Aires, 39 
which we inaugurated on April 1. With this inaugural, we accomplished a major action 40 
goal for Latin America by providing service to all major business centers in the region 41 
within three years of launching Atlanta as the newest Latin America hub.  42 
During 2000 we continued the dramatic strengthening of our international alliance, 43 
SkyTeam.  44 
SkyTeam, which recently added Czech Airlines as a member, now accounts for $400 45 
million of Delta‘s total $500 million in annual revenue from codeshares and alliances. 46 
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SkyTeam is rapidly becoming the second most successful alliance in the world, with the 47 
potential to reach No. 1. 48 
Delta also enplaned 120 million passengers in 2000, more than any other airline in the 49 
world. 50 
We easily exceeded the passenger counts at American, which totaled 86 million, and at 51 
United, with 83 million – and we anticipate retaining that lead even after American and 52 
TWA combine operations. 53 
These are all excellent achievements. But the most gratifying of all our accomplishments 54 
was Delta‘s continued improvement in customer service. 55 
From 1997 onward, when our new management team was assembled, Delta has made 56 
customer service the No. 1 priority after our obvious bedrock commitment to safety. 57 
Given Delta‘s long-standing service reputation derived from over 70 great years of 58 
operation, our employees were disturbed in 1997 by the company‘s falling performance 59 
as measured by the Department of Transportation‘s customer service indices. At one 60 
point, Delta fell to tenth out of 10 in on-time rankings.  61 
In the year 2000, however, Delta ranked No. 1 or 2 in lowest numbers of customers 62 
complaints, denied boardings, and mishandled bags. We slipped only in the on-time 63 
category, where Delta fell to fourth place because of operational difficulties in the last 64 
two months of 2000.  65 
And while a Newsweek cover article last week carried the caption "Airline Hell", the 66 
charts in the article conveyed a positive message regarding Delta‘s customer service 67 
performance. 68 
Newsweek chose to use the widely-touted Wichita State survey of airline customer 69 
service for its foundation statistics. 70 
And there -- at the very top of the key chart that rated overall customer service quality -- 71 
was Delta, ranked as No. 1. 72 
In an extremely difficult year, with an onslaught of negative public sentiment within the 73 
industry, what a tribute this represents to Delta employees. 74 
However, despite these excellent achievements, storm clouds were gathering as the fourth 75 
quarter began, including concerns over high fuel prices, industry restructuring, increased 76 
governmental scrutiny of customer service issues, a weakening economy, and pilot 77 
contract negotiations. 78 
While all these issues remain on the radar screen, the two that have most dominated the 79 
Delta‘s performance difficulties during the last six months are the deepening economic 80 
downturn and labor issues both at Delta and at our wholly owned subsidiary, Comair. 81 
First, let me discuss the more general of the two issues, which is the current economic 82 
environment.  83 
The business news today provides a constant litany of downward economic trends and 84 
corporate losses, indicating that few companies are escaping the effects of the current 85 
economic environment. 86 
Consensus forecasts for GDP growth have consistently fallen over the last few months 87 
and the forecasts now range from a prediction of zero growth for the year to a high of 88 
1.8% -- well below the 5% GDP growth rate for 2000. 89 
Such indicators point to a longer economic slowdown than had been expected, and to an 90 
economy that will not yield the kind of revenue gains we have seen in recent years. 91 
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An unfortunate reality for our industry is that, since business travel expenses are an early 92 
cost-cutting target, airlines suffer a disproportionate amount of revenue pain during these 93 
cycles relative to the rest of the business world. 94 
The effect of the slowing U.S. and global economies, along with labor issues, were 95 
reflected in Delta‘s March quarter results, which we announced last week. 96 
For that period, Delta posted a disappointing net loss of $122 million, our first loss in 25 97 
straight quarters. 98 
The other situation impacting Delta‘s performance in recent months has been the 99 
uncertain status of pilot contract negotiations at Delta, and also at Comair. 100 
Of course, we are gratified that much of that uncertainty was relieved when on Sunday, 101 
Delta and ALPA arrived at a tentative agreement that brings significant benefits to all 102 
constituencies: customers, shareowners, and employees.  103 
But the process of these negotiations has had a major influence on all that has been 104 
happening at Delta, and provides important context for the future. 105 
So let‘s review briefly where we wanted to be at this point and then where we actually 106 
are. 107 
To this end, I‘d like to refer to five important principles regarding negotiations that we 108 
enunciated at the October shareholder meeting. 109 
First, since customer service is Delta‘s highest priority after safety, passengers should be 110 
exempt from spillover from labor negotiations.  111 
Second, Delta is committed to the principle of top pay for top performance. 112 
Third, the application of the principle of top pay for top performance continues to be that 113 
pay for Delta employees ranks at the top of the industry as compared with the equivalent 114 
employee group in the industry – flight attendants to flight attendants, agents to agents, 115 
pilots to pilots, and so forth. 116 
Fourth, in order to support the lofty goal of top pay for top performance, everyone at 117 
Delta must constantly seek productivity gains.  118 
And finally, in order for Delta to fund the increased costs of an industry-leading pilot 119 
contract, we require the corporate strategic flexibility to pursue new businesses and to 120 
quickly act to meet competitive challenges. 121 
In retrospect, the contract negotiation process met these expectations, with one deeply 122 
regrettable exception. 123 
Unfortunately, customers were impacted in the course of these negotiations, especially 124 
during the extensive schedule interruptions in November and December. 125 
That situation, in turn, necessitated a system downsizing of around 3% to 4%, which 126 
continues even today.  127 
Given the high-level of customer-service orientation resident in the people of Delta Air 128 
Lines, these reliability failures were painful and difficult for us all. 129 
In the face of these challenges, Delta people throughout the corporation, including the 130 
vast majority of pilots, exhibited the best of our service tradition by responding heroically 131 
to minimize the impact on customers whenever possible. 132 
We are gratified, too, by the loyalty of Delta‘s customers, and by their patience during 133 
these often frustrating and uncertain weeks and months.  134 
Let me also extend my gratitude to both negotiating teams for their hard work and 135 
professionalism throughout these negotiations.  136 
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And in addition, we are grateful for the vital role played by President George Bush, by 137 
Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta, and by the National Mediation Board in 138 
assisting Delta and ALPA to reach an agreement. 139 
This is an important bridge we have now crossed. 140 
But unfortunately, though we would very much like return our full attention now to 141 
customer matters, all is not yet quiet on the labor front. 142 
Comair pilots are now in the 32nd day of a strike. 143 
And while meetings resumed yesterday, there appears to be no clear path to a settlement.  144 
Delta fully supports Comair‘s management team in their efforts to reach a resolution that 145 
maintains vital service to our nation‘s small and mid-sized communities while enabling 146 
the continued financial viability of the feeder airline business. 147 
So, having briefly outlined for you the most significant challenges our company has faced 148 
over the last few months, the obvious question is, "Where do we go from here?" 149 
In the near term, we must deal with the economic hand we‘ve been dealt, hoping that the 150 
turnaround will be fast, but fully prepared in the event it is not.  151 
We are pursing aggressive marketing campaigns and pricing strategies to return diverted 152 
passengers to our flights and to develop new business. 153 
On the cost side, Delta as you know already holds an industry advantage in unit costs, 154 
and we also have in place a prioritized set of cost-management initiatives.  155 
This program begins with the cost-savings that are easiest and least painful to implement, 156 
including items such as reallocating capacity and restricting non-essential hiring. 157 
The program can then proceed along a clear, measured path of escalating actions to be 158 
implemented only as-needed. 159 
For the longer term, we will continue to build on our strengths, pursuing the important 160 
initiatives that support our long-term strategy.  161 
Delta will:  162 
Grow in the Southeast, using our strong and successful Atlanta hub as the foundation. 163 
Expand our East Coast presence, including facility improvements at Boston and New 164 
York-JFK that will foster this growth.  165 
Build on our position as No. 1 U.S. carrier across the Atlantic. 166 
Continue to expand in the profitable Latin American markets.  167 
Pursue opportunities for profitable growth in regional jet markets. 168 
And further develop alliances, including SkyTeam, that extend Delta‘s reach. 169 
As I conclude my remarks today on the state of Delta Air Lines and our prospects for 170 
continued long-term success, I am highly optimistic. 171 
The six months since our last meeting have been difficult for our company, but we have 172 
held steady to the course thanks to the dedication, strength and skill of our time-tested 173 
team of Delta people. 174 
If there is one phrase that captures what is best above all about our workforce, it is a core 175 
commitment to teamwork as a basic element of corporate success. 176 
Because the negotiation process has been at times divisive, it is with a sense of relief that 177 
we now begin the important work of coming together again as a single, united team. 178 
The task will be tough – but not nearly as difficult as situations other divided 179 
organizations have faced.  180 
When our nation was beginning its steps toward reunification following the Civil War, 181 
President Abraham Lincoln provided apt leadership.  182 
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In his second inaugural address, he offered these useful words of counsel:  183 
"With malice toward none, with charity for all; with firmness in the right, as God gives us 184 
to see the right, let us…do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace 185 
among ourselves." 186 
Our team can and will return to a single focus on Delta‘s future. 187 
The vision that will unite us is the certainty that everyone‘s best opportunity for personal 188 
and professional success lies in our company‘s continued success and profitability, and 189 
the sharing of the benefits that derive there from.  190 
Thank you. 191 
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The single most obvious subject which must be addressed in any shareowner review of 6 
2001 is, of course, the impact of September 11 and its aftermath. 7 
Virtually every corporation across our nation and around the world felt the reverberations 8 
from this terrible tragedy. 9 
But most were spared the direct impact experienced by U.S. airlines, whose aircraft 10 
became the weapons of war leading to massive death and destruction in this heinous act 11 
of terrorism. 12 
Without question, the nation‘s air travel system was shaken to its very roots. 13 
We all felt disbelief, horror, and concern and compassion for the persons directly affected 14 
on the morning of September 11. 15 
But for those in aviation, our emotions were quickly overtaken by the realization that our 16 
nation‘s air transportation system was under siege, and that we must, for the first time 17 
ever, bring commercial air service to a halt. 18 
Within two hours of the first strike, all Delta domestic flights were safely on the ground. 19 
Within another 45 minutes, so were our international flights. 20 
The screens in Delta‘s Operations Control Center slowly went vacant as the planes 21 
landed. 22 
And soon, we at Delta began to comment on the absence of sound as the roar of the 23 
airport, so much a part of our life that we don‘t even notice it, went eerily silent. 24 
Amazingly -- even though passengers, crew members, and aircraft were scattered at 25 
unplanned destinations -- Delta‘s service levels were back to more than 85% of normal 26 
levels by the fifth day after shutdown. 27 
The operational capabilities of the airline, always great, led to performance at heroic 28 
levels. 29 
And so, let me take a moment in this public forum to express once more my sincere 30 
gratitude for the professionalism and the resounding unity and support which has flowed 31 
from the employees of Delta Air Lines throughout this period. 32 
But even as the operational feats were accomplished, another crisis swiftly asserted itself. 33 
Financial matters, a back burner concern in the first three days, swiftly came to the fore.  34 
Passenger revenue was reduced to zero during the shutdown, and there was immediate 35 
recognition of a prolonged revenue crisis that would emerge; 36 
Large revenue drops historically have occurred following an aviation crisis – and this was 37 
clearly the worst the industry had ever encountered. 38 
In addition, the industry had to re-invent security immediately -- to contribute to the 39 
defeat of terrorism and to restore public confidence that it was safe to fly.  40 
These dual challenges – financial matters and security – led to another remarkable team 41 
effort – this one involving the federal government and the aviation industry. 42 
In one three-day period, an entirely new approach to aviation security – new rules, new 43 
procedures, new personnel, new technologies, and new partnerships involving airlines 44 
and federal intelligence agencies – was added to the security already in place, which had 45 
previously worked quite well. 46 
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And within a week, the federal government had passed the landmark Air Transportation 47 
Safety and System Stabilization Act. 48 
Funding from this legislation enabled aviation to fulfill its public interest obligation to the 49 
American people and helped restore a shaken American economy. 50 
It provided legislative support for the security changes underway, and essential financial 51 
and insurance help for an industry stressed to its monetary limits by the terrorists‘ 52 
decision to use commercial airplanes as weapons. 53 
I do want to pause here and thank again President Bush, Secretary of Transportation 54 
Norman Mineta, and the U.S. Congress for their leadership during a dire period. 55 
In this arena as in many others, they truly stepped up and met their part of the aviation 56 
challenge. 57 
Today, more than seven months later, U.S. airlines have recovered from the initial blows 58 
of this crisis. 59 
Survival of all airlines seems probable. 60 
However, the potential to thrive remains in question. 61 
In the wake of 9/11, the path to ensuring survival was rocky, requiring many difficult 62 
decisions with far-reaching implications for the industry: 63 
Staffing cuts throughout the industry affected more than 95,000 employees. 64 
Capital expenditures, including technology and aircraft, were greatly reduced 65 
And the debt load for virtually all carriers increased enormously. 66 
On the positive side, months of diligent focus on improved aviation security succeeded in 67 
restoring the public‘s confidence in air travel; 68 
And passenger traffic is slowly returning.  69 
Now, while the rebound in traffic is encouraging but, unfortunately, we have to note that 70 
revenue is not keeping pace.  71 
For example, while the number of passengers traveling on Delta in the March 2002 72 
quarter was down 8% compared to the March 2001 quarter, passenger revenue for the 73 
same period was down 20%. 74 
At the same time, industry costs that had not even been a consideration prior to 9/11 75 
skyrocketed as war risk insurance premiums and aviation security expenses escalated 76 
sharply. 77 
The financial strain of lagging revenue and growing costs has been troubling in terms of 78 
short-term industry losses; 79 
Unfortunately, it also bodes poorly for the future financial strength of our nation‘s 80 
airlines. 81 
In remarks I made last month, I characterized the current state of the industry as "living 82 
on the edge." 83 
By that I meant that each airline would generally be able to finance day-to-day operations 84 
but would be unable to invest adequately in tomorrow. 85 
We‘re surviving, but we‘re not positioned to thrive. 86 
What does this mean --- to survive, but not to thrive? 87 
A thriving, growing healthy industry is one that serves its constituencies well, both today 88 
and tomorrow. 89 
For an airline, that means: 90 
Providing customers with high levels of service, including excellent access to the world. 91 
Delta Airlines 2002 
 191 
Providing a return on investment to our investors and shareowners that attracts an 92 
adequate stream of future private sector financing. 93 
And it means attracting, rewarding and retaining a highly qualified and highly motivated 94 
team of employees. 95 
Serving these three constituencies well – our customers, our shareowners, and our 96 
employees – is Delta‘s overarching goal.  97 
Hence, the question before us today is, will we simply survive, or have we laid the right 98 
foundation, taken the right steps, and made the right plans to ensure that Delta will thrive, 99 
and therefore that Delta will meet and exceed our obligations to these constituencies? 100 
The answer to that question, and the theme of my remaining remarks today, is this:  101 
Delta will thrive, emerging from this difficult period not as the same airline it was before 102 
September 11 – but as a better, stronger, more competitive, and more successful company 103 
than ever before. 104 
My confidence derives from two important sources:  105 
1. Prior to 9/11, Delta had developed a strong foundation which served us well in the 106 
aftermath of the crisis and will continue to serve us going forward. 107 
2. Delta has a well-defined strategic direction which builds on our strong foundation and 108 
provides us with more opportunities to succeed than any other airline. 109 
I‘ll begin with the first point, which is the strong foundation Delta had built prior to 9/11. 110 
During the period preceding 9/11, our airline had worked diligently to establish 111 
excellence through consistent focus on six areas crucial to our business success. 112 
These areas include:  113 
Safety and Security; Customer Preference; Employee Satisfaction; Network 114 
Development; Technological Innovation; and Financial Performance 115 
I want to comment briefly on each, for they provide the key evidence as to why Delta will 116 
succeed. 117 
Turning first to safety and security, let me begin with an important point: 118 
While the terrible tragedy and grief of September 11 belonged to us all, Delta was spared 119 
the sharper pain of losing our passengers and crew. 120 
Our heartfelt sympathies go out to those more directly affected – at the World Trade 121 
Center and the Pentagon, and at our compatriot airlines, American and United. 122 
For reasons that may be larger than any of us can know, Delta was spared direct 123 
involvement in the tragedy. 124 
Of course, terrorism of such magnitude was beyond the imagination of all in the aviation 125 
business prior to September 11. 126 
Before that date, and as a foundation for moving forward, Delta has always maintained an 127 
excellent safety and security commitment.  128 
Just since 1996, our airline has safely carried almost 600 million passengers 3.8 billion 129 
miles.  130 
During that period, employee injuries and aircraft damage have also declined steadily. 131 
In 2001, Delta actually exceeded every safety goal we set. 132 
Our achievements confirm Delta‘s safety performance standards as second to none. 133 
In fact, a Federal Aviation Administration industry-review memorandum from earlier this 134 
year, which was largely critical of the industry, made note of Delta‘s "excellent safety 135 
culture" and "strong lines of communication." 136 
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Turning to the area of customer preference, Delta also had made good progress prior to 137 
September 11: 138 
Industry surveys show Delta has moved over the last few years from the bottom tier to 139 
the top tier in customer satisfaction – 140 
As recently as this month, Delta was rated the #1 airline by Consumer Reports magazine. 141 
In the area of employee satisfaction, surveys show that Delta has substantially improved 142 
employee morale. 143 
Positive employee response to the statement "Delta is a great place to work" grew from 144 
54% in 1996 to 75% in the most recent survey. 145 
Relative to employees, it is also important to note both Delta‘s commitment to diversity 146 
and the strong progress being made. 147 
Delta has increased the percentage of women and minorities represented in Delta‘s 148 
management ranks from 25% in 1998 to 30% in 2001. 149 
And at the officer and director level, that percentage has grown even more dramatically, 150 
from 17% in 1998 to 25% in 2001. 151 
In the coming year, we‘ll continue our efforts to further improve these numbers. 152 
In terms of network development, Delta has built on our core strengths and also expanded 153 
into new territories. 154 
For example, in Latin America and the Caribbean, we grew from almost no presence to 155 
our current major commitment of 34 daily flights to 14 countries serving 20 destinations. 156 
We now serve every major business center in South and Central America. 157 
Delta also expanded its role in the regional jet market from our partnership with Comair, 158 
which, in 1997, owned just 54 RJs, to our current ownership of more than 231 RJs, or 159 
more than 30% of the industry‘s total. 160 
Importantly, these RJs support mainline presence and growth by providing approximately 161 
$2 billion annually in passenger feed to our mainline hubs. 162 
By 2001, Delta had also successfully extended its network by moving from a small 163 
international alliance with Swiss Air to founding-member status in SkyTeam. 164 
SkyTeam is now rated #2 in the world -- second only to Star. 165 
SkyTeam last year added Alitalia to its membership, and also gained important anti-trust 166 
immunity for Delta and European SkyTeam members Air France, Alitalia, and CSA 167 
Czech Airlines. 168 
Other key partners include Korean Air in North Asia and Aeromexico in Mexico. 169 
In the area of technology, Delta by 2001 had progressed from a technology laggard to a 170 
technology leader. 171 
As an example, Delta advanced from almost no indirect or Internet product distribution a 172 
few years ago, when we relied just on travel agents and calls to our reservations centers, 173 
to selling more than 20% of all tickets online in 2001. 174 
Delta is widely regarded as an innovator in all matters of electronic commerce. 175 
And in the area of financial performance, Delta had also established a strong, industry-176 
leading position. 177 
In key financial measures for the industry – including operating profit margin, cost per 178 
available seat mile, and return on investment -- Delta exceeded all hub and spoke airlines; 179 
In the entire industry, we were exceeded only by Southwest. 180 
Our company has progressed, too, from previously weak auxiliary income to strong, 181 
especially through our burgeoning partnership with American Express. 182 
Delta Airlines 2002 
 193 
In addition, Delta has gone from no investment gains to huge investment gains, including 183 
almost $1 billion to date as a result of our Priceline.com agreement. 184 
Delta has also developed a highly professional fuel hedging program oriented to 185 
mitigating the risks associated with fuel cost spikes. 186 
Through this program, Delta saved a total of more than $853MM, relative to simply 187 
making purchases on the open market from 2000 through 2001. 188 
In large part because of these financial performance improvements, Delta was, by 189 
September 11, firmly in control of its destiny.  190 
In summary, then our hard won gains over the past few years in the crucial areas of 191 
Safety and Security; Customer Preference; Employee Satisfaction; Network 192 
Development; Technological Innovation; and Financial Performance placed Delta in an 193 
industry-leading position prior to September 11. 194 
So – what, then, has happened to our airline in the intervening seven months? 195 
Importantly, Delta‘s strong base and excellent performance record have served us well in 196 
the difficult aftermath of September 11, and we‘ve continued to make progress on many 197 
fronts.  198 
As mentioned earlier, Delta along with all airlines, confronted an immediate financial 199 
crisis post September 11. 200 
But the strength of our pre-September 11 financial foundation assured from Day 1 that 201 
Delta would make it on its own. 202 
On the afternoon of September 11, we borrowed $450MM in pre-approved funds, 203 
established for such a contingency. 204 
Six days later, on September 17, we succeeded in completing $1.25 billion in secured 205 
debt offering we had already initiated prior to 9/11. 206 
Completion of that transaction represented an enormously gratifying statement of support 207 
for Delta by private financial institutions. 208 
In addition, Delta itself played a leadership role in convincing Congress of the 209 
seriousness of the industry plight and facilitating passage of the airline stabilization act. 210 
Our portion of the $5 billion cash aid from the Stabilization Act totaled $654 million.  211 
As a result of these steps and other efforts, Delta has ended the March 2002 Quarter with 212 
a cash balance of $1.5 BB and additional short-term liquidity of $1.6BB plus $7BB in 213 
unencumbered aircraft that could be used as collateral as need arises. 214 
All these achievements together constitute a strong financial position as we move to the 215 
future. 216 
The second major area of progress following 9/11 was to build on our strong tradition of 217 
safety and security to help revamp aviation security.  218 
Delta has rapidly and thoroughly implemented all enhanced security processes and 219 
procedures.  220 
Thirdly, in the immediate post September 11 period, Delta also increased its already 221 
rigorous attention to cost control, including trimming excess capacity and related staffing.  222 
We swiftly reduced scheduled capacity by approximately 15%.  223 
Importantly, our strong foundation provided flexibility so that as we adjusted the 224 
schedule, we kept our network footprint intact – continuing to provide some service to 225 
every domestic city we served prior to 9/11. 226 
Even as we faced the need to eliminate as many as 13,000 jobs, we worked hard to 227 
preserve the Delta spirit… 228 
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And we did. 229 
Of course, any job reduction effort is difficult – 230 
But one of the proudest moments of the last year occurred when Delta‘s management 231 
team presented to me an innovative collection of voluntary programs designed to address 232 
excess staffing.  233 
These programs -- which included voluntary severance, leaves of absence, and early 234 
retirement – permitted approximately 10,000 Delta employees to depart the company on 235 
their own terms, most with options to return as travel demand rebounds. 236 
While Delta regrets the loss of any employee -- including those who were not eligible for 237 
voluntary programs -- we were greatly heartened that these programs helped so much to 238 
ease the disruption of employees‘ lives. 239 
Finally, at the same time that Delta strictly managed costs, we also have maintained a 240 
strong customer orientation. 241 
Though the aviation industry, as I mentioned earlier, has succeeded in restoring the 242 
public‘s confidence, the so-called hassle-factor associated with air travel has 243 
unquestionably increased significantly.  244 
Right now, that hassle factor may rate as the most significant obstacle to getting the full 245 
complement of passengers back on the planes. 246 
Delta is working closely with governmental agencies such as the Department of 247 
Transportation, the Office of Homeland Security, and the Transportation Security 248 
Administration to improve convenience. 249 
But importantly, Delta itself is finding other ways to speed up the airport experience, 250 
from 300 additional automated check-in kiosks in airport lobbies to faster frequent flyer 251 
lanes at security checkpoints. 252 
In summary, then, Delta‘s progress both before and since September 11 has been good, 253 
and in many cases excellent. 254 
But as George Bernard Shaw once noted, and as we referenced in this year‘s annual 255 
report, "We are made wise not by the recollection of our past, but by the responsibility 256 
for our future." 257 
Here, too, Delta is taking charge. 258 
As I noted earlier this morning, Delta has a well-defined strategic direction which builds 259 
on our strong foundation and provides us more opportunities than any other airline to 260 
succeed in the future. 261 
In the near term, our strategic direction will build on the customer service, financial, 262 
security and capital investment initiatives underway; 263 
These steps will provide the necessary momentum to carry us forward on important 264 
strategic fronts, including: 265 
Strengthening our position in Atlanta and the Southeast 266 
Expanding our presence in the Northeast 267 
Continuing to build on our position as #1 U.S. carrier across the Atlantic, based on 268 
number of nonstop destinations served. 269 
Increasing our reach in Latin America 270 
Maintaining our industry-leading role in RJ markets  271 
And growing the SkyTeam alliance infrastructure 272 
Even as we take these steps, however, we all need to acknowledge that aviation has 273 
fundamentally changed. 274 
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Forces were already in motion for these changes prior to September 11, but these forces 275 
became hugely more powerful in its wake. 276 
The strong position Delta held prior to 9/11, combined with the excellent responses to the 277 
challenges since then, should give all of us confidence that Delta will be an airline that 278 
thrives. 279 
But our ambitions are greater than that. 280 
Colloquially, when asked the simple questions, "What do you want Delta to be?", we 281 
have always answered, "The world‘s greatest airline." 282 
Is this possible?  283 
Clearly, in my view, it is. 284 
But it requires that we now engage in that most difficult of all tasks, and that is to "think." 285 
We must think through the fact that old assumptions no longer prevail, and think through 286 
how to both respond to these changed assumptions and also how to take advantage of 287 
them. 288 
We‘re not waiting for the world to come back to Delta and to fill our flights profitably 289 
once more.  290 
Instead, we‘re thinking through tough issues such as these:  291 
We must restore customers to first place in our concerns, creating an aviation system that 292 
maximizes security AND passenger convenience. 293 
In so doing, we will ensure that Delta is the airline customers prefer over all others. 294 
We must find innovative ways to win the competitive battle on many fronts, including 295 
strategies to meet the growing strength of low cost carriers such as Southwest Airlines, 296 
AirTran, and JetBlue – airlines I‘ve previously noted as our most serious competitors. 297 
We must extend our network further into important international markets, including 298 
especially Asia, where we have no ready answer as of yet. 299 
We must maintain and build the employee compact so that we attract, reward and retain a 300 
highly motivated workforce so engaged in Delta‘s success that they resemble a team of 301 
volunteers. 302 
Yet we must build the employee compact at a time when cost issues are as challenging as 303 
they have ever been. 304 
We must move more money to the bottom line, restoring Delta‘s record of superior 305 
financial returns and creating growth in shareholder value. 306 
And finally, we must work with governments at every level to ensure that, when the 1 307 
billion passengers who are expected in 2013 arrive, we have the air traffic control and 308 
airport infrastructure capacity required to offer them the level of service they deserve.  309 
These are significant and demanding goals, and attainment of each of them is essential. 310 
Still, I remain confident. 311 
Since September 11:  312 
We have proven the strength of the foundation we worked together to build.  313 
We have seen the Delta team unified and in action, successfully overcoming challenges 314 
previously unknown in our industry. 315 
We have shown our ability to keep a steady eye on long-term goals despite short-term 316 
distractions. 317 
And -- finally and most importantly -- in the coming months, we stand ready to prove that 318 
our confidence in this airline and the people who will make it the world‘s greatest airline 319 
is well deserved. 320 
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Thank you.  321 
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DELTA AIR LINES, INC. 1 
2003 ANNUAL SHAREOWNERS‘ MEETING 2 
April 25, 2003 3 
Leo F. Mullin Remarks 4 
****AS PREPARED, NOT NECESSARILY AS DELIVERED******** 5 
I.  At this point in the meeting, I would like to make a few remarks regarding the current 6 
and future direction for Delta, in the context of today‘s airline industry 7 
environment. 8 
 That environment, as is widely known, may well be the most difficult in airline 9 
history.  10 
 As such, it now presents Delta with a task that would have seemed unimaginable 11 
just two years ago, which is to restructure our company, remain solvent, and form 12 
the basis for sustained success in the future. 13 
 And we must accomplish this task in the midst of significant macro-economic and 14 
competitive changes that, given the recent experiences of our competitors, suggest 15 
the odds may be against us.  16 
 Yet I hope to convey to you today my strong belief that, despite the current 17 
difficult circumstances, Delta can emerge from this crisis capable of achieving the 18 
long-term sustainable success which will benefit us all.  19 
II. There is much to cover regarding these subjects 20 
 But before I begin, I want to speak directly to the subject of executive 21 
compensation, and to express my personal regret for what has happened in that 22 
regard. 23 
 The situation, as has been described in the proxy statement, had its origins in the 24 
September 11 crisis. 25 
 In the immediate period that followed, everyone associated with the industry, 26 
including Delta, was affected, including customers, shareowners, governmental 27 
authorities, aviation suppliers, and – most especially -- employees.  28 
 Delta took fast action in the last quarter of 2001 as demand and revenue 29 
plummeted, making significant cuts in capacity – and, unfortunately, the related 30 
reductions in staffing. 31 
 By far, of all that has been required from that initial response to 9/11 and since, the 32 
most difficult action, however necessary, was reducing Delta‘s valued workforce 33 
by approximately 16,000.  34 
 Despite Delta‘s quick response, however, it was obvious by early 2002 that the 35 
airline crisis would not be short lived. 36 
 As the situation unfolded, and as is generally the case in any extended span of 37 
business-related duress, it also became clear that the continuity of Delta‘s 38 
management team was in the company‘s best interest  --  and, hence, needed also 39 
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to become a key priority. 40 
 Responding to that situation, we took the steps outlined in the proxy statement. 41 
o Agreements and programs related to retention were established.  42 
o The incentive compensation program was focused on the goals crucial to 43 
Delta‘s survival, which were to maintain a strong and liquid balance sheet, 44 
and to minimize cash burn -- issues which I will discuss in more detail 45 
later this morning. 46 
o And, by coincidence, because 2002 also marked the expiration of the 47 
initial five-year term of my employment agreement with Delta, that 48 
agreement was renewed in November. 49 
 In short, in the context of the unfolding crises which riddled 2002, each of these 50 
decisions had merit, given progress made against crucial goals as well as the tasks 51 
still ahead. 52 
 Yet, in the current timeframe, with new and different challenges, these actions, 53 
when considered cumulatively, no longer appear appropriate. 54 
 It is part of my job to be sensitive to the implications of all decisions made at Delta 55 
 In this instance, I did not meet that obligation. 56 
Therefore, I would like to offer my sincere apology for this, especially to the employees 57 
of Delta Air Lines. 58 
 As I indicated earlier this month, I have taken corresponding actions which 59 
encompass: 60 
o A 25% reduction in my salary rate 61 
o A commitment to take no incentive compensation in 2003, should such be 62 
earned 63 
o The rescission of my retention agreement 64 
o And also the rescission of equity awards associated with my five-year 65 
contract. 66 
 My purpose in taking these steps was both to recognize and respond concretely to 67 
the issues that had been raised, and also to provide a basis for moving forward and 68 
resuming our focus on the crucial business issues still before us.  69 
 Essential to this effort will be my continuing responsibility to sustain at every level 70 
the strong Delta team required to enable our company‘s recovery --- 71 
 For surely, Delta‘s future success is the outcome that will best ensure improved 72 
opportunities for all constituencies – employees, customers, and shareholders. 73 
 I will close this portion of my remarks by simply stating once more that I consider 74 
my stewardship of this proud company a privilege, and that my most heartfelt 75 
desire --- and that of the entire executive team — is to leave Delta an even better 76 
airline for the generations that follow. 77 
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III. Turning now to a discussion of the business issues we face and how those issues have 78 
developed over the past year, let me use as reference the remarks I made at Delta‘s 79 
previous Annual Meeting for Shareowners, on April 26, 2002,  in Washington, D.C.   80 
 We knew even then that, in the wake of September 11, everything – including 81 
aviation -- had changed. 82 
 However, as I reviewed last year‘s speech, it was clear that none of us at that time 83 
yet knew the degree of profound, fundamental change which still lay ahead. 84 
 For example, I observed in last year‘s speech that, in the seven months that had 85 
passed since 9/11, U.S. airlines had recovered from the initial blows of that event, 86 
making bankruptcy unlikely for any of the carriers. 87 
 I noted, too, that with passenger demand slowly returning, the primary problem for 88 
our industry and the aviation system would be profit levels which were still 89 
insufficient to allow for adequate investment in the future. 90 
 In retrospect, that portrayal, which I thought was quite bleak at the time, now looks 91 
incredibly optimistic, given the reality of the past year. 92 
 Regarding my observation last year that passenger demand and revenue were 93 
slowly returning to normal levels, that trend ended abruptly. 94 
 This was well ahead of the additional fall-off at the end of 2002, when the Middle 95 
East grew increasingly unstable, and certainly long before the oncoming impact of 96 
SARS.  97 
 And as to my point that low profit levels would likely be the industry‘s primary 98 
problem in 2002, that issue has been fully displaced by the urgent issues of day-to-99 
day airline survival and the related concerns of maintaining an effective, efficient 100 
national aviation system. 101 
So, where does Delta stand in relation to this much grimmer picture? 102 
 The essential point I would make in response to this question is that Delta can 103 
survive, and can remain solvent throughout this incredibly challenging period. 104 
 And if we succeed, then Delta will have the best chance of any airline for long-term 105 
success. 106 
 We have been putting the underpinnings for this success in place – but success is 107 
anything but assured. 108 
 Huge challenges must be met if we are to achieve safe passage to, first, sustained 109 
solvency and, then, sustained profitability. 110 
 The underpinnings of successful passage include the following:  111 
 First, an unwavering focus on our fundamental customer service obligation, 112 
which has as its most basic element an absolute commitment to safety. 113 
 Second, a balance sheet with strong enough liquidity to provide the staying 114 
power required to weather a sustained financial crisis. 115 
 Third, the ability to maintain this staying power by minimizing the cash 116 
required for daily operating expenses, otherwise known as cash burn. 117 
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 Fourth, a cost structure that, in the immediate term, enables survival and, in 118 
the period thereafter, would be competitive with all other carriers, and 119 
responsive to the continued growth of low-cost airlines.  120 
 And finally, despite the surrounding crisis, steady movement towards our 121 
longer-term strategic objectives. 122 
 My confidence in Delta‘s ability to meet the challenges ahead is based on our 123 
progress in almost all these areas.  124 
IV.  First, of course, is Delta‘s commitment to customer service – and, as noted, the most 125 
fundamental aspect of that obligation is ensuring the safety of our passengers. 126 
 I would like to pay tribute at this point to the continued dedication to 127 
excellence on the part of employees throughout the organization who have 128 
made Delta‘s safety programs and performance top-of-the-line by any and all 129 
measures.  130 
 In addition to safety, so basic to the equation, excellent customer service 131 
entails performing well all the day-to-day activities that ensure a highly 132 
satisfactory travel experience. 133 
 The upheavals associated especially with employee reductions have obviously 134 
challenged all of us to maintain and exceed the customer service standards for 135 
which Delta has long been known. 136 
 For the most part, we have done well. 137 
 Yet, as change sweeps over us internally, we must focus even more sharply on 138 
the customer – our reason for being. 139 
 To this end, Delta will continue to invest in improving the customer 140 
experience, despite current financial difficulties. 141 
 The planned initiatives cover a wide range of enhancements. 142 
 One example is the planned transformation of 81 of Delta‘s airport lobbies 143 
through the use of technology tools, including 400 additional kiosks. 144 
 The redesigned lobbies and the new, even more customer-focused roles of our 145 
agents are in place at LaGuardia and, as of yesterday, in Cincinnati. 146 
 These transformed lobbies and those at seven more cities slated for completion 147 
next week are part of the effort to create line-free service for Delta‘s 148 
customers.  149 
 Second in the list of underpinnings for success, Delta has established a balance 150 
sheet which, while weak relative to other industries, provides continued staying 151 
power relative to the current crisis. 152 
 As noted in our financial report last week, we ended the quarter with $2.5 153 
billion in cash and short-term liquidity, in addition to  $3.1 billion in 154 
unencumbered aircraft. 155 
 As was also indicated in our report, Delta early this month completed a 156 
series of financial transactions that fortify our ability to meet debt 157 
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obligations through 2003 under all but the most unlikely and unforeseen 158 
circumstances. 159 
 Moreover, Delta expects to receive during the June quarter its estimated 160 
$400 million share of the federal reimbursement for aviation security costs. 161 
 And finally, relative to the pending sale of Worldspan, our cash position 162 
will be further enhanced when that transaction is complete. 163 
 All these together constitute a notable accomplishment in the current 164 
environment. 165 
 Moving to Delta‘s progress on the third point, our airline has minimized cash burn 166 
by reducing costs, with many of those actions involving substantial hardship. 167 
 Due to falling demand, we‘ve cut mainline capacity by 15% since 9/11. 168 
 Sadly, that has resulted in the elimination of the 16,000 jobs referred to 169 
earlier. 170 
 We‘ve also reduced costs by successfully pursuing a long litany of 171 
opportunities, including lowering distribution expenses, optimizing the 172 
network, simplifying the fleet, investing in technology that improves and 173 
streamlines processes, and changing some employee benefit programs. 174 
 Based on these and many other steps, our mainline operating costs at the 175 
end of 2002 were down by approximately $1 billion year-over-year. 176 
 As a result, Delta succeeded in reducing cash burn for 2002 to only $124 177 
million – another excellent accomplishment in a tumultuous year. 178 
 Turning next to the fourth underpinning for Delta‘s success, however -- which is 179 
the establishment of a competitive cost structure – our progress is less complete.  180 
 The revenue picture continues to be bleak.  181 
 Thus, even in light of the significant cost reductions I have already 182 
outlined, the losses continue. 183 
 The unfortunate reality is that we do not yet have an appropriate revenue-184 
to-cost relationship, despite the sacrifice and hard work that have occurred 185 
already.   186 
 Until this situation is remedied, Delta cannot be assured of solvency, 187 
followed by profitability. 188 
IV.  So, what must be done to fix the revenue-cost relationship? 189 
 It should be noted that Delta‘s first target in its cost reduction program has always 190 
been non-employee costs – and these efforts, already underway, will continue. 191 
 But employee costs, which represent the largest portion of any airline‘s cost 192 
structure, must inevitably come into play. 193 
 Obviously, some important savings have already been realized through reductions 194 
in staffing, as well as benefit changes. 195 
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 The ongoing challenge, however, will be to ensure that Delta‘s cost structure 196 
meets the competitive pressures emanating from low-cost carriers, as well as the 197 
hub-and-spoke airlines which are restructuring within or outside of bankruptcy. 198 
 Accomplishing this essential task will require the active involvement of all Delta 199 
employees, with each workgroup fully understanding the cost challenges, and fully 200 
prepared to take the steps necessary to achieve a competitive position.   201 
 Now, it is not our intent today to single out any specific work group for attention 202 
in this regard. 203 
 It is, however, widely acknowledged that the greatest potential for improving 204 
Delta‘s cost structure lies with our pilots. 205 
 Delta‘s pilot unit costs – reflecting the combination of pay rates, benefits and 206 
productivity --- are the highest in the industry. 207 
 This situation is the result of a fully appropriate collective bargaining process 208 
which was completed in June 2001; clearly, there is no blame associated with the 209 
outcome. 210 
 However, as I have described today, the competitive situation has changed so 211 
dramatically since the signing of the agreement that its provisions are not 212 
sustainable in the current environment. 213 
 In line with these concerns, we are pleased that the elected representatives of the 214 
Air Line Pilots Association, which represents Delta pilots, have been open to 215 
meeting with us for discussions about the challenges we face. 216 
 ALPA financial analysts are currently reviewing Delta‘s financial information, 217 
according to ALPA‘s procedures, and will submit their report to the ALPA Master 218 
Executive Council shortly. 219 
 As the process proceeds, I want to acknowledge the support ALPA has already 220 
demonstrated for our recovery efforts, including approval for the 221 
Delta/Northwest/Continental marketing agreement. 222 
 We look forward to continued partnership with our pilots and all Delta employee 223 
groups in ensuring Delta‘s ability to compete effectively. 224 
 At the same time that these and other employee cost issues are being pursued, 225 
Delta will continue forward with a program of profit improvement initiatives 226 
which is intended to provide a cash savings of $1.5 to $2.0 billion by 2005. 227 
V. As I turn now to my fifth and final point regarding Delta‘s underpinnings for success, 228 
which relates to longer-term future initiatives, I‘d like to first set the stage with a brief 229 
look backward. 230 
 In the most difficult year our company has so far encountered, not only did we 231 
survive, we also posted a considerable number of achievements.   232 
 For example, including some of the items I noted earlier: 233 
 Delta‘s reached its liquidity and cash burn targets for 2002, providing the 234 
staying power needed to weather the current crisis.   235 
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 We succeeded in minimizing the number of furloughs through the use of 236 
innovative voluntary programs – an option that was possible in large part 237 
by our relatively strong financial position. 238 
 We gained antitrust immunity with transatlantic and transpacific members 239 
of SkyTeam, the global alliance founded by Delta and Air France only 240 
three years ago, which is now substantially enhancing Delta‘s revenue 241 
base.  242 
 We continued to expand our role as the world leader in the use of regional 243 
jets, which provide $2 billion in revenue each year. 244 
 We continued to strengthen our presence in the Southeast, adding flights at 245 
Deltas‘ s No.1 hub – Hartsfield Atlanta international Airport -- and 246 
ushering through the startup of construction on Atlanta‘s fifth runway, a 247 
project vital to our future growth in the region. 248 
 We also extended our presence in the Northeast, including the beginning of 249 
construction for our new Boston terminal. 250 
 By independent measures, including Wall Street analysts, Delta‘s performance 251 
was consistently noted as the best of the network carriers. 252 
 I would like to express again my appreciation to the entire Delta team for their 253 
willingness to stay the course, overcome countless obstacles, and never, never 254 
give up -- as these results so clearly show. 255 
 Building on this base, let me resume, now, the discussion of that fifth and final 256 
point which underpins Delta‘s potential to succeed, and that is our continued 257 
focus on longer-term strategies. 258 
 Our commitment in this area is evident in the progress which has been made 259 
towards three of these forward-looking initiatives in just the past few weeks. 260 
 First, Delta has addressed the growing competitive threat of low-fare, point-to-261 
point carriers – a concern which I have noted repeatedly to you in previous 262 
annual meeting remarks – with the launch of Song. 263 
o Earlier this month, Song inaugurated service between New York-JFK 264 
and West Palm Beach. 265 
o By this fall, Song plans to have introduced an additional 144 daily 266 
flights serving Atlanta, Boston, Dulles, Ft. Myers, Hartford, LaGuardia, 267 
Las Vegas, Newark, Orlando, Tampa, and -- as we announced just 268 
yesterday – San Juan.  269 
o With the launch of Song, this important initiative is well on its way to 270 
full implementation. 271 
 Secondly, as I noted earlier, Delta‘s nearly year-long effort to obtain 272 
reimbursement for post-9/11 aviation security costs has finally come to fruition. 273 
o You may recall that in May 2002, Delta began pushing an industry 274 
effort to convince the government of its responsibility for those 275 
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aviation security costs which are, in fact, part of the national security 276 
responsibility. 277 
o Through frequent trips to Washington D.C., testimony before Congress 278 
on behalf of the industry, and the grass roots efforts of many Delta 279 
employees, our airline played a pivotal role in the development and 280 
passage of the airline components of the  Emergency Wartime 281 
Supplemental Appropriations Act. 282 
o Delta‘s portion of the $2.9 billion allotted to airlines as part of this act, 283 
which was signed on April 16, will total about $400 million. 284 
 And in a third area of positive development, the Department of Transportation 285 
gave final approval at the end of March to the Delta-Northwest-Continental 286 
alliance. 287 
o Delta is immensely pleased that the final DOT guidelines will allow us 288 
to provide customers with access to the full range of benefits that 289 
alliances can offer to consumers. 290 
o We expect the alliance, when fully mature, to generate passenger 291 
revenue gains of $150 million to $200 million per year.  292 
VI.  As I near the end of my remarks today, let me state once more my strong belief that 293 
Delta can succeed in meeting the challenges ahead.  294 
 Clearly, the tasks still before us are enormous – and success is far from 295 
certain. 296 
 But Delta enters the fray armed with many significant advantages. 297 
 Our commitment to customer service remains strong, and is being 298 
further revitalized. 299 
 Our liquidity is adequate to the near term need. 300 
 Our cost reduction efforts are well underway  301 
 We continue to make progress on important strategic fronts 302 
 And the Delta team is, at every level, experienced, committed, and 303 
focused. 304 
 At this point, the battle is ours to lose – or to win. 305 
 Based on the foundation we have built and – most importantly -- the capabilities 306 
and the fierce spirit of Delta people, which I have come to know and cherish 307 
during the past five and a half years, I am confident that the outcome can and will 308 
be not a battle lost, but a battle won.       309 
 Thank you.  310 
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Frontier Airlines
Frontier Airlines’ 2001 Annual Meeting
Statements contained in this presentation, which are not historical facts, are 
forward-looking statements as that item is defined in the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995.  This presentation contains forward-looking 
statements and certain information contained in this presentation involves 
risks and uncertainties that could result in actual results differing materially 
from expected results. Forward-looking statements represent the Company’s 
expectations and beliefs concerning future events, based on information 
available to the Company as of the date of this presentation. The Company 
undertakes no obligation to publicly update or revise any forward-looking 
statements to reflect events or circumstances that may arise after the date of 
this presentation. Additional information regarding these and other factors may 
be contained in the Company’s SEC filings, including without limitation, the 
Company’s Form 10-K for its fiscal year ended March 31, 2001; the Company’s 
Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2001; the Company’s Form 8-K filed 
May 7, 2001 and the Company’s Form 8-K filed January 22, 2001, as amended 
by the Company’s Form 8-K/A filed July 11, 2001. 
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Frontier Route Map and Snapshot
Fiscal Year 2001 Operating Highlights
FY 2001 Variance
Enplanements 3,017,418    32.1%
ASMs (000) 4,260,461    19.7%
RPMs (000) 2,773,833    31.8%
Load Factor 65.1% 6.0 pts.
Yield 17.05           8.8%
Unit Revenue (RASM) 11.10           19.7%
Unit Cost (CASM) 9.20             12.7%
GAP 1.90             0.79         
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Fiscal Year 2001 Financial Highlights
FY 2001 Variance
Total Revenues 472,876,427$  43.4%
Total Operating Expenses 392,155,107$  35.0%
Operating Income 80,721,320$    105.3%
Net Income before Taxes 88,332,438$    103.5%
Net Income 54,867,773$    103.1%
Diluted EPS 1.90$               100.0%
Operating Margin 17.1% 5.2 pts.
Pre-Tax Margin 18.7% 5.5 pts.
Net Margin 11.6% 3.4 pts.
FY 2001 Accomplishments
Shared Results
– Completed a stock dividend of one common share for each two shares outstanding
– Distributed profit sharing checks for the third consecutive year
New Initiatives
– Introduced a frequent flyer program, EarlyReturns
– Opened a new reservations call center in Las Cruces, NM. 
– Increased corporate accounts to over 6,000 
Streamlined Distribution
– Positioned our lowest available fares our Web site
– Increased the percentage of Internet-related booked and flown revenue to 30.9 percent of 
total revenue
– Increased the amount of e-tickets as a percentage of total revenue to 74.0 percent
Growth
– Added service to Kansas City International Airport and Ronald Reagan Washington National 
Airport
– Increased passenger connection opportunities to 7.5
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Recent Company Developments
• Airbus
• Service to Houston, Reno & Austin
• Great Lakes Codeshare
• Mesa Codeshare
Industry Overview
Softening Economy
• June quarter was only the third time in 30 years that 
the industry has posted an operating loss.
• Industry is expected to lose $2.0 billion during 
calendar 2001.
• July industry unit revenue down 12.3%.
• Year over year fuel prices down but trending up.
• Aggressive industry fare sales implemented.
• “None of us has ever seen this kind of collapse in 
business travel” 
CFO for a major airline, WSJ, 8/28/01
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Impact of Economic Downturn on 
Frontier
Annual impact if we experience a…
… 1 percent variance in yield = $4.7 million
… 1 point variance in load factor = $7.3 million
… 1 percent variance in unit cost = $3.9 million
… 1 cent variance in fuel price = $667,000
FY 2002 First Quarter Operating 
Highlights
Q1 FY02 Variance
Enplanements 846,115          18.8%
ASMs (000) 1,148,546       12.9%
RPMs (000) 776,764          16.5%
Load Factor 67.6% 2.1 pts.
Yield 15.88              (6.2%)
Unit Revenue (RASM) 10.74              (3.2%)
Unit Cost (CASM) 9.75                13.5%
GAP 0.99                (1.51)
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Fiscal Year 2002 First Quarter 
Financial Highlights
Q1 FY02 Variance
Total Revenues 123,316,357$  9.3%
Total Operating Expenses 112,010,797$  28.1%
Operating Income 11,305,560$    (55.4%)
Net Income before Taxes 12,533,761$    (53.5%)
Net Income 7,739,597$      (53.0%)
Diluted EPS 0.26$               (54.4%)
Operating Margin 9.2% (13.3 pts.)
Pre-Tax Margin 10.2% (13.7 pts.)
Net Margin 6.3% (8.3 pts.)
Industry June Quarter Results
Operating Margin Pre Tax Net Margin
AirTran 19.7% 16.0%
Southwest 18.7% 18.5%
Frontier 9.2% 10.2%
Continental 5.4% 3.1%
Alaska 2.0% 1.4%
USAir 0.8% -1.2%
Northwest -1.3% -3.4%
Delta -3.0% -4.2%
United -7.6% -9.6%
America West -9.3% -9.4%
American -13.6% -14.2%
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Airbus Integration
Revenue Enhancements
– Manage inventory through economic downturn
– Codeshare agreements
– EarlyReturns
Cost Control
– Fuel conservation program
– Internal focus on low cost culture 
– Push Internet distribution channels 
Manage Through Slowing Economy
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Strategic Plan
• 15% annual capacity growth
• Expand Denver hub
• Serve major metropolitan markets 
• Maintain low cost structure
• Ride out the current economic environment
• Provide value to our employees, customers 
and shareholders
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Slide Notes 2001 
 
Slide 3    
27 aircraft (24 Boeing jets after the early return of a Boeing 737-300 in Sept. 01 and 
3 Airbus aircraft).  
-          Soon to be 29 aircraft due to the addition of two more Airbus aircraft during Sept. 
-          Current route map serving 22 cities out of Denver, adding Reno/Tahoe NV and  
 Austin TX on October 1. (24 counting Reno and Austin) 
 
Slide 4 
  Next two slides show Frontier‘s fiscal year ended March 31, 2001.  
-          Not much to say except what a year it was. 
-          In addition to a thriving economy, Frontier experienced some positive traffic and  
 revenue gains from United‘s operational difficulties experienced during the  
 summer of 2000. 
-          As you see on Slide 6, operating income, net income before taxes and net income  
 all more than doubled over the prior year. 
 
Slide 6 
-          In addition to posting outstanding performance numbers, we accomplished a great  
 deal during the year.  
-          In March, we completed a 3-for-2 stock split which was distributed in the form of  
 a stock dividend. 
-          In June, we distributed profit sharing check to employees for the third year in a  
 row (totally 6% of the company‘s pre-tax net profit or $7.0 million) 
-          In January, we introduced EarlyReturns, which today has over 150,000 members. 
-          In August, we opened a new call center in Las Cruces, New Mexico, which  
 allowed us to discontinue outsourcing from a secondary call overflow center. 
-          Currently have over 6,000 corporate accounts, with more corporations opening  
 their doors to us in light of their desire to reduce travel expeditures. 
-          In January, we began offering our lowest fares, previously available only through  
 consolidators, over our internet site.  
-          This action, along with other marketing of the site, increased the percentage of  
 flown revenue generated by both our site and other internet travel sites to over  
 30% at the end of March 2001. 
-          E-tickets are now 74 percent of total revenue. 
-          New service initiated during 2001 included Kansas City and Washington National;  
 additionally, in May 2002, we inaugurated service to Houston, and we look  
 forward to opening Austin and Reno in October. 
-          The new markets and additional frequencies that we implemented during the year  
 meant that at the end of the year, passengers had an average of 7.5 connection  
 choices on Frontier when flying through our Denver hub. 
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Slide 7 
-           Houston started in May with 3 daily flights 
-          Reno and Austin begin October 1 with 2 flights 
-          Great Lakes codeshare began in July and includes 7 markets. 
-          Mesa codeshare, announced Wednesday, calls for 5 CRJs to operate as Frontier  
 JetExpress sometime in the early part of calendar 2002.  
-          We are pleased because the agreement will allow us to supplement existing cities  
 as well as reach new markets that likely wouldn‘t support our larger jet operation. 
 
Slide 8 
          Sept quarter estimate EPS range of $0.18 - $0.28 versus consensus of $0.37 
 
Slide 13 
The Airbus integration remains our highest priority and we plan to have 29 
aircraft by Fiscal Year End 2002 (23 Boeing 737s; 6 Airbus A319s) (this includes 
270 which we‘re hoping to return early in December but that we have not 
announced as well as the sixth Airbus we‘ll take delivery of in Feb.02).  
-          Purchase/Lease order for up to 45 aircraft by March 2005 
-          During the transition, we‘ll operate Boeing and Airbus but upon conclusion of the  
 transition, Frontier‘s all Airbus fleet will be more fuel efficient, operate with  
 lower maintenance costs than our current older, leased Boeing fleet and we‘ll  
 realize the benefits of accelerated depreciation for tax purposes vs. life of the  
 asset. 
-          Financed the first three aircraft at approximately 6.54% 
 
Slide 14 
-          Market Cap: $354 million (9/4/01) 
-          Cash, cash equivalents & short-term investments (6/30/01) $102.1 million 
-          Strong balance sheet 
-          32.5 percent revenue growth over the last 12 months (6/30/01) 
 
 
 
 
1Fiscal Year 2002 Annual Shareholders Meeting
Fiscal Year 2002 Annual Shareholders Meeting
Notice on Forward Looking Statements
Statements contained in this presentation, which are not historical facts, are forward-
looking statements as that item is defined in the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act of 1995.  This presentation contains forward-looking statements and certain 
information contained in this presentation involves risks and uncertainties that could 
result in actual results differing materially from expected results. These forward-
looking statements reflect management‟s expectations and beliefs based on 
information available to us as of today, September 5, 2002, and the Company 
undertakes no obligation to publicly update or revise this presentation or any forward-
looking statements to reflect the events or circumstances that may arise after the date 
of this presentation. The Company cautions users of this presentation not to place 
undue reliance on forward looking statements, which may be based on assumptions 
and anticipated events that do not materialize. Additional information regarding these 
and other factors may be contained in the Company's SEC filings, including without 
limitation, the Company‟s Form 10-Q for its fiscal quarter ended June 30, 2002 and 
the Company‟s Form 10-K for its fiscal year ended March 31, 2002.
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2As of Sept. 2002
• 34 Cities Served
• 170 Daily Departures
• 7 Boeing 737-200
• 17 Boeing 737-300
• 10 Airbus A319
Current Route Map and Snapshot
FY 2002 Accomplishments
 4th Year of Profitability
 Net income of $12.7 million, or $0.43 per diluted common share, excluding unusual 
items and the $7.7 million (net of tax) government grant monies
 Fleet Enhancements
 Added six new Airbus A319
 Scope of Service Expansion
 Introduced F9 service to six new cities
 Increased capacity 7.8%, on a year-over-year basis, including 9/11 reductions
 Entered into a code share agreement with Mesa Airlines
 Expanded code share agreement with Great Lakes Aviation
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3Post September 11 Environment 
 Scaled Back…
 Reduced capacity by 20%
 Reduced all capital and other non-essential spending
 Implemented pay reductions ranging from 3% to 40%
 Furloughed approximately 400 Frontier employees
 …But Maintained Our Ability to Plan for the Future
 Increased productivity
 Retained Airbus delivery schedule
 Implemented “Seats for Sharing”
 Encouraged “Friends and Family Flying” through an employee 
grassroots program
Recent Company Developments 
 LiveTV
 Corporate Branding
 Build loyalty through EarlyReturns; membership at the end of June 2002 over 
300,000
 Improve consistency of product
 Continued Focus on Distribution Improvements
 Over 26% of flown revenue generated via www.frontierairlines.com during 
the June 2002 quarter
 Reduce Unit Costs
 Controlled indirect cost growth
 Brought revenue accounting function in-house
 Cultivate Frontier‟s Culture
 Unique employee benefits remain intact, including 401(k) match, ESOP, 
tuition reimbursement
 Recent maintenance contract negotiated and ratified in under one year
 Most employee groups remain non-unionized
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4Business Strategy – Steady Conservative Growth
 A fleet replacement program initiated in June 2001.
 Frontier expects to have a single fleet type of 45-50 Airbus A318/A319 by May 
2006, assuming conversion of 18 option aircraft to firm deliveries.  
Fleet Projection *
Fiscal Year End Fleet
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*   Frontier expects to retire its last Boeing 737-300 in May 2006 (at which time Frontier will be in fiscal 2007).
** Frontier has only firm-ordered 32 Airbus aircraft as of August 2002.
Frontier fiscal year ends March 31
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Boeing 737-200
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Airbus A319/A318
Current Industry Environment 
 Business Travelers Have Not Returned to the Skies
 July 2002 industry unit revenue declined 6.9%
 June 2002 industry unit revenue declined 7.1% 
 Industry Has Not Weathered the Storm Sufficiently
 US Airways Chapter 11
 United Airlines in 30-Day countdown to Chapter 11
 American “restructuring” its hub system
 Industry consolidation posed as solution via code share relationships
 Economy Has Not Rebounded
 August 2002 manufacturing activity unchanged from July 2002 
 Waning consumer confidence
 July 2002 unemployment levels flat for the third consecutive month 
 August 2002 crude oil prices up 7.3% above July-end levels
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5Softening Economy
• June quarter was only the third time in 30 years that the industry has 
posted an operating loss
• Industry is expected to lose $2.0 billion during calendar 2001
• July industry unit revenue down 12.3%
• Year over year fuel prices down but trending up
• Aggressive industry fare sales implemented
• “None of us has ever seen this kind of collapse in business travel”
CFO for a major airline, WSJ, 8/28/01
Flashback: Summer 2001 Industry Overview
Net Income (Loss) and Operating Margin by Quarter
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Net Income
Operating Margin
December 01 includes a $12.7 million grant from the federal government.
Events of 9-11 Affected Four Consecutive Years 
of Net Income
 Frontier recorded its first quarterly loss in four years in June 2002.
September 11
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61Q FY03 Operating Statistics
3 Mos Ended
6/30/02
Yr over Yr 
Change
Enplanements 928,000 9.7%
ASMs (000) 1,369,000 19.2%
RPMs (000) 860,000 10.7%
Load Factor 62.8% (4.8 Points)
Yield 12.71 -18.2%
Unit Revenue (RASM) 7.98 -24.1%
Unit Cost (CASM) 8.44 -13.4%
Operating Cost per ASM of Selected Airlines
(Three months ending June 30, 2002)
7.48
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9.12
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11.32
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West
Frontier AirTran Continental Alaska Delta American United
Source: Company Press Releases
Low Operating Costs
 Frontier‟s lower cost per ASM allows it to provide passengers a 
low fare alternative to United out of Denver. 
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7Low Operating Costs
 Frontier has reduced its costs more than its peers over the last year.
Year-Over-Year CASM Excluding Fuel
(Quarter Ended June 30, 2002)
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Breakeven Load Factor Results Quarter Ended June „02
Source: Company Press Releases
* Breakeven load factor derived from reported data.
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June 2002
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8Balance Sheet Highlights
June 30, 2002 March 31, 2002
Assets
Cash, Cash Equivalents & 
         Short-Term Investments 79,050$                    89,555$                       
Other Current Assets 104,221                    102,493                       
Total Current Assets 183,271                    192,048                       
Property and Equipment, net 204,069                    142,862                       
Other Assets 79,462                      78,775                         
Total Assets 466,802$                  413,685$                     
Liabilities and Stockholders' Equity
Current Liabilities
Accounts Payable 13,978$                    20,153$                       
Air Traffic Liability 69,011                      64,123                         
Other Current Liabilities 71,941                      67,788                         
Total Current Liabilities 154,930                    152,064                       
Long Term Debt 112,854                    66,832                         
Deferred Tax Liabilites 9,546                        6,717                           
Other Long Term Liabilities 21,596                      18,939                         
Total Liabilities 298,926                    244,552                       
Stockholders' Equity 167,876                    169,133                       
Total Liabilities & Stockholders' Equity 466,802$                  413,685$                     
Impact of Economic Downturn on Frontier
 Annual impact, based on year-end March 31, 2002 
results, if Frontier experiences a…
…1% variance in yield = $4.4 million
…1 point variance in load factor = $6.8 million
…1% variance in unit cost = $4.1 million 
…1 cent variance in fuel price = $.71 million
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9Industry Reaction 
 Capacity Reductions October/November 2002
 United
 American
 US Airways 
 Continental
 Labor Issues at Major Competitor(s) Remain Largely Unresolved
 Service Levels Decreasing
 Larger carriers imposing more stringent restrictions on non-refundable tickets, 
change fees
 Larger carriers considering a system where air travelers purchase amenities in an 
ala carte fashion (for example, extra fees attached to assigned seats) 
 Consolidation Proposals
 United Airlines and US Airways code share
 Delta, Northwest and Continental code share
Frontier‟s Focus
 Revenue
 Reallocation of capacity  
October 2002 Schedule Change
Mexico Service
 Corporate branding initiative 
 LiveTV
 Costs
 Expect further CASM reductions from June 2002 level
 B737-200’s retirement by Q403 should result in an estimated .25 cent 
reduction in CASM
 Airbus transition will contribute to lower CASM
 Increased fleet utilization
Lower operating/ownership costs
More fuel efficient
Lower maintenance expense
224
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Frontier‟s Focus (cont.)
 Airline Transportation Stabilization Board (ATSB)
 Frontier is applying for a government loan guarantee to support a
revolving credit facility in order to strengthen its liquidity position in
a difficult competitive environment
 Seeking a $70 million line of credit, of which 85% would be backed 
by the Federal government’s loan program 
 Frontier would pledge certain collateral to the Lender and Guarantor 
to secure the repayment of the facility
 Corporate Governance
 Financial Certification 
 Disclosure/Transparency
Awards and Recognitions
 In August 2002, Frontier Chairman Sam Addoms was awarded the 11th annual
Daniel L. Ritchie Award by The Colorado Ethics in Business Awards Selection
Committee. The award is given to an individual, or individuals, who exemplify
and promote ethical conduct in their business and professional careers. Addoms
received the award for his leadership and dedication at Frontier Airlines.
 For the third consecutive year, Frontier‟s maintenance department received the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Diamond Award (Oct. 1999, Feb. 2001
and Feb. 2002). The award is the highest given by the FAA and recognizes
advanced training for aircraft maintenance professionals throughout the
industry. To receive the award, 25% of a company‟s aircraft maintenance
technicians must complete certified training requirements beyond the
technician‟s initial licensing. Frontier is the first airline to have 100% of eligible
employees complete the aviation maintenance training program, as it has for the
past three years.
 Entrepreneur Magazine named Frontier to its “2002 Best Low-Fare Airlines” list
in the publications ninth annual Business Travel Awards. (April 2002)
225
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Strategic Plan
 Expand Denver hub
 Frontier has increased connection opportunities through its Denver hub 
from 4.7 per arrival in March 1999, to 9.4 per arrival in June 2002
 Frontier and Frontier JetExpress combined marketshare (based on pax 
enplanements) at DIA during July 2002 was over 11%
 Serve major metropolitan markets
 Frontier serves 34 cities and 309 city pairs (June 2002)
 Serves 19 of the top 25 cities in the United States
 Frontier has a 20% or greater market share in its top 10 markets, excluding 
DIA 
 Maintain and improve low cost structure
 Frontier offers affordable day-to-day fares to passengers, and provides fare 
competition to larger airlines
 Provide value to our employees, customers and shareholders
Questions
Questions
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Fiscal year 2003 marked another turbulent year in the airline industry. Continued threats 5 
of terrorism, the war with Iraq, and several significant Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings 6 
were just some of the many obstacles Frontier faced in fiscal year 2003. Despite these 7 
obstacles and a very challenging economy, Frontier‘s 3,200 aviation professionals 8 
worked harder than ever to achieve significant improvements in our overall cost 9 
structure. While I am disappointed that our employees‘ efforts did not return Frontier to 10 
profitability in fiscal year 2003, I believe those efforts resulted in Frontier reporting 11 
significantly lower losses than those suffered by the majority of airlines over the last 12 
year. I am proud of the fact that in spite of the external challenges, we continued our 13 
transition to an all Airbus fleet and brought Frontier‘s affordable fares and outstanding 14 
service to nearly four million passengers. 15 
 16 
During fiscal year 2003, Frontier achieved a number of milestones: 17 
 18 
1. We continued our transition to an all Airbus fleet by adding 11 new Airbus A319 19 
aircraft and retiring five Boeing 737 aircraft. Our fleet at the end of fiscal year 2003 20 
consisted of 17 Airbus A319 aircraft and 19 Boeing 737 aircraft. 21 
 22 
2. Compared to fiscal year 2002, we reduced our unit costs for fiscal year 2003 by nearly 23 
11 percent, and on a fuel exclusive basis, by nearly 14 percent. 24 
 25 
3. Our liquidity improved by closing a $70 million commercial loan facility guaranteed 26 
by the Air Transportation Stabilization Board that netted $68.2 million, and by 27 
completing two sale lease-back transactions that netted $12.3 million. 28 
 29 
4. The Company implemented its first fuel hedging program that reduced fuel expenses in 30 
fiscal year 2003 by over $725,000, on a pre-tax basis. 31 
 32 
5. Frontier introduced service to 11 new markets and entered our first international 33 
markets with flights to two Mexico destinations. 34 
 35 
6. We completed the installation of DIRECTV service on all of the Company.s Airbus 36 
aircraft. 37 
 38 
7. We unveiled our simplified domestic pricing structure that reduced business and 39 
leisure fares and capped unrestricted fares at $499 one-way. 40 
 41 
8. Our maintenance and engineering team received the Federal Aviation Administration‘s 42 
Diamond Award for the fourth consecutive year, recognizing their continued, advanced 43 
maintenance education and training efforts. We have always managed our airline by 44 
focusing on factors we can control, as opposed to engaging in excessive hand-wringing 45 
over those that we cannot, and looking for opportunities in the challenges that face us. 46 
Frontier Airlines 2003 
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For example, when our principal competitor in Denver, United Airlines, declared 47 
bankruptcy in December 2002, we were initially presented with an increasingly 48 
competitive pricing environment as United struggled to maintain market share. By 49 
simplifying our domestic pricing structure, as mentioned above, we were able to compete 50 
in this environment and continue to build loyalty among our customers. In spite of the 51 
many challenges we faced in fiscal year 2003, we focused on programs that reduced 52 
overall costs, improved our liquidity, and advanced our revenue opportunities to position 53 
Frontier for the future and allowed us to end our fiscal year with $104.9 million in cash, 54 
cash equivalents and short-term investments. 55 
 56 
At press time, the positive results of our continued focus to return Frontier to profitability 57 
were seen in our June 2003 traffic numbers, including a load factor of 75.6 percent, the 58 
highest Frontier has ever achieved in one month since its inception in 1994. With traffic 59 
increasing 30.9 percent during our fiscal first quarter 2004, and outpacing our capacity 60 
growth of 22.3 percent for the same period, we anticipate reporting a small profit for our 61 
fiscal first quarter 2004. If successful, this will mark our first profitable quarter since the 62 
quarter ended March 31, 2002. 63 
 64 
Although our summer traffic appears positive, we realize the airline industry is facing 65 
unprecedented challenges unlike any the industry has ever faced before. National 66 
unemployment, including long-term unemployment, is at its highest level since Frontier‘s 67 
inception in 1994, business travel expenditures have not returned to pre-9/11 levels and 68 
we are not certain it will ever return to those levels, and security threats against our 69 
nation and our industry continue to deter people from traveling. These realities make it 70 
more important than ever to remain focused on our core mission, which includes 71 
conservative growth achieved by avoiding complexity, improving productivity, and 72 
approaching business challenges in unique ways. 73 
 74 
This past spring, that message was delivered when we unveiled our ―Whole Different 75 
Animal‖ branding campaign. Through this innovative positioning, we stand firmly on 76 
four cornerstones: affordability, flexibility, accommodating, and comfort. By focusing on 77 
the little things that make a difference to travelers, we believe Frontier will continue to be 78 
different from other airlines. In fact, our ―whole different animal‖ message is delivered 79 
by the very creatures that distinguish the appearance of Frontier‘s aircraft: the wildlife 80 
animals that grace our planes tails. By bringing these characters to life, we successfully 81 
created a communication platform that achieves two goals: First, capture the consumer‘s 82 
attention, and secondly, deliver a key message about our service, including destinations 83 
served, DIRECTV, and our brand-new Airbus fleet. When asked if our commercials have 84 
achieved what we had hoped they would, I simply tell people that the proof is all around 85 
us, especially when employees are stopped in grocery check-out lines by patrons who feel 86 
compelled to break into Larry the Lynx‘s voice, repeating our commercials line for line 87 
Keeping our business model simple, our operation safe and our employees and customers 88 
secure provides a firm foundation as we enter fiscal year 2004. We will continue our fleet 89 
transition during fiscal year 2004 and are proud to be the launch customer for the new 90 
Airbus A318 aircraft, which we will bring into our fleet in July 2003. During fiscal year 91 
2004, we plan to bring in 10 additional Airbus aircraft and retire eight Boeing aircraft, 92 
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resulting in two net additional aircraft to our fleet by end of fiscal year 2004.  93 
 94 
At the end of fiscal year 2004, we plan to operate a fleet of 38 aircraft (14 owned and 24 95 
leased), including 27 Airbus aircraft and 11 Boeing 737-300 aircraft. During fiscal year 96 
2004, Frontier will expand its service to more Mexico destinations, and inaugurate 97 
service to several new cities, including John Wayne Airport in Orange County, 98 
California, and Milwaukee, Wisconsin. We believe we are on track to weather the current 99 
storm and position Frontier for a bright future. As a valued shareholder, you contribute to 100 
that future and we appreciate that support immensely. As always, we thank you for flying 101 
Frontier whenever possible and look forward to serving you soon on a Frontier flight102 
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